Clientelism and Social Trust in Comparative Perspective: Particularism versus Universalism

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Abstract

The study of clientelism is a complex endeavour calling for attentive analyses of the social processes implied and defined by the practices involved. I believe that an anthropological comparative approach can help to overcome some of the shortcomings of mainstream political theory, especially as far as the integration of a top-down perspective with a ground-level approach is concerned. The aim of this paper is to shed some lights into the problem whether clientelism can be tackled as a universal phenomenon, even though there is abundant anthropological evidence of its different socio-cultural connotations. I will make use of empirical data which I collected through fieldwork research in three different regional contexts: Central Eastern Europe, Southern Italy and Japan.

Introduction

In my past and current research I have been dealing with the study of socio-political phenomena which are included in the general denomination of clientelism in different regional contexts. The aim of this paper is to shed some lights into the problem whether clientelism can be tackled as a universal phenomenon, even though there is abundant anthropological evidence of its different socio-cultural connotations. I argue that mainstream theoretical positions in the social sciences about clientelism and patronage find weak empirical applicability to the treatment of particularistic social ties. One of the main reasons is the strong emphasis on the judgments about morality and impartiality which have long influenced the debate over these practices’ social functions. The emphasis on the search for a moral order (ethos) in patron-client relations has tended to obfuscate both their real socio-political nature and their perceived utility, without providing illuminating insights into the universalistic feature of this notion. In my research, I make use of an anthropological approach to relate ideas, ideologies and practices of clientelism in different socio-cultural contexts, using reference to the idea of social trust. On the one hand, I argue that clientelistic practices are grounded on face-to-face trust relationships that make this practice strongly appealing in particular socio-cultural contexts. On the other hand, excessive weight on interpersonal trust may undermine the proper functioning of formal institutions by replacing formal tasks within these institutions with dyadic structures of power relations.

In the first section of this paper I aim to summarize the theoretical framework for the anthropological analysis of clientelistic practices. In the second part I make use of empirical data which I collected through fieldwork research in three different regional contexts (Central Eastern Europe, Southern Italy and Japan) to propose a comparative perspective of clientelism and trust. In the third section I compare the collected data in order to propose suggestions on the particularistic or universalistic nature of the phenomenon. The aim is to map some of the most relevant tendencies, features, and deviations in the relationship between trust and clientelism in these regions. The comparative perspective offers a crucial analytical instrument to map similarities and dissimilarities, and more generally to test the present significance of these practices in conditions of economic instability and social transformation.

1 I have been conducting fieldwork research in Central Eastern Europe (Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary) from 1999, the year of my enrolment as a PhD student at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale up to present. My fieldwork research in Southern Italy has taken place in the period March 2004-June 2006. I have conducted research in Japan in 1994-1998 and in 2008-2009.
**Theoretical Approaches to Clientelism**

Clientelism is a theme of strong appeal in the social sciences. What makes this an extraordinarily timely topic is its universality, framed beyond time and space. Historical accounts of clientelistic practices have indicated their presence in cultural contexts as different and distant as ancient Rome, Meso-American empires, China and Japan. Although it might be argued that clientelism, as the practice of resorting to personal, particularistic ties to obtain preferential access to goods and services, is innate in human nature, an opposite perspective sees these practices as strongly rooted in culture. Gellner argues that what makes patronage a universal feature is that it is a form of power, although power is not always a form of patronage (Gellner 1977: 1-2). The universality of patronage can be searched for in the several levels at which this is constructed and acquires significance in society. Before introducing reference to some of these levels, I would like to follow one of the most basic definitions of clientelism, as formulated in the political science of Lemarchand. He defines political clientelism as “a more personalized, affective and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships” (1972, 51-2). From this definition several points emerge which delimit the analytical and methodological spheres.

First, clientelism is a personal (and personalistic) relation which replaces or complements formal and abstract societal ties with ties based on acquaintance, friendship and shared emotional affinity. The preference to resort to this type of interpersonal relation has been explained in several ways by anthropologists. Some individuate in clientelism the dominance of cultural practices which attribute more importance to friendship and face-to-face relationships, others look at the tension between mutual trust and solidarity and unequal relations of power, a different approach considers personalized interaction as instrumental to the achievement of collective goal and identity (Silverman 1965; Scott 1977; Waterbury 1977). All these positions, however, seem to share the analytical dichotomy between a personalized human solidarity and a Weberian abstract rationality founded in institutional trust (Weingrod 1977).

The second field of analysis concerns reciprocity. Reciprocity comes to play a major role in patron-clients relations, again as a universal feature of these practices. Scott identifies the interplay of different levels of reciprocity according to the perceived benefits of the clientelistic practice (Scott 1977). The problem is that, what the patron bestows (protection, access to benefits and goods) is not easily measured on the same scale of that which the client gives in exchange (support, prestations, money and alliance). More significantly, the range of exchanged goods in a clientelistic relationship is very broad and culturally specific, hence it renders the reciprocity framework weak and fuzzy. To this one adds that balanced reciprocity tends to be influenced by the degree and kind of favors received by the clients. Eisenstadt and Roniger warn about the difficulty to apply fruitfully the reciprocity paradigm to clientelism, underlining the immanent tension, present in these practices, between inequality in the patron-client relation and the ideological drive towards equality-building in the “affective” tie (1984). In another context, Roniger and Ayata (1999) refer to redistributive systems of power, which is inherent in these types of social relationships. Redistribution, as Sahlin postulated (1972) is a different form of reciprocity where unequal power positions dictate the rules of the exchange, which first moves from below to the centre (where authority is situated) and then is distributed downwards in different forms. This pattern may be easily identified in non-state societies, such Big Men societies in Melanesia, but it is of difficult application in the case of the European contexts and Japan.

Third, resources distributed through patronage are scarce to those who seek them. Whereas neo-classical economics treats the scarcity of resources as one of the driving forces of the market, anthropology and sociology have drawn attention to the social and cultural consequences of actual and perceived effects of scarcity (Foster 1976; Scott 1976). Some of the anthropological approaches have attempted to apply alternative theoretical models to investigate the social and political functions of scarcity, as well as the cognitive dimension. One of these is the notion of moral economy, developed following the work of Edward Thompson (1971) and James Scott’s accounts of peasant resistance in Indonesia (1976) which set out to define those (mainly rural) practices and choices which, in conditions of scarcity and economic inequality, are conceived as ethical and desirable to maintain subsistence levels, even if they bring about economic involution (Geertz 1970). In a similar fashion, clientelism has often been described as a moral inclination towards maximizing inherently unjust personal power relations vis-à-vis potentially equal impersonal relations in conditions of scarcity.
One famous example, relevant to this paper, is Banfield’s account of Montegrano (1958) in southern Italy, followed by recent further applications of this model by other social scientists (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Misztal 1998, Sztompka 1999. Without going into details in the critiques of this position (Meloni 1997), the familist ethos which accounts for the low levels of generalized trust and cooperation in Southern Italy is for Banfield one of the adaptation strategies to conditions of economic backwardness, scarcity and strong inequality. As clientelistic practices are responses to lack of transparency in the information and access to resources and services, familism stands against the interests of the collectivity. The familist trap generates what recently has been described as “inequality trap” in the case of corruption and bad governance (Uslaner 2008, Rothstein 2011). In other terms, the dominance of preferential ties or exclusive trust (what Putnam calls ‘bonding social capital’) would generate low levels of generalized trust, which produces widespread corruption and clientelism, and, in turn, increases inequality. This vicious circle seems a socially-bounded phenomenon, with strong particularistic attributes, but, unfortunately, it does not explain why clientelism and corruption remain widespread throughout the world.

The fourth point, the “political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of the dyadic relation” refers to the durability of patron-client ties. This has long constituted one of the most contested points of patronage theory. On the one hand, political and anthropological accounts of the benefits of clientelism seem to put emphasis either on the short-term conditions of the transaction (once the favour has been reciprocated the transaction ends), or on the long-term feature, often stressed by those who argue on the moral commitment established in the clientelistic dyad (Boissevain 1974; Lomnitz 1971; Woodall 1996; Pardo 2004; Schneider and Schneider 2003; Torsello 2003, 2012). The issue, I believe, is not exactly whether these relationships have long or short-term implications for those tied by them, but whether their durability is perceived or not by local actors. Silverman underlines the need to differentiate between emic and etic perspectives on the patronage practices and ideas (1977), stating that to understand the emic approach to clientelism one needs to pay adequate attention to the difference between verbal expression, ideologies and perceived social benefits. Referring to the Umbrian example, she analyzes the historical phases under which changes in the ideology and use of patronage have been introduced, and the perceived duration of these practices.

Eisenstadt and Roniger, on the other hand, insist on the tension between the rationale of these practices (the pursuit of the patron’s and of the client’s respective interests) and the condition of social anomaly in which they are generated, expressed – among many- by a weak predisposition (and optimism) towards controlling and changing the established order (1984). These positions have in common a concern for the dialectical strength of clientelism, which is not merely a dyadic power relationship, or an ethos, but constitutes a cosmology, a way of perceiving and featuring the social world. This idea is confirmed by much of the most recent anthropological literature on corruption, which draws a useful working distinction between corruption practices and corruption talk (Shore and Haller 2005). As I found in my research in postsocialist Europe (Torsello 2006, 2007), that increased social uncertainty and dramatic changes bring about a shift in the perception of what is trust, as well as in its actual utility. Personalistic ties are not immune from the impact of these changes, and the most obvious field to which uncertainty applies is the duration of patron-client relationships.

**Comparative Fields of Investigation**

Having paid consideration to some of the most basic premises that the existence of clientelistic ties introduce in society, I will introduce the fields of investigations in which analytical and comparative approaches to the study of clientelism can be grounded. I will compare some of the results of prior and ongoing field research in three regions: Central Eastern Europe, Southern Italy and Japan.

**Interpersonal level**

Patron-client relations are first of all relationships between individuals and they are established and maintained through interpersonal dyadic bonds (Boissevain 1974). The main assumption is that these are de facto relations of inequality, but their rhetoric may indeed be one of equality. When teaching at a university in southern Italy I was approached by a person, a school teacher in a small town in the Basilicata region, who asked me to support one of his protégées, a former student with whom he shared kin relationship, as he attempted to enter a master program in the social sciences, where an admission test was required. The teacher emphasized that there would have been many other things that he “could have done” for me in the future if we had become closer.
This stresses the power tension between the prospective client and the prospective patron where, according to the social and economic status of the two, adjustments may be required to balance the scale of reciprocity.

In another circumstance, in Japan, I was confronted with the necessity to obtain permission to reside in the village chosen as my fieldwork site. In spite of repeated trips to this village, I had been unable to obtain formal permission to reside in the community. I turned to my supervisor who used his authority to influence the decision of the village head and obtain his acceptance. One particular way in which, in the face of villagers, he sought acceptance to my request, was, first to introduce me as one of his students, and then to appealing to their empathy by slapping on my back (a rather atypical behavior in Japanese interpersonal communication) and mentioning that, thanks to my height, I could have been of great help to pick up apples from the farmers’ trees.

This is, of course, not identifiable as a clientelistic practice, but the style and power relations underpinning this form of behavior were typically dyadic. As it has been formulated abundantly in anthropological literature on Japan, the structure of “vertical society” (Nakane 1967, and for critiques Hata and Smith 2007), rests on a careful combination of hierarchical (vertical) with horizontal (empathic) social relationships. The power of this dyadic formula, that has been abundantly revealed in political clientelistic practices in Japan (Kawata and Pappova, forthcoming), is exactly at the intersection between the uneven power relation and the perceived (emotionally or simply rhetorically) interpersonal trust. Equality, although unreal, is stressed not only on the side of the patron who assumes a paternalistic standing, but also from the client, who attempts to reduce his own dependency. Trust plays here an important role, since it is for the assurance of compliance with the given (or merely expected) promise that checks are introduced by the two parties. In this issue I disagree with Roniger who states that the lack of trust moves people to resort to clientelistic ties, based on unequal standpoints among actors, since I have found that trust may constitute an instrument to increase inequality (Roniger 1999).

**Kin and extra-kin groups**

The second level extends from the single individuals to cover the interrelation among groups (kin and extra-kin). The extension of patronage to broader spheres of social action is naturally possible through kinship. However, as Boissevain demonstrates, the range of persons with whom Ego may preferably seek interaction in cases of need does not necessarily coincide with kinship patterns (Boissevain 1974). Often kinship is deployed for friendship, or simply interest affinity, and this has also with the strong moral and behavioral obligations of kinship (Zinn 2001; Torsello 2003, 2008). When clientelistic relations expand beyond the kin sphere they require the presence of a broker who helps to facilitate connectedness among social networks. Anthropologists have too long tended to overlook the instrumental character of these extra-kin relations, framing them in general paradigm of social order, cohesion or group conflict (Waterbury 1977). I see two possible ways to escape this analytical impasse. The first is to pay attention to the cognitive orientations through which protection seeking and granting is rendered meaningful as a set of choice-option. This would take trustworthiness as an analytical tool to establish ways in which social actors check and balance their own expectations in the competence of the potential patrons (Hardin 1996, Yamagishi 2002). The second is to consider the historical grounds on which group activity, cooperation and extra-kin solidarity is founded. To this second task ethnographic field data can provide a positive contribution.

In the village I studied in southern Slovakia villagers voiced daily their mistrust towards other community members, outside their kinship sphere. This is a village that historically occupied the land of a church estate, the land being under the ownership of an absentee feudal institution, without any nobility residing in the community.

Power in the village was controlled by a dozen of comparatively large landowners who served the function of patrons vis-à-vis the small owners and the large number of landless who constituted the majority (see also Fél and Hofer 1973; Gunst 1989). Socialism had cancelled historical power relations based on land ownership. After socialism, the heirs of these large landowning families have not been able (and willing) to reacquire their control over resources and power. The outcome is today that villagers express their fear of inequality through uttered mistrust in the community members. On the level of social practices, however, this is one of the most active village of the region in the organization of collective religious and civic events, as well as in the number of cultural associations. Historical factors such as land tenure, social stratification, religion and social mobility play a significant role in determining some of the sets of responses (such as values) among which the individual select the best option, and the sphere of collective action is one of the most evident (see also Kaneff 2004; Hann 2006).
Clientelistic practices are still present in the daily lives of individuals, as their significance is shaped in two ways, first as continuity from the socialist past, in which informal procedures where symbiotic to formal ones. Second, and more importantly, clientelistic ties have been perceived in times of rapid and dramatic social transformation, as safety valves to establish a certain (perceived) degree of individual control over political decision-making at local level.

A second example, Japan, has been described as a country marked by strong group cohesion and weak individualism (Chie 1970; Hendry 2004). The old Japanese kinship system (ie) had traditionally deemphasized individual and personal achievements, strengthening the social and economic role of the corporate kin group. Following the transformation and nuclearization of the family, in the postwar period, the important group has been shifted away from the kinship domain, and is being forcibly reproduced in work relations as a “natural” translation of the lost role of the family. The Japanese firm is, ideally, structured under a Confucian ideology which delegates the main task of the individual to seek collective goals and sacrifice personal achievements. On the other hand, rural villages have lost their corporate structure and the strong degrees of inner cohesion due to the weaker patronage role of the stem family in assembling and controlling the minor branches.

In the village I have been studying the outcome was dissimilar from these trends. This is a community which was established in 1947 as a postwar rural settlement, integrating a population of 43 households of repatriates from the former occupied territories and colonies of continental Asia (Torsello 2000, 2002). Here, villagers, chose to create a social reality on their own efforts, deprived of kinship ties with the local communities. They succeeded in establishing a strong sense of community, with strategic avoidance of overt conflict and a surprisingly high degree of collective action for such a small settlement. The absence of historical ties of dependence on the ie structure, the different land tenure and production systems compared to the local society and the previous experiences of settlement in Manchuria, Sakhalin and Northern Korea, favored the consolidation of stronger degrees of group harmony, as well as the virtual absence of any form of patronage, which were simply seen as useless.

The third example is the Italian case. In the communities I studied there is a clear distinction between the reasons and situations for which trust can or cannot be sought in the case of the kin group. Here, for instance, financial help is often sought outside the kin sphere, whereas help with babysitting or lending of tools and machinery is preferably entrusted to kin members. The need to reciprocate favors is felt with particular strength only in less frequent trust relationships, such as those with distant relatives. The sensibly lower trust in distant relatives between southern Italian and Slovak respondents is an indication of the spatiality character of voiced trust in southern Italy. Relying on distant relatives is a more hazardous option than relying on extra-kin neighbors or friends since the chances of reciprocating the act of trust are rarer and, as such, less controllable by the trustor. There is a moral component in this kind of distrust which emerges from the often quoted proverb: parenti serpenti (relatives are snakes). On the other hand, relatives who live in the same community are entrusted almost on a daily basis with favors, help, loans, gifts and other forms of services. The rationale underlying this choice is not merely moral, but also instrumental, since continuous interpersonal interaction actually reduces the social leverage of trust. Moreover, positive emotional approaches to trust among close kin members are amplified by values such as commitment to family relationships, strength and density of networks, number of reliable relatives. These aspects are considered as positive values in the communities I investigated, usually the larger the kin network the more reliable the person is in the whole community since the number of possible checks with other relatives increases. This influences the ways in which patronage is sought, since I noticed a strong awareness of the importance of being able to perform alternative forms of control over prospective patrons. It is rare that, at village level, a person would enter a clientelistic relationship without any kind of social tie with the kin group of the patron, and this practice is bifocal, in the way that the patron needs to get assurance on this tie too.

The state

The third level is the state and the local political arena. In this field the contribution of anthropology has been less conspicuous, compared to that of political science. There are two basic ways in which clientelistic systems are encapsulated in state politics. The first is through a brokerage system, in which patronage serves as the filter of state authority, allowing the cliente to gain access to knowledge, services and goods and eventually carriers. The second is through penetration into the political interstices of the state, providing clients with access to resources which are unequally distributed or in absolute scarcity.
The difference in these two is in the strength of the state: in the former the state merely controls the access to resources (more or less equally available), in the latter it monopolizes access and distributions of resources which are not equally available (or at least information about their availability is not rendered public). In these two perspectives the interaction between the state and local political factions which represent the interests of the broker constitutes the main field of investigation. Here the examples worldwide are extremely rich and, as some of the recent anthropological literature on corruption has showed, they point out the extent of the phenomenon in both wealthy and less wealthy countries (Pardo 2004; Shore and Haller 2005). True, the second approach, where the state assumes predatory control over the economy, is more frequently found in developing economies. On the other hand, however, the opposite may also be true. Japan has been historically analyzed as developing out of a weak state system in which political power has, since the early 20th Century, been controlled by a small number of economic corporations (zaibatsu, later transformed into keiretsu).

Japan is also one of the few countries in the world to experience a mono-party government system, in which the Liberal Democratic Party has remained virtually unchallenged in power since 1946. Moreover, the Japanese state is still extremely dependent on the corporations and political factions, as local-level politics is dependent on highly hierarchical clienteles, which find legitimacy in the liberal expressions of the need to let the economy have its free flow. Political clientelism has exerted serious concern in Japan, even though the public commitment towards this problem is rather weak. The preliminary findings of my research in Japan confirm that clientelism is perceived as structurally tied to economic progress and development, and that this view has especially gained momentum in the years of the country’s economic recession (since the mid-1990s). Local bureaucrats play an important role in mediating between the political and economic fields, as shown by the phenomenon of the amakudari (fallen from heaven) according to which large and middle-size companies seek to employ retired bureaucrats, offering them high-rank salaries and unrecorded benefits to capture some of their political capital at state level.

In the southern Italian case, the state makes up an interesting object of study for assessing citizens’ practices and ideas about institutional performance. Even though rampant corruption and widespread clientelism generally affect (negatively) the perception of good governance, one cannot argue that the state is perceived as weak or powerless. Quite the contrary, trusting state institutions is still, particularly in the southern regions, perceived as the main solution out of economic distress. One example is the degree of trustworthiness that I measured through a survey questionnaire in the communities I studied, and comparatively, in Slovakia. To the question: “Can you express, from 1 (low) to 5 (high) your level of trust in the state?” in Italy the average score was 2.8, whereas in Slovakia 1.6. The higher score in Southern Italy suggests that in Slovakia the socialist experience has led citizens to express negative judgments in the operations of the state, whereas southern Italians, still believe (as it was at the times of Banfield’s research) that intervention from the state should help them to improve their conditions, as it was mentioned to me in several interviews. The persistence of clientelistic practices can be here attributed to the perception that state institutions are both still ultimately responsible for the well-being of individuals and their communities, and that the people can actually give meanings to the functioning of these institutions by cross-cutting them with clientelistic ties (Gupta 2005).

**Transnational organizations**

The fourth level is that of the transnational organizations and political institutions. Abélès (2000) argues that the consolidation of the EU achieved through the process of integration and enlargement has brought about a number of paradoxes, among which is a lack of transparency. This idea is in line with the claim, made by some political scientists (Bliss and Di Tella 1997) that clientelism and corruption are eventually enforced by the consolidation of strong supra-national organizations, especially when the allotment of resources and funds is governed by the direct interaction between states and these organizations. Here, again, power and elite groups are able to divert resources towards their own clienteles. The process is not easily tracked as in the case of state or local politics, but nonetheless extremely significant. In my recent research in the TEN-T transport projects development in Central Eastern Europe, I have encountered a strikingly high number of similarities among countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, but also Italy and Austria). Three main points emerged out of these studies. The first is that the consolidation of clientelistic ties between local (regional) factions and the state has been an unintended product of the EU system of structural funding.
In this, subsidiarity, one of the major concepts on which the Maastricht Treaty has historically gained legitimacy has actually turned out to be one of the most tedious thorns in the side of the Brussels’ project (Torsello 2012). The second point is that clientelism (and more evidently corruption) has strengthened the role played by civil society in debasing the state and the EU. Frequent corruption scandals brought to the forefront local (and international) activists who became the real actors of the environmental protest and of denunciations of political irregularities. Local citizens, on their side, seem increasingly concerned about corruption talk (using it as a common daily rhetoric), but not in a instrumental way. They do not seek benefits (as Silverman suggested in the case mentioned above), but they try to give meaning to unintelligible political maneuvers. Third, the state is making use of dubiously democratic and radical means\(^2\) to maintain its façade of legitimacy on the one hand, and not to lose control of the EU resources on the other. The paradigm of development (in this case highways, motorways and railway building), and recently that of recession shielding are more or less successfully used by governments to justify their murky actions. This eventually leads to the leveling of political opposition (also observed in Western Europe) and to the consolidation of cross-parties clientelistic and faction ties. This field, however, is the one that still lacks a more sound empirical research, perhaps because anthropology has only recently started to engage with the study of transnational organizations and institutions.

**Conclusions**

The study of clientelism is a complex endeavor calling for attentive analyses of the social processes implied and defined by the practices involved. I believe that an anthropological comparative approach can help to overcome some of the shortcomings of mainstream political theory, especially as far as the integration of a top-down perspective with a ground-level approach is concerned. From the few ethnographic examples provided above two main points of conclusion emerge. First, clientelism is an inherently social, other than political phenomenon, which is informed by actors’ ideas and practices of trust. Trust, be it constructed at interpersonal or individual-institutional level, is a cognitive as well as social mechanism of human interaction. Thus it may be of little help to address the issue of the particularistic versus universalistic nature of clientelism. This is because the constant tension between expectations and performance, respectively from the client and the patron, is grounded on both knowledge and availability of information, and on the particular features of the social tie itself (empathy, socio-cultural constructions of hierarchic arrangements, the rhetoric of amity and so forth).

Secondly, the attempt to frame clientelism within different spatial and agency layers (from interpersonal to individual-state relationships) as well as socio-cultural contexts may help to restitute universalism to this practice. If it is true that there cannot exist a single typology of social trust-based dyadic relationships among societies, the weight of the particular social domains (kin group, state, transnational organizations) may exert comparatively similar pressures in case of so different cultural contexts as Italy, Japan and Central Eastern Europe. This is, however, more a methodological than analytical standpoint which deserves, in my view, further investigation.

**References**


\(^2\) One example is the recent law passed by the Slovak government which allows the state to build highways and high-priority infrastructural projects on privately owned land even prior to the purchase of this land. This law is under proposal also in the Czech Republic.


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