Corruption in the Police Force: A Study of Police-Drivers Behaviour along Highway in Southern Nigeria

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Abstract
The main thrust of this paper was to examine police and drivers behaviour along highway in Southern Nigeria. Questionnaire survey was used as method for data collection. The systematic sampling technique was used to study 170 respondents that comprised: policemen from the Operations Department of Mopol II, Calabar Cross River State Command and Ikot Akpan Abia, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State Command, as well as drivers and passengers in the aforementioned study locations. The results showed that: there is no significant correlation between police extortion and their personal emoluments; that extortion by policemen on roadblocks is significantly dependent on availability of police operational facilities; and that there is a strong correlation between motorists daily revenue and police extortion. The study recommends amongst others that the Federal Government should endeavour to improve police operational facilities, while ensuring that a special task force of credible persons from Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) be mandated to check extortion of money at roadblocks by policemen.

Keywords: Policemen, Extortion, Corruption, Highway and Roadblock.

Introduction
Social Science scholars have observed that corruption has become endemic in Nigerian society to the extent that it is now ironical that persons who are not corrupt are often regarded as “deviants” in the society (Anyadubalu, 2010). The word “corrupt” is often used to describe an aspect of human behaviour that is conceived as obnoxious, mean, degrading and offensive to the acceptable norms, the intention being to serve private ends. Exposure of corruption and corrupt practices are within the ambit of the Nigerian Criminal Justice System. The police are in the forefront of detecting and apprehending culprits including suspects. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 4 of the Police Act CAP 359 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, states that:

“The police shall be employed for prevention and detection of crime. The apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due employment of all laws and regulation with which they are directly charged and shall perform such military duties within...Nigeria as maybe required by them or under the authority of this or any other Act” (Police Act CAP 359:4).

Unfortunately, the police who are often charged with the responsibility of checking corruption have been found to be deep in corrupt practices. Many persons refer to them as initiators and practitioners of corruption (Uhakeme, 2009).

Various attempts have been made both by the government and the police authorities to curb the problem of extortion, but all efforts have not yielded positive results. One notable reason for the poor result being that intensive campaigns were mounted through the mass-media, using various captivating but ineffective slogans with paltry practical follow-ups which gradually faded away unnoticed, leaving no tangible impact on the attitudes of policemen.
Many persons who refused to comply with ₦20.00 bribe demanded by policemen on roadblocks and tollgates have met their untimely death in the hands of such policemen (Oyewale, 2005). The police force touted slogan “the police is your friend” has been found wanting. It has become a source of ridicule in the eyes of most Nigerians because of several illegal “tollgates” and roadblocks set-up for the illegal collection of money from Nigerians (Adediran 2009; Obiola, 2005). Several names such as “roadyer”, “particulars”, “appreciation”, and “support” have been used by the police to perpetuate these illegal collections. This situation has raised a number of questions: for instance what factors motivate policemen to continue in this odious practice, despite regulations to curb it? Could it be true to say that the police monthly salary is too low to sustain a living? Could the availability of police operational facilities such as the vehicle and rifle encourage extortion of money from motorists? This paper will attempt to provide answers to these questions, in a study comprising both Akwa Ibom and Cross River States.

Theoretical Framework
Corruption should not be regarded as an exclusive social problem of the Nigeria Police alone; it permeates all facets of the society. Almost everyone in Nigeria is guilty of the same offence of cutting corners which means that all are key players and are culpable of the offence (Uhakheme, 2006). This assertion agrees with the major tenets of the systems theory of Herbert Spencer (1820 - 1903); Vilfredo Pareto (1848 – 1923) and Margaret Archer (1988) which observed that the society is a giant system with intricate web of relationships, which exist in various and varied interactions, interrelationships and interdependences between and among its elements. Thus, the unceasing network of these relationships enables socialization processes that create new cultures that challenge or are at variance with existing culture (Bertalanffy 1968). These views align with the assumptions of the cognitive social learning theory of Bandura and Mischel (1977) which noted that behaviour is learned and influenced strongly by environmental experiences (Halonen and Santrock, 1999). Edwin Sutherland’s (1966) differential association theory also gives meaningful explanation in support of the proposition that criminal behaviour such as corrupt practices by policemen and women are learned through constant and frequent association between the police and other corrupt persons in society. Also, the act of extortion of money by the police along major highways in Nigeria can be seen as a subculture outside the acceptable “means” to acquire wealth by the Nigerian society. This subculture is in line with the second typology of criminal act discussed by Robert K. Merton (1968) theory of deviance. Again, the proliferation of such criminal intent is driven by the functional benefits derived therein. This is imbued in the major assumption of the structural functionalist theory of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) which emphasized the functionality of crime (Ritzer, 1996). It is assumed that the ill-gotten wealth made of money from motorist through extortion on highways could be a way of improving the low income level of policemen and this could be the reason why most police constable lobby to be amongst those sent to secure major highways checkpoints across the country. Based on this proposition, the structural functionalist theory is adopted as a guide to this study.

Conceptual Issues
In Nigeria, the word “corruption” is susceptible to varying definitions. It connotes moral deterioration, deprivation, perversion of integrity by bribery or favouritism. It is in this regards that Musa (1991) pointed out that corruption as a term is uncertain and devoid of any specified definition. According to Adegbite (1991), corruption implies perversion of something from an original state of purity, a kind of infection or infected conditions. Adegbite linked corruption to an act of inducement with the intent of improperly securing an advantage for oneself or for another person. He further pointed out that corruption is the conscious and well planned act by a person or group of persons to subvert. Obviously such definition makes corruption interwoven with power. Similarly, Adams (2003) argued that corruption is a behaviour of public officers, which deviates from acceptable norms in order to serve private ends. On the one hand, corruption has been identified as a negative index in the developmental strides of Nigeria as a nation (Anti-Corruption Law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2000). On the other hand, Ikoh, Iyamba and Charles (2005) noted that corruption covers a wide range of conduct patterns. They maintained that several local jargons serve to describe corruption in Nigeria. Among policemen and women, it is named roadger. In government bureaucracy, it is often called kola, kickback, ten percent or lobby, depending on the subject matter of interest. This behaviour has become cankerworm and has eaten deep into the fabrics of our society to an extent that almost every ethnic group in the country have names for corruption.
The Yorubas for instance call it “egunje” that is (free food) while the Ibibios call it “Ubokedem” (money given through the back) as an inducement. Given the catholicity of view points, corruption can be seen as act of offering and accepting of bribes, most especially as it involves police/drivers interaction on highway roadblocks in Nigeria.

**Incidence of Corruption in the Police Force**

In the Nigeria Police force, corruption is known to have grown from a humble beginning, when the force had little supplies of stationeries which contributed to posting of some officers to solicit for assistance from the public which gradually led to a sustained behaviour of begging within the police force (Kehinde, 2005; Adediran, 2009). Today the situation has changed, it is no more lack of sufficient materials, the blame is currently directed on the government, as demonstrated by key informants of the police force during a Focus Group Discussion. The group observed that “the federal government has neglected the police by not attaining to their welfare, thus, making their condition of service to remain poor”. They equally maintain that, each succeeding government had neglected the police. The neglect ranged from lack of furniture allowance to officers of Nigeria Police Force, to lack of uniforms and stationeries. Oyewale and Charles et al (2005) reported that, in the area of remuneration, the police job is one of the poorest paid in the country.

This situation has resulted in loses of lives on account of “accidental discharge” of bullet from police riffs. Motorists who refused to pay the required toll fee have ended up in their early graves. Cases of extra-judicial killing appear on Nigeria daily newspapers. In October 2002, for instance, a Police Inspector shot and killed Lawan Kyari, a Shuwa businessman and his son over the former’s refusal to give him bribe in Mabosha village in Mafia Local Government Area of Borno State. Again, policemen manning roadblocks on November 14, 2002, killed four and injured eight Christian worshippers returning from a vigil night service at Enugu. The incidence happened at Ogbunike toll gate, when the driver refused to hand over a N60.00 bribe but decided to give N20.00 instead. This infuriated the policemen who subsequently opened fire at close range, killing the driver and the three passengers instantly while the rest of the passengers on the vehicle scampered to safety (Oyewale, 2005).

Furthermore, Kehinde Adenij, a driver and Bolanle Banidele, a passenger were killed by a policeman at another roadblock allegedly mounted by policemen between Ita-Odo and Aramoko on June 3, 2004. They were travelling from Ikole-Ekiti to Ibadan when they were stopped and asked to pay N20.00, which the driver declined. Similarly, Corporal Adejare Apata shot and killed Saheed Aborishade in front of Nigeria Police post Orogun in Oyo State for refusing to pay a N100 bribe on Monday, July 12, 2004. Also, Blessing Ighinovia, a policeman, with service number 397213, along Acme Road, Ogba, Lagos murdered Fedelis Okoji, a father of five, on July 8, 2005 for interfering in a disagreement between a bus driver and the policeman and for refusing to give the N20.00 (Oyewale, 2005).

Obiola 2005 noted that many persons including women and children have been killed in extra judicial circumstances since 1999. This unfortunate situation has generated several reactions. Adediran (2009) for instance, calls for inquiry into “extra judicial executions” since 1999. The reason being that many cases of extra judicial killings by the police across the country are yet to be investigated. The Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) also expressed reservations about the growing cases of extra judicial killings across the country. The organisation spokesperson claimed that the law enforcement agents, especially the police, killed an average of five persons weekly in extra judicial situations in Nigeria (Oyewale, 2005).

In the light of the foregoing observations, three working null hypotheses were formulated for the study:

- There is no significant relationship between policemen extra judicial killing at roadblocks and their personal emoluments.
- Extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks is significantly independent of availability of police operational facilities.
- There is no significant correlation between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and poor welfare services for Nigeria Police by Federal Government.

**Methodology**

Questionnaire was a major instrument for data collection.
Where the respondents could not read and write we adopted the interview method based on items on the questionnaire, until the required number of respondents was interviewed. To select the 170 respondents envisaged for the study, a systematic random sampling technique was used. The following criteria were adopted for selection of sample: the police officer must be from the operation department of both Akwa Ibom State and Cross River State Command assigned on weekly basis to handle roadblock and provide security along Calabar-Itu Highway; the driver must have at least 5 years experience of motoring along Calabar-Itu road and have taken part in ₦20.00 bribe incidents to policemen and women officers at roadblocks. Again, the driver must be the one that was in-charge of the vehicle at the park where the demographic characteristics of the respondents, i.e. drivers and passengers are located, as well as having a fair knowledge on the subject matter, and finally, the passenger must have witnessed police officers demanding and collecting money at roadblocks at least once. Therefore passengers and drivers departing from Akwa Ibom Transport Co-operation (AKTC), Uyo to Calabar, as well as those departing from either Etim Edem Park i.e. Calabar Main Park, Petex Transport Service formed the research population.

Using the systematic sampling technique, the researchers selected a total of 80 respondents from a sample frame of 160 policemen obtained from the Department of the Nigeria Police Command, Mopol II, Calabar, Cross River State and Ikot Akpan Abia, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State who were assigned to handle roadblocks along Calabar-Itu Highway on a weekly basis. Each respondent was picked from the list after every count of 2 until 40 respondents were derived from each state to make up the 80 policemen required for the study. From the police on patrol roster, their duty posts (roadblocks)/days of engagement were identified for easy administration of questionnaires.

Also, at motor parks, drivers were required to register their vehicles and take turn. This daily registration is often referred to as “booking”. At every “booking”, the vehicle number of the driver was written down and displayed on the board. From this board which was available in all the motor parks selected for this study, a sample frame of 150 drivers was deduced. A systematic random sampling was adopted to select a total of 50 respondents to represent driver’s population for this study. Each respondent was picked from the list after every count of 3 for the administration of questionnaire at different parks respectively.

40 passengers were selected for this study. This number was derived from the “manifest” (a list that contains names and addresses of passengers from point of departure to their destination for reference purposes) given to the selected drivers for this study. Also, the systematic random sampling technique was adopted to distribute questionnaires to passengers whose name appeared first on each “manifests” assigned to the first-twenty drivers under study in AKTC, Etim Edem or Petex motor parks respectively. At the completion of data collection, every respondent was included in the tables. This helped to show at a glance the trend of data and the related variables. For test of hypotheses: chi-square (X²) test of significance and phi-coefficient correlation were used in testing the hypotheses. Expressed mathematically, Chi-square test of significance is given by the formula as:

\[ \chi^2 = \sum \frac{(o-e)^2}{e} \]

where \( \chi^2 \) = Chi-square sign,
\( o = \) observed frequency,
\( e = \) expected frequency,
\( \sum = \) summation sign, and

Phi-coefficient correlation \( \phi = \frac{bc-ad}{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)} \)

Where a, b, c, d; represents statistical frequencies of 2 by 2 table.

The correlation is calculated thus: \( \phi = \frac{b-c}{\sqrt{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)}} \)

Where Or = relationship between the variables 0.637 = a constant known as coefficient of variables.
**Data Analysis**

It should be clearly stated that the researchers prepared and distributed a total of 170 copies of questionnaires, however only 102 copies were retrieved, constituting 60 percent proportion of the sample size (see table 1 for details).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Copies of questionnaire administered</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Questionnaire Retrieved</th>
<th>Percentage of questionnaire Retrieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policemen</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>47.06</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work (2010).

**Hypotheses One**

The first hypothesis of this study was to test the relationship between corrupt practice by policemen at roadblocks and their personal emoluments.

- \( H_0: \) There is no significant relationship between policemen extra judicial killing at roadblocks and their personal emoluments.
- \( H_1: \) There is a significant relationship between policemen extra judicial killing at roadblocks and their personal emoluments.

**Table 2: Respondents perception on the relationship between policemen extra judicial killing at roadblocks and their personal emoluments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Significant</th>
<th>Insignificant</th>
<th>Partially</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policemen</td>
<td>5 (7.0)</td>
<td>34 (32.12)</td>
<td>3 (2.88)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>9 (6.67)</td>
<td>29 (30.59)</td>
<td>2 (2.75)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>3 (33.0)</td>
<td>15 (15.29)</td>
<td>2 (1.37)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work (2010).

The critical limit for ejecting \( H_0 \) were set at 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance, with a degree of freedom of \((R-1)(C-1) = (3-1)(3-1) = 4\), with a chi-square \((X^2)\) table value of 9.488 and 18.465 at 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance respectively.

**Table 3: Chi-square distribution of respondents’ opinion on the association between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and their personal emoluments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fo</th>
<th>Fe</th>
<th>Fo – Fe</th>
<th>(Fo - Fe)^2</th>
<th>(Fo - Fe)^2 Fe</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>4.0000</td>
<td>0.5714</td>
<td>0.7559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>32.12</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3.5344</td>
<td>0.1100</td>
<td>0.3317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
<td>0.0050</td>
<td>0.0707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>5.4289</td>
<td>0.8139</td>
<td>0.9022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>30.59</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
<td>2.5281</td>
<td>0.0826</td>
<td>0.2875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>0.5625</td>
<td>0.2045</td>
<td>0.4523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.1089</td>
<td>0.0327</td>
<td>0.1808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.0841</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.3969</td>
<td>0.2897</td>
<td>0.5382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \Sigma x=102 \)

Source: Field Work (2010)
From table 3, the calculated chi-square is lower than the table values, at both 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance. Clearly, the calculated value of 2.1155 ($X^2$) (which is lower than 9.488 and 18.465) means that corrupt practices by policemen does not have significant association or connection with their personal emoluments. Additionally, the standard residual (R) computation shows that the drivers are the greatest contributor to the significant $X^2$ value (see the fourth cell with the highest R value of 0.9022), vis-à-vis policemen at roadblock (see first cell with R value: 0.7559), while the least contributor is the third cell, which corresponds with the passengers.

We can therefore state that: corrupt practices by policemen manning roadblocks have no significant association with their personal emoluments.

**Hypothesis Two**

The second hypothesis of this study was with a view of determining whether there exists an association between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and availability of their operational facilities.

$H_0$: Extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks is significantly independent of availability of police operational facilities.

$H_1$: Extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks is significantly dependent on availability of police operational facilities.

**Table 4: Respondents perception on the relationship between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and availability of their operational facilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Facilities</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>9 (8.098)</td>
<td>5 (5.902)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Allowance</td>
<td>5 (21.402)</td>
<td>32 (15.598)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunch Allowance</td>
<td>10 (6.941)</td>
<td>2 (5.059)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walky-Talky/Riffle Guns</td>
<td>35 (22.559)</td>
<td>4 (16.441)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work (2010).

The critical limit for ejecting $H_0$ were set at 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significant, with a degree of freedom of (R-1) (C-1) = (2-1) (4-1) = 3, with a chi-square ($X^2$) table values of 7.815 and 16.208 at 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance respectively. The table below shows the chi-square field computation.

**Table 5: Chi-square distribution of respondents’ opinion on the relationship between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and availability of their operational facilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fo</th>
<th>Fe</th>
<th>Fo – Fe</th>
<th>(Fo - Fe)^2</th>
<th>(Fo - Fe)^2 Fe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.098</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0.813604</td>
<td>0.1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.902</td>
<td>-0.902</td>
<td>0.813604</td>
<td>0.1379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.402</td>
<td>-16.402</td>
<td>269.025604</td>
<td>12.5701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>15.598</td>
<td>16.402</td>
<td>269.025604</td>
<td>17.2474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.941</td>
<td>3.059</td>
<td>9.357481</td>
<td>1.3481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.059</td>
<td>-3.059</td>
<td>9.357481</td>
<td>1.8497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>22.559</td>
<td>12.441</td>
<td>154.778481</td>
<td>6.8611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.441</td>
<td>-12.441</td>
<td>154.778481</td>
<td>9.4142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∑=102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>∑= 49.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work (2010).

From the table above, the calculated chi-square value is greater than the table value; hence the null hypothesis is rejected at both 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance. The calculated value of 49.53 means that extortion by the police is significantly dependent on availability of operational facilities, and this cannot be attributed to chance.
In order to establish the association convincingly, the contingency co-efficient was to x-ray the strength of the relationship. This is given as:

\[
C = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{N}}
\]

Where \( c \) = contingency co-efficient
\( \chi^2 \) = calculated chi-square
\( N \) = sample size.

\[
C = \sqrt{\frac{49.82}{102(1+49.82)2}}
\]

\[
C = 0.98.
\]

The \( C \) value of 0.98 (which is very close to and almost 1.00) is indicative of a strong relationship between extortion by policemen at roadblocks and availability of operational facilities, such as rifles/guns, vehicles, walky-talky and so on. However, we need to determine the maximum value of \( C \) to know if there is truly absence of “correlation alienation”. \( C_{\text{max}} \) is given as:

\[
C_{\text{max}} = \sqrt{\frac{k-1}{k}}
\]

Where \( k \) = number of columns

\[
C_{\text{max}} = \sqrt{\frac{3-1}{3}} = 0.866
\]

Thus, the maximum value of the relationship in our problem is 0.866 \( \approx 0.9 \) (very close to .00). Clearly, this shows that extortion encourages the use of rifle/guns, vehicles walky-talky etc, and these facilities also encourages extortion by policemen who handle roadblocks. The \( C_{\text{max}} \) value of \( \approx 0.9 \) makes it so glaring, and we are 99% confident that the right decision has been made.

**Hypothesis Three**

The third hypothesis of this study take a look into the correlation between extortion by the police at roadblocks and poor welfare services for the Nigeria Police by Federal Government.

\( H_0 \): There is no significant correlation between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and poor welfare services for the Nigeria Police by Federal Government.

\( H_1 \): There is a significant correlation between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and poor welfare services for the Nigeria Police by Federal Government.

**Table 6: Respondents perception on the correlation between extortion of money by policemen at roadblocks and motorists daily revenue.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Motorists Revenue</th>
<th>Police Extortion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32(31.2)</td>
<td>29(29.8)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10(10.8)</td>
<td>11(10.2)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work (2010).

Information presented above were gathered in police and drivers questionnaires, hence the change in “N” value. For the above purpose of testing the hypothesis, data are represented below in a 2 by 2 table:

\[
a^32 & b^29 \\
с^10 & d^11
\]

In order to determine the strength of the correlation, the phi-coefficient \( \phi \) is used as given below:

\[
\phi = \frac{bc-ad}{\sqrt{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)}}
\]
And $\theta r = \frac{r}{\sqrt{1-r^2}}$

Thus from phi-coefficient we have:

$$\theta = \frac{(29 \times 32) - (32 \times 11)}{\sqrt{(32 + 29)(10 + 11)(32 + 10)(29 + 11)}}$$

$$\theta r = 0.62$$

The calculated $\theta r$ value of 0.62 shows that there is a correlation between motorists’ daily revenue and police extortion. However, since there are cases motorists’ pay in excess of ₦20.00, the $\theta r$ value was further tested to ascertain its significance statistically. This is demonstrated using the test of significance formula:

$$t = \frac{\theta r}{\sqrt{1-(\theta r)^2}}$$

$$0.62 = \frac{(4-2)}{\sqrt{1-(0.62)^2}}$$

t = 1.12

df = N-2 = 2

Table value at 0.05 level of significant = 4.30.

Since the calculated $t$ (1.12) is less than the table value (4.30), the null hypothesis is accepted. Put differently, there is no correlation between motorists’ daily revenue and extortion by the police. This means that, all things being equal, revenue generated daily by motorists does not influence the amount demanded by policemen, and vice versa. In other words, the correlation was by chance. This decision is at variance with our phi-coefficient value of 0.62. Be it as it may, it is still doubtful, if revenue generated by motorists daily does not influence monetary demands by policemen. Therefore, we decided to ascertain the proportion of variation in the variables using the coefficient of determines: $\theta r^2$, as demonstrated below:

Coefficient of determinant $= \theta r^2$

$= (0.62)^2$

$= 0.38$

To convert this figure to percentage, multiply $\theta r^2$ value by 100.

$$0.38 \times 100 = 38\%$$

This shows that 38% of monetary demand by policemen may be attributed to motorists revenue, while 62% is determined by other factors such as: fluctuation in fuel prices, seasons and periods of the year (both Easter or Christmas seasons and the likes), standardization in police demand: ₦20.00, mounting of campaign through the mass media and so on. In summary therefore, only 38% of monetary demands by the police may be attributed to motorists’ daily revenue.

**Discussion**

Findings in this research have revealed a number of salient issues that are relevant to the study. The analysis derived from respondents’ shows that the age distribution of respondents ranged from 15 – 60 years, those respondents between 20 – 24 years represented the modal frequency of 26.5%, and this was followed by the age bracket between 25 – 29 years representing 17.6%. The marital status of respondents was from both singles and married. Those divorced, separated and widowed were all involved in the study with 53 married persons representing 51.96% as the highest then followed by 44 singles representing 43.14%. The religious affiliation of respondents cut across Christianity, Islam and Traditional Religion. Those who were Christians were 98 representing 96.08% which was the highest because the study area is Christian dominated. Also, this study revealed that, inadequate police operational facilities, such as operative vehicles, transport money to roadblocks, money for launch, provision of walky-talky, riffles/guns, etc was regarded as the major cause of police extortion on Nigeria highways.
Out of a total number of 80 Nigeria policemen, 42 police respondents, 27 (67.5%) agreed that most of the operational facilities such as: uniform, shoes, belt, touch-light, fuel for the vehicle are provided by them. 30 (71.4%) said “No” to government provision of adequate operative vehicles, 33 (78.6%) said that transport to roadblocks are always provided by them, while 31 (73.8%) said they make provision out of their own pocket for launch everyday at roadblocks.

This finding agrees with the aforementioned argument of the Junior Police Officers (JIPOA) who said that “the Federal Government has neglected policemen by not attaining to their welfare”. Responses gotten from Question 20 and 21 of the questionnaire administered on the Officers/Men/women of the Nigeria Police reveals that, 20 (47.67%) of them agreed to have been collecting money on roadblocks, 10(25%) of them sees nothing wrong with it, saying it is a “gift” from God. From this finding, it is arguable that, if government provide enough operational vehicles, to take care of police transportation to roadblocks, provide for their launch while at roadblocks, and as well make provisions for them to have access to communication gadgets, extortion of money from motorists by policemen will be reduced.

**Conclusion**

Police extortion on roadblocks has serious implications, both to the police force, the public and the nation at large. This research set out to identify the causal factors that lead to police extortion and brutality, it has also investigated and discovered that corruption within the police force did not just emerged within the force, but has a link to what is obtainable within the larger society. Therefore, to achieve a good and reputable police force, the Nigerian government and the police authorities should give serious thought to a number of recommendations stated in this work. It is believed that findings made in this study should contribute to policy makers, the government, non-governmental organizations, who may wish to extend the benefits of this research to assist in solving other related social problems associated with police extortion and brutality in Nigerian society in general.

**Recommendations**

Based on research findings of the study, the following recommendation are put forward.

- First, a task Force on corruption should be set up to handle all police problems at roadblocks since it has been observed that without supervision, extortion at roadblock will not stop.
- Second, in addition to the Police Task Force on corruption, the Federal Government under the Agency of the Economic Financial and Crimes Commission (EFCC) should urgently appoint credible personnel into a special Task Force to check Police corruption. The employment of digital cameras which could take instant pictures from long distances will assist in detecting corrupt police behaviours at roadblock.
- Third, orientation programmes should be carried out for policemen on roadblocks, in order to enlighten them on etiquette at roadblocks in the interest of the nation.
- Fourth, Government should look into the welfare of all police officers and improve their general welfare services since most of them commit offences because of their poor welfare package which predisposes them to extort money from commercial motorists.
- Fifth, the operational facilities of the police should be improved.
- Lastly, the motorists also should be warned to refrain from enhancing this corrupt practice along Nigeria highways. Since most police respondents in their comments stated that, it is the motorists themselves that offer them money, so they have no option than to collect.
References


