The Construction of Socio-Political and Symbolical Marginalization in Brazil: Reflecting the Relation between Socio-Spatial Stigma and Responses to Violence in Rio de Janeiro

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Abstract

In this article I reflect upon the construction of socio-political and symbolical marginalization of the dwellers of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. I explore the demonization of favelas and the particular labelling of favelas’ youngsters as the usual suspects and the face of fear in the city. I argue that addressing youngsters generically as ‘drug dealers’ follows the systematic historical devaluation and humiliation of the dwellers of the favelas in the public arena. Thereby I want to show the nature of criminalization of poverty in Rio, and its consequences on youngsters’ life experiences in the city. Youngsters from favelas have been transformed into the main target of strategies of social control and spatial enclosure. Such processes unfold in a core period for Brazilian society and involve transformations in Brazilian socio-political and spatial context, where the negative effects of neoliberal agenda challenge the consolidation of democracy and social justice. This article is based on empirical research in Brazilian favelas with youngsters living under a socio-symbolical shadow (Fernandes, 2009, 2013a/b) and involved in drug trafficking (Fernandes and Rodriguez, 2009; Silva et al, 2009). It is also based on extensive reflection on concepts and theories that enable new representations on favelas and by extension, new routes for public policies addressed for marginalised groups.

Keywords: Urban Violence, Favelas, Youth, Stigma, Social Fear

Fear in the City and the Socio-Symbolical Place of the Poor

In urban societies the problem of agglomerations and revolts are threats that historically have pushed strategies for social control into the urban ordination (Foucault, 2008). The need to control urban “dysfunctions” has been characterized by the tension between agglomeration, social heterogeneity and the idea that it was necessary to keep strangers (and strange habits) far away. As Tuan points out, “whatever the cities have changed over the time the conflict remains between the desire for an imposed socio-aesthetics and the reality of the mass living in a dynamic and confuse world” (Tuan, 2005). Therefore, the presence of strangers and outsiders is a permanent threat for a harmonic and safer society, where the system of trust among people is based on order, familiarity and predictable situations (Elias, 1993).

In contemporary neoliberal cities, the production of social fear is even more complex and involves a context marked by interconnected factors associated with the reinforcement of urban marginality as a result of neoliberal restructuring and its impacts on the urban space, with the formation of isles of enclosure (Soja, 1993) and gated communities (Marcuse, 1997). In this context, stigmatized and marginalized neighborhoods are the core areas for the reproduction of decivilisation process – an interpretation of Norbert Elias by Loïc Wacquant in his analysis on the American hyperghetto (Wacquant, 2008a). Wacquant suggests that these spaces of abandonment and the lack of social investment creates a perverse process of enclosure and dispossession that leads to the de-pacification, the erosion of public space; the organizational desertification and the politics of coordinated abandonment of public services in areas with high concentration of black and poor people as well as the demonization of the black sub proletariat and their symbolic denigration. Although Wacquant (2008a) applies Elias’ decivilization theory to explain the processes occurring in the American society, some aspects are very similar to the Brazilian context, where the neoliberal agenda and the reshaping of urban dynamics are reflected in the ‘punitive containment’ of favela as the socio-political and spatial section of the society where decivilization, demonization and symbolic denigration are reproduced. In fact, in other work Wacquant considers similarities between the American ghetto and the Brazilian favelas, although he recognizes divergences in the socio-political and historical condition of blackness.
For him, “in both societies multisecular cast or color divisions haunt the configuration of urban space and continue to impinge upon the functioning of the chain of institutions of law enforcement (...) in both nations, the penalization of urban marginality relies on reactivates symbolic associations between blackness and dangerousness” (Wacquant, 2008b, 68). I understand that there might be much more divergences than similarities between Brazilian favelas and the American ghettos, and it is not Wacquant’s intention to establish comparative analysis. However, it is clear that wider socio-political processes operating in the American ghetto are also operating in Brazilian favelas as part of a common dynamics resulting from the neoliberalisation of society and the responses to social contradictions. In this context the fall (or reshaping) of the welfare state and its institutions, the increasing social disparities, the rise of the “new dangerous classes”, and the growth of urban violence are processes in course of the Brazilian urban scene, where the effects of stigmatization (“demonization”) and its relation to the rise of violence have a particular impact on reshaping of the urban dynamics driven by the association of expansion of capital and social fear with severe consequences for the democracy in the city (Leeds, 1996).

Such processes are observed in Rio de Janeiro, where social fear is historically associated with the connection between poverty (and areas of poverty) and crime. Images and ideas linking favelas to urban violence are historically present in the collective imagination and are frequently disseminated by the mass media, soap operas, movies and literature (Fernandes, 2005). Such imagination has been constantly renewed and reinforced by cultural trends and new forms of representation of the urban evil of favelas. In the recent decades social fear has acquired a new shape due to the rise of armed criminal groups trafficking drugs in favelas. Such groups have dominated expressive parcels of urban territories taking advantage of the historical lack of sovereignty and authority of Brazilian State in favelas (Fernandes, et al. 2008). In such areas the life of the most forgotten people is in a social and symbolical shade, only visible when crime and violence is seen as a threat for those living in the bright “marvellous city”.

As result, it has produced a dual process in the urban environment. On one hand, the reconfiguration of urban dynamics within the growth of middle class gated communities and a wide range of new habits and practices linked to this phenomemon (Souza, 2000; Caldeira, 2000; Ribeiro and Telles, 2000). On the other hand the rise of tough strategies of social control and spatial enclosure of the poor – reflected not only in the key role played by the police but also in some social policies addressed to keep the social tension under control. In this instance, such strategies have transformed poor black male youngsters into the main target of stigmatizing practices performed by government and private agents.

In Rio de Janeiro socio-spatial inequalities are followed by civil rights and human rights violation, and are strongly associated with the social representation of favelas. Favelas’ historical stigmatization has been reinforced in the recent decades due to the presence of armed criminal groups, transforming the favelas in the main target of urban violence. This scene has increased criminalising responses, and diminishing the welfare in favelas, revealing the rising of a “penal state” in Brazil. With effect, violence has increased social fear across the city, and produced tough reactions addressed to favelas. Because of historical stigmatization, there is a general sense that the favelas’ residents are second class citizens. Therefore, there is a general sense that they do not deserve urban and social improvements and must be banished from the city. In this way, institutional violence performed by the state, in particular by the police, is sustained in a discourse marked by indifference and rejection. In this context, the favelas have been suffering massive historical structural violence which is marked by a lack of social development and human rights. Because of this, people living in favelas hardly ever have a place in the public sphere, being under-represented and socially invisible.

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2 It is important to highlight the recent strategies adopted by the Rio de Janeiro government in the recent years, where a shift on strategy has been producing more positive results in contrast to the historical approach performed by Rio’s police. The basic aspect of this new approach involves the permanent control of territories previously dominated by criminals by the creation of Pacifying Policing Units (UPP) within the favelas’ territory. It takes over previous major strategies involving great operations with large number of deaths and harm provoked by use of firearms. There is still no clear evidence if such a strategy will completely eliminate armed criminals from favelas. In the same direction, it is not totally clear if such an approach represents structural changes in the Police strategy. At a glance it seems a pivotal change in the way the marginalized groups are controlled towards a ‘softer’ manner. A good example is the work of Carvalho (2013) who shows the contradictions behind ‘pacification’. Similarly some human rights organizations (like the Observatory of Favelas) are discussing the social regulation of favelas under UPP model. They question whether such strategy means either ‘legal state’ for favelas or the reinforcement of a ‘territory of exception’.

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It means they have a low capacity to influence and pressurise for rights, living under the stigma and the pressure from hegemonic groups. As Holston and Caldeira point out, “the stigma of slum leaves little space for their dignity and vitality. It squashes people into totalizing characterizations and, in that reductive way, reproduces an over-determination of urban poverty that has difficulty recognizing spaces of intervention and agency” (Caldeira, 1999, 18).

As seen, in Rio de Janeiro urban violence is connected to the absence of the state, structural violence and low development in favelas. Similar to Souza (2000), I consider that urban violence is a result of an unsustainable model of socio-spatial development, which reinforces socio-spatial inequality and socio-symbolical marginality among the most vulnerable and stigmatized groups. Furthermore, such violence constitutes a dialectical process in which it is simultaneously the result and the agent of deprivation and inequality in Brazilian cities. As part of this process, cities become more fragmented, with isles of wealth and investments amid seas of deprivation and poverty.

The socio-political and cultural environment is characterized by the criminalization of poverty, the production of prejudice, and stigmatization and segregation of segments of the city’s population. The consequence of these processes is the ‘fragmentation of the socio-political and spatial urban fabric’ (Souza, 2000) that includes some relevant aspects and consequences for equality and wellbeing. As part of this, some socio-spatial processes operating in Rio can be highlighted.

The first process involves the production of social fear as part of increased prejudice and stigmatisation against favelas, resulting in social avoidance and indifference towards addressing the criminalization of the poor. The mass media play a central role in this process in so far as they produce, shape, and reinforce public opinion, spreading fear and reproducing stereotyped narratives and images about the dwellers of the favelas (Ramos and Paiva, 2007). In this case, poor young black men living in deprived areas are those most identified with crime and violence, and as a consequence, are the usual suspects identified by the police and the wider society (Ramos and Musumeci, 2005). Such representation is strongly linked to the construction of the idea of “drug trafficker”. As result, youngsters from favelas are the main targets of the demonization of the urban outcasts in Rio. In the construction of their social representation they are presented as a threat to society, putting at risk everyday life as well as the wealth and the aesthetic life-style based on values disseminated through the hegemonic culture of consumerism.

The second process is the production of strategies addressed to produce social control and spatial enclosure as part of a punitive containment (Wacquant, 2001). Such a process involves a wide range of management policies created to keep control and avoid unwelcome people in certain sections of the city. These policies include symbolic and physical interventions and are reflected in the management of public spaces (or semi-public spaces, such as shopping centres), policing approaches and social policy design. In this instance, the poor have their urban life experience restricted, resulting in poor social capital and limited world-view as well as awareness of their rights. As a consequence, it is observed that the restriction of urban experience constrains the right to the city. Here I mean that favelas are the Brazilian form of the neighbourhoods of relegation in which operates a punitive containment (Wacquant, 2001). Favelas are the areas of poverty and also the areas of violence, upon which policies of management of the urban outcasts are focused.

Thirdly, there is the production of fortified enclaves/gated communities and the reduction of the public sphere as a consequence of social fear, increasing the fragmentation in the city and the tension among groups, particularly between the “formal” and “informal” cities. These processes prevent integrated acquaintances among different groups, and also blocks integrated urban development and, consequently, worsens socio-spatial inequalities in the city. Practices of self-protection adopted by the use of private security services or community security are used in response to urban insecurity and are part of a wider process of social cleansing to keep undesirable groups out of the affluent neighbourhoods.

Finally, there is a subtle (though sometimes explicit) creation of a socio-political atmosphere of “state of exception” (Agamben, 2004) resulting in the informal restriction of rights and freedom as part of a strategy to tackle crime in favelas. Such conditions lead to the adoption of “rough justice” in the “shady” areas of the city and links to the rise of the penal state and the responses to advanced marginality in the neoliberal agenda which has been resulting in the militarization of urban marginality in Brazil (Wacquant, 2008b). Evidence of this process is observed in the rise of homicides and imprisoning. Homicide rates in Brazil have risen to 32% between 1992 and 2007.
There were 19.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1992 in contrast to 25.4 in 2007 (Ministry of Health, DATA-SUS). With regards to prison population, there were 148,000 prisoners in Brazil in 1995. This number rose to 361,000 ten years later. In 2010 this number reached 494,000 prisoners in Brazilian jails, which demonstrates that in 15 years, the number of prisoners rose by 150% (Ministry of Justice, DEPEN).3

**The construction of socio-spatial stigma**

_Favela hill is a legend in the city but nothing is more real than its mysteries._

_Few people went up that mountain – very few managed to see and understand the labyrinth of huts, hides, empty sepultures and wee houses of fake doors that compose the originality of the terrorist neighborhood where the 8th district police does not go._

_Chaweurs after ten o’clock do not accept passengers to the America Street._

_Trans after that time go quickly and the motorman and the conductor take in hands their pistols raised up_ (Barbosa, 1993 [1923], 111).4

The construction of _favelas_ as dangerous places is a key aspect to understanding the roots of criminalization of poverty in contemporary cities in Brazil, in particular those from the most stigmatized backgrounds which in Brazil are the afro-Brazilians and northeast descendants. Such social representation links to socio-symbolical processes that mark the history of _favelas_ in Rio, where strong stigmatization was the basis for a singular model of segregation in which symbolical barriers superimpose physical barriers (Fernandes, 2009). In this aspect, stigma results from the reinforcement of isolation and barriers between groups (Elias, 1993) and implies exacerbation of negative and depreciating aspects that define the differences among individuals (Goffman, 1988). In the specific case of socio-spatial stigma, it is relevant to highlight the symbolical place of _favelas_ in the construction of a discourse on urban violence (Fernandes, 2005). Therefore, the socio-cultural relations as well as its hegemonic social representations are relevant aspects to understand the criminalization of the poor, and also to explain the nature and specificity of social exclusion and socio-spatial segregation in Brazil (Fernandes, 2009).

Consequently, a process of _territorial alienation_ is observed in which the deterioration of community life and the entailments with the neighborhood are strongly associated with socio-spatial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2001). This problem of urban development in Brazil has become more complex in so far as _favelas_ and their dwellers are not seen as part of a structural problem, but as a problem themselves. Historically they have been blamed for urban problems and most of the time they are perceived as undesirable and unwelcome in the cities. They are often associated with social disorder and crime, being the main targets of controlling interventions (Abreu, 1994; Pechman, 2002). Some episodes in the history of _favelas_ in Rio can illustrate this situation. The best image of that is the association of the poor as an urban disease, as illustrated in an old cartoon titled “a needful cleaning” where the chief of the sanitation office, Dr Oswaldo Cruz, takes people out of the _favela_ as if they were head-lice. The most interesting aspect of the illustration is the fact these people were actually resistant to take the vaccine because they were concerned about side effects. However, the resistance from _favela_ represented a confrontation between rationality, science and civilization in contrast with barbarity and ignorance. The sickly aspect of _favelas_ is also an illustration of how these people represented a threat to the urban health. As seen, other hills look happy and healthy in contrast with a morbid appearance of _Morro da Favella_.

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3 Both homicides and imprisoning are socially and geographically localized, with clear targets and victims. Most of the 40,000 homicide victims Brazil has on average in a year are black male youngsters living in the poorest and most stigmatized neighborhoods (Cano and Santos, 2001; Cano, 1997; Ramos, 2009). The rate for homicides in the country figure among the highest in the world (UNODC, 2011). In 2007 the national index for homicides was 19.6 per 100,000 inhabitants while the index for youngsters between 15 and 24 years old was 50.1 per 100,000. The homicides among youngsters represent 1/3 of the amount of homicides in Brazil. In 2007 a total of 47,707 people have died from violence. From that 17,475 were youngsters. In Iraq, a country in declared war, for 2007 the total of deaths was 24,562 – half than Brazil. Rio de Janeiro city has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, as in this city, there are 41.45 homicides out of 100,000 inhabitants (Civil Police of Rio de Janeiro/ISP). This situation is even more dramatic among poor male youngsters, as the rate for youngsters from 15 to 29 years old figures in 152.04 homicides per 100,000 youngsters.

4 This is a free translation from the original in Brazilian Portuguese: “O morro da Favela ficou como uma lenda na cidade, entretanto, nada mais real do que os seus mistérios./Pouca gente já subiu aquela montanha – raríssimas pessoas chegaram a ver e a compreender o labirinto das baiucas, esconderijos, sepulturas vazias e casinholas de portas falsas que formam toda a originalidade do bairro terrorista onde a policia do 8º distrito não vai./ Os cheuffeurs, depois das dez da noite, não aceitam passageiros para a rua da America./ Os bondes depois dessa hora passam a nove pontos, e o motorneiro e o condutor levam nas mãos as suas pistolas engatilhadas.”
“A needful cleaning”, presenting the social representation of favelas as an urban disease. Rio de Janeiro, 1904.\(^5\)

Such representations of the poor and their living places as urban diseases are also found in literature, as illustrated in the novel ‘O Cortiço’ (‘The Slum’) written by Aloísio de Azevedo in 1890:

“And on the muddy ground covered with puddles, in the sultry humidity, a living world, a human community, began to wriggle, to seethe, to grow spontaneously in that quagmire, multiplying like larvae in a dung heap” (Azevedo, 2000, 12).

The sickly aspect of favelas and their dwellers has unfolded into more complex representations over the years. Its images and imaginations have incorporated other aspects of danger and threat. The current image of favelas includes the idea they are a threat to the urban environment and the source of urban violence. Although these images are linked to facts, information is exaggerated in negative aspects, reinforcing historical stereotypes. It is clear that the discourse once again blames favelas for their own problems instead of reflecting on the structural factors that push favelas to grow and poverty in the city. Therefore, favelas are socially represented as a problem themselves.

The election of favelas as a scapegoat in Brazilian cities has transformed favelas into a kind of socio-symbolical simulacrum of urban poverty in Brazil. Favelas have become the essential place for public interventions addressed to tackle urban poverty as well as the preferred territory for studies on urban poverty and charity (Valladares, 2000). Furthermore, favelas are the synthesis of urban problems, and such social representation reinforces surpassed ideas linking favelas to urban diseases which contaminate (or at least threaten) a healthy city\(^6\), as illustrated on a cover of the most important weekly magazine in Brazil, Veja (24/01/2001). On this cover, a colourful and vibrant city is surrounded by a grey and threatening favela. It calls attention to a yellow/red highlight saying “CANCER – the famous example” – no information is linked with the cover theme, but subtly connected with the cover message.

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\(^6\) Urban studies at the end of eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century were strongly linked to the idea of the urban as a body, and poverty as a threat to urban fabric health. Foucault (1984) for instance, investigates the birth of the “urban medicine” in the eighteenth century Western European cities. Brazil has suffered expressive influences from those ideas, having doctors and hygienists at the core of urban planning (Abreu, 1988; Hochman, 2006).
Weekly magazine *Veja* (24/01/2001). The cover says: “The periphery encircle. Middle class neighbourhoods have been squeezed by a belt of poverty and criminality that grows six times more than the inner cities in Brazilian metropolis”

Considerations like *Veja*’s cover reduce the understanding of socio-spatial complexities in Brazilian cities, and results in simplistic, sensationalist and reactionary world views. It also spreads fear and feelings of social avoidance and indifference against those who “squeeze” and threaten the supposedly healthy, bright, vibrant and happy life style experienced by the middle classes as illustrated on the cover image of the threatened city.

This context has been marking those areas for massive structural violence with a considerable lack of social development and human rights. This situation worsens the conditions for democracy and citizenship in *favelas*, and is reinforced by the pressure from conservative groups who believe the state must address control and policing policies instead of social policies. Because of this people living in *favelas* live with high risk and vulnerability. They are subject to violence performed by criminals and violations performed by the state. They also have little space in the public sphere, being under-represented and unable to exercise citizenship. They have low capacity to influence and pressure for rights, living under the stigma and the pressure from hegemonic groups. In this way, in most situations, it is possible to say that they live without constitutional guarantees.

In this scenario, under the strong influence of public opinion, governments have been reproducing practices that reinforce poverty and marginality instead of promoting rights and emancipation. Therefore, the social representation of *favelas* and their residents has produced an image that they do not deserve urban and social improvements. On the contrary, they must be banished from the city in protection of those who are in fact are supposed to deserve the state goods, those who are the ‘first in the line’ (Bauman, 2009). In this way, the dwellers of the *favelas* are urban outcasts who in a socio-political and symbolical sense are “the ‘excessive’ and ‘redundant’, that is the population of those who either could not or were not wished to be recognized or allowed to stay” (Bauman, 2004; Wacquant, 2001). Because of this, over the years such settlements and its residents have been abandoned by the state. Few initiatives have been taken and most of them were carried out based on strong prejudice and stigmatization, generally keeping them under control instead of producing autonomy and social change. This is a direct reflection of the treatment addressed for those living under social invisibility.

The condition of second class citizen (or even a non-citizen) summarized by the idea of “excessive or redundant” leads to the exacerbation of social indifference and the devaluation of life in *favelas*. In this case, there is no apparent difference between the “honest worker” and the criminal. They are part of the same homogeneous group labelled “*favelado*” – which is the adjective for “someone from a *favela*”. Here the territory of *favela* is determinant on the construction of internal cohesion and social identity, but also part of a stigma imposed from the outside. With effect, there is no clear separation between criminals and common people. In addition, for criminals from *favelas*, the treatment tends to be even more severe than for any other criminal. This fact reveals the disparities in Brazilian society, and the role of *favelas*’ social representations on human rights violations and the expressive indifference observed in the society when a criminal from *favela* is killed or arrested.
As the enemy, they are supposed to receive the toughest treatment whilst issues of human rights and civil rights are reduced in value in a kind of like-state of exception (Agamben, 2004).

**Drug Traffic, Youth and *Favelas*: An Explosive Mixture?**

The historical lack of state authority, sovereignty and investments in *favelas* is part of a systemic devaluation and abandonment of *favelas*. It is possible to say that such a process has been in part intentional and can be explained by the historical exploitation of *favelas* as kind of “urban black hole” offering the conditions for the reproduction of political interests (votes, paternalism) and either informal and illegal activities without rigid control from the state. Such a situation has led to the territorialisation of armed criminal groups who operate drug trafficking and other illegal activities in (and from) *favelas*. In fact, despite the fact that *favelas* is not the place of crime, it is possible to say that it is a place for crime due to its singular characteristics in the urban socio-political fabric. In this case, the intentional lack of state investment in *favelas* must be understood as a result of the weak institutional capacity to face crime and corruption powers, and the strong influence and penetration of these groups in the state structure (Alves, 2008).

There are two different criminal groups operating in Rio’s *favelas*: local drug traffic gangs and militias. Both configure organized criminal groups, linked to wider criminal networks and webs of corruption. Local drug traffic gangs are mainly composed of youngsters from *favelas*, although gang chiefs are usually older and more experienced members. Both groups are in several ways linked to wider structures of power and political influence in an intricate web of corruption and money laundering that involves not only local politicians and police officers but also high ranking members of the parliament and state authorities (Machado, 1996).

In this work is not my intention to undertake an extensive analysis of criminal networks in Rio. It has already been done elsewhere (Fernandes, et al, 2008; Silva et al, 2009). My intention here is to develop an analysis of the invention of the idea of “drug trafficking” as part of that wider process of intentional abandonment of *favelas* and the construction of its social representation. I intend to draw attention to the process of criminalization of youngsters and the growing indifference perceived in the Brazilian society with regard to their socio-symbolical marginalization, physical extermination and public devaluation.

Local drug traffic gangs are the most vulnerable and exposed part of an extensive international network (Souza, 1996). Local drug traffic gangs operate locally in a mix of gang structure and organized crime, involving different arrangements according to the criminal command and local particularities. In spite of this, they are indiscriminately labelled “drug traffickers” by the mass media and authorities in a dangerous generalisation. Two aspects configure the generalized idea of ‘drug trafficking’. The first is the simplification of a complex network involving arms traffic, corrupt politicians and the police as well as “invisible” investors that create the structural conditions for drug trafficking to happen. Second, the generalization of local drug traffic gangs exposes them as the face of “drug traffic” making them, as a consequence, the main target of a declared “war against drugs and crime”. Such generalization results in the demonization of local drug gangs, and in their image as the core idea of “drug traffic”. The fact they are the most vulnerable part of an extensive criminal network as well as the fact they are part of a social group historically stigmatized and criminalized are aspects that feeds police violence, social indifference and human rights violation not only against those ‘flip flop sandals bandits’ (Fernandes, 2009), but also throughout the population living in territories dominated by them.

By controlling territories, local drug traffic gangs have established their business with a strong connection within micro local dynamics. As a consequence, they have produced a particular regulation of local life through coercive control – which is based on the threat and the use of force (Janowitz, 1975).

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7 This is not a rigid rule because some gangs have younger chiefs. This is particularly more evident during the recent years when the death and imprisoning of older members made way for youngsters to take them over.

8 There are three main commands in drug trafficking in Rio: Comando Vermelho (Red Command); Terceiro Comando (Third Command); and Amigo dos Amigos (Friend of Friends). Each command has its own rules, but they follow similar references based on a mix of youth and machismo culture, hierarchical power and loyalty. More information about Rio’s drug gangs can be found (among vast literature) in Dowdney (2003), Observatório de Favelas (2006), Silva et al (2009), Cruz Neto et al (2002), Zaluar (1994). There is a specific article in which I develop an in-depth analysis of the local drug gangs in Rio (Fernandes, 2012b).

9 The idea of “flip-flop bandits” (“bandidos- de-chinelos”) illustrates the fragility of these youngsters operating at the most vulnerable point in that complex and multi-scalar network of drug trafficking. “Flip-flop bandits” are identified as “the drug dealer ones” by the wider society being the main target of the police.
It includes, in particular, the explicit use of fire arms and other violent ways of coercion in consonance with their interests. Coercive control is also a manifestation of machismo and power in favelas, and is used by criminals as a way to acquire prestige and respect. Such a process has been incorporated into daily life in favelas and has influenced, in particular, youngsters immersed in a context of wider social and civic invisibility. In this instance, joining a gang is a way to create a sense of identity, visibility and power (Silva et al., 2009). During the nineties, some changes in drug traffic hierarchies have led younger members to gradually become leaders, taking over from more experienced criminals (Dowdney, 2003). This situation has produced a shift in the “philosophy” of crime in favelas, producing a more violent and conflictive environment in contrast with the romanticised idea of “Robin Hood”—when drug traffickers used to establish a paternalistic relationship with the community in order to gain local support (Alvito, 2001). The rise of youth gang violence has produced a shift inside favelas. The increment of conflicts involving heavy fire arms and the breakdown of previous community chains from “Robin Hood” times had put the internal connections at risk, and had increased the barriers to democracy, citizenship and freedom (Leeds, 1996). This was even more emblematic because Brazil was experiencing crucial socio-political transformations with the redemocratisation and the new constitution.

In fact, changes observed in the wider society following the new democracy have not been observed in favelas, where the police kept the violent approach from the times of the military regime. This fact has worsened the conditions of life in favelas at the same time it increased the socio-cultural and economic divide in Rio. In addition, it reinforced the historical civic divide because the changes from the new constitution have not reached favelas equally. As a consequence, it was observed that there was a clear deficit of civil rights in favelas (Burgos, 1998) and the growing of urban disparities. With this, it has been observed the fragmentation of the urban socio-political and spatial fabric (Souza, 2000) and the reinforcement of socio-political and symbolical marginality (Fernandes, 2009). As a result, deep social contrasts associated with the rise of urban violence have increased indifference and social avoidance against those labelled as threatening and undesirable.

Following this process, it has been observed the construction of a singular social representation of youngsters from favelas during the nineties. The mass media has had a relevant role in this process, which is not only supported by the wider society but also a reflection of society’s expectations from media coverage. Research on the media and violence in Brazil has revealed that most media professionals recognize that media vehicles have great responsibility in characterizing poor areas as places of violence. In addition, subjects like culture, economy, sports and daily challenges are rarely reported – in particular when confronted with the large amount of news about police operations, shootings and sort of violence-related subjects (Ramos and Paiva, 2007).

Such social representation constitutes the construction of meanings and coherence to a discourse, making this assimilated and incorporated to a group (Jodelet, 2001). In this case, youngsters from favelas have been classified and labeled by external groups, being transformed into categories and images from which a discourse is elaborated. The criminalization of their cultural habits (such as the prohibition of Funk parties and the generalization of its linkage with criminal groups) is an example. Funk has been demonized and transformed as the music style of criminals and symbol of violence (Vianna, 2000).10 The same has been observed in favela’s youngsters’ apparel and behavior. The way they dress, walk, and speak has been systematically labeled negatively and in contrast with the aesthetical standard of a middle class consumerist society. Finally, they have been widely labeled as dangerous criminals (or potential ones), who perform the most perverse and dreadful crimes.

In this case the idea of suspicion and mistrust is a driving force not only in the police’s approach but also in the indifference from society – a dead youngster is first of all a “supposed drug dealer” and, because of this, a ‘disposable’ (Giroux, 2011) and “excessive, redundant” (Bauman, 2004) person in society. Such images have been constantly reinforced by episodes involving mutilated bodies, people being burned alive and other crimes that have been transformed into urban legends about drug dealers in Rio. However, despite the fact that such crimes were restricted to very specific situations, locations and groups - involving rivalry among gangs -, the general idea was that everyone in the city was subject to that and, of course, the simple fact you are close to a favela or black male youngsters from there might constitute a great risk of being horrifically killed or harmed. It reinforces the construction of an “ideal type” that is disseminated in form of hegemonic social representations which are shared by the wider society (Moscovici, 1988).

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10 In fact drug traffickers have been supporting funk parties and compositions of “forbidden funk” that tell stories about the power of gangs and inciting rivalry and fights among youngsters (Arruda et al., 2012). However, the criminalization of funk is once again part of a process of demonization and generalization of favelas’ youth culture.
Such representations are spread in the *talk of crime* (Caldeira, 2000), which is reproduced by common people’s daily narratives. This includes conversations, jokes, storytelling and works as a way to build a symbolic ordination of the world through the elaboration of prejudices and the naturalization of the perception of certain groups as dangerous. The talk of crime, in a simplistic way divides the world into good and evil, and criminalizes some social categories (Caldeira, 2000). In addition to the talk of crime, it is possible to identify a wide range of mass media products that play a significant role on the construction and reproduction of social representations. In recent years, Brazilian movies have been playing a core role in this process. One of the most famous examples is the blockbuster *City of God*.

In *City of God*, a set of stereotypes in *favelas* is presented, but it calls attention to the image of Zé Pequeno, famous and dangerous drug dealer who dominated the City of God between the seventies and the eighties. The representation of Zé Pequeno as a strong, violent, powerful, cold killer and vigorous man reproduces the general idea of *favela*’s criminals, and spread social representations based on very narrow criteria. However, such ideas are overrepresented, and transmits a general sense that all youngsters involved in drug gangs look like Zé Pequeno, and also, a general idea that all youngsters are at risk of becoming a Zé Pequeno “multiplying like larvae in a dung heap” of the life in *favelas* – to paraphrase the Brazilian writer Álvares de Azevedo (Azevedo, 2000). Evidence from research carried out by myself and colleagues at the Observatory of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Silva and Urani, 2002; Observatório de Favelas, 2006; Silva et al, 2009; Fernandes and Rodríguez, 2009; Fernandes, 2009) show that most youngsters involved in drug trafficking do not match with this general stereotype, although they usually pretend to use this as a way of self-affirmation and self-protection. It has also been demonstrated for research on drug dealers’ life trajectories (Rodriguez, 2011). For youngsters involved in drug gangs, the use of fire arms are restricted to specific positions and require some level of loyalty and reliability – reinforcing even more so the role of relationships as criteria to join a gang. In previous research (Silva et al, 2009) we found that 51.7% out of 230 youngsters had been persuaded to join a gang by friends (43%) or relatives (8.7% - mainly cousins). In fact, the reasons for joining a gang vary according to societal and cultural aspects. In the case of Brazil, the relationship between poverty, social invisibility and machismo must be considered. However, the collapse of family and community ties, as well as the incapacity of public institutions to increase social capital and self-esteem is also an element to be considered (Zaluar, 2004).

**Figure 3 – Zé Pequeno and the evil of favela’s criminal**

![Screenshot of City of God where Zé Pequeno appears in his powerful semblance – Source: Internet Movies Database](http://www.imdb.com/media/rm119439360/ch0004104)

**Urban Violence in the Perspective of Youngsters Living in Favelas**

In *favelas* and other stigmatized areas, the lack of state regulation and its failure in assuring rights, contribute to singular forms of violence among youngsters. They are in a particular situation, where the simple fact of living in deprivation put them at risk and increase their vulnerability. However, the conditions of violence experienced by youngsters add dramatic conditions to their life experiences, and imply a complex web of vulnerabilities, trauma as well as the development of resiliencies – even if it results in joining a gang (Rodriguez, 2011). In terms of violence experienced by youngsters in *favelas*, *peer violence* and *institutional violence* are two correlated manifestations of violence which are influenced by the wider *socio-symbolic violence* against *favelas*. 
Youth peer violence is based on gang conflicts, and has strong connections with the rules and normalisation imposed by drug dealers. In the case of Brazil, it is inserted in a wider idea of “community violence” (Silva and Silva, 2005), once it is reproduced inside *favelas* and based on socio-cultural and symbolical aspects that surround the conflicts among criminal groups. In this context, peer violence is strongly related to conflicts involving territory domination or at least, considering the territoriality of groups. Usually the crimes are linked to revenge or to disputes among opposing groups/gangs. When a member of an opposing group is captured, a brutal death typically occurs as part of a demonstration of power. Sometimes, depending on the level of dispute and tension among groups, it does not matter if a captured youngster is member of a gang or not. Simply the fact that he lives in an area dominated by a gang is enough to classify him as an “enemy”, as related by a youngster living in a *favela* in Rio de Janeiro:

*Do you fear walking about on the streets? Are you afraid of someone taking you away somewhere?*

*Yes. Certainly.*

*What are you afraid of?*

*I am afraid of a car stopping suddenly and throwing me inside the boot and then they kill me.*

*But why do you think it could happen to you?*

*Ah... because there is a lot of rivalry in the world... it could happen anytime. If I am going over there anybody could think: he is a bandit... so they could take me to the car... even here inside the favela, for example, it could happen... the guys from other side (rival gangs) could invade when I am hanging around and they could kill me. I am afraid of this.*(Edson, 16 years old, Favela da Maré, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2008)

The fear demonstrated by the youngster reflects the consequences of the disputes between gangs and criminal groups in *favelas*. Because of this, it is quite difficult or sometimes impossible for someone to cross physical (and symbolical) boundaries imposed by criminal groups. This is particularly serious among young males, who might be identified as an “enemy” for a member of a rival gang. But usually, this rule is accepted by any person living in a *favela* as part of a collective wisdom for internal safety. In this way, the incorporation as well as the naturalization of coercion are reproduced and reinforced in a cycle fed by fear, insecurity and vulnerability.

Rivalry is a way to establish a position, to defend a territory, but also a way to demonstrate power among peers and opposing groups. The production of self-empowerment and self-confidence is a clear attempt to produce social visibility in a context of social invisibility and stigma. Youngsters use the image of criminals as part of a strategy to be recognized even if it is part of a negative image.

By belonging to a criminal group they are part of a group with a sense of mutual identity and under the same rules; yet they have power, visibility and prestige. The production of social visibility is also strongly connected with market values. Poor youngsters are seduced by crime as an easy way to access products and objects they could not access before. As Vanderschueren(1996) points out, an environment characterized by consumerism, competition and propagation and legitimization of violence by the mass media influence youngsters living under deprived condition. He considers that “In a society that promotes consumption to the detriment of sharing, and unbridled competition at the expense of solidarity, young people with no hope of employment or success look for ways to gain a sense of achievement and recognition, if not from society then at least from their peer group. This often leads to or involves violence” (Vanderschueren, 1996, 93).

The influence of marketing and values transmitted through TV programmes and celebrities develops an atmosphere of superficial values and relationships based on what people have rather than in what people are. At the same time, the mass media produces and disseminates violence as a natural phenomenon in daily life, with excessive exposure of fire arms, generally associated with an image of power.

It is also possible to understand that the involvement of youngsters in gangs is part of some social frustration and negative experiences. This could lead them to non-adaptation at school, to a lack of personal discipline and to low self-esteem.

In research carried out by Observatório de Favelas (2006) it was revealed that the age between 11 and 14 is the critical period when youngsters leave school and begin to take drugs. In this research, 60% out of 230 interviewees joined a drug gang between the age of 12 and 15 years old.

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11 Edson is a nickname. This extract is part of several interviews carried out in 2008 as part of my PhD research about socio-symbolical marginality and violence in Rio de Janeiro (Fernandes, 2009).
Youngsters are at a critical period of their lives, when transitions towards important transformations happen (Silva and Silva, 2005). Vanderschuren (1996) considers that the lack of personal discipline and low self-esteem, creating psycho-social compensatory mechanisms that lead young people to join gangs, where anti-social behaviour and criminal activity became ways to affirm a specific kind of self-esteem mutually recognized by peers. Zdun (2008) also considers self-protection as a motivation to join a gang. It could be a strategy to keep safe in a context marked by frequent threats, even when you are not a gang member.

In this environment, some situations suggest that violence involving youngsters is the face of their rebelling. This reinforces an image that deviance, disruption and wickedness are expected from youngsters and fulfils negative stereotypes about them (Brown, 1998). However, youngsters are not necessarily rebelling and prone to anti-social behaviour, even if they live in social conditions where supposedly it could happen. Indeed the connection between youth and crime is socially set up at the same time that ideological discourse feeds political practices (Pitts, 2003). So, the problem is not the anti-social behaviour itself, but the consequences of its social representation and treatment.

For youngsters living in stigmatized areas the connection between anti-social behaviour and the social environment tends to be stronger in hegemonic social representation. They are transformed into a target of a wide range of interventions to prevent and to block their predicted behaviour. It increases the prejudice and violence against them, in particular from policing agents. In Brazil, where the police practices stem from non-democratic periods, the institutional practices are immersed into strong cultural values, such as machismo and authoritarianism, which enable practices that disrespect human rights and produce humiliation, and more revolt.

The main consequences of this complex context are the high rates of homicides and institutional violence, in particular among the poor and black youngsters. They are generally recognized as a threat to society, and most of the time indiscriminately identified as criminals. In this context they have been suffering a dual process of social invisibility and criminal visibility in terms of social representation. They are the face of fear on the streets and the main target of security interventions.

In this scenario, the institutional violence is based on abuse practiced by professionals working for institutions which should preserve rights, such as the police and the judicial system. It could be divided into several aspects, such as: prejudice, abuse, and killing. In case of the police, violence assumes the most dramatic face. The institution which should protect or prevent young people from violence does not do that but, on the contrary, produces more violence. Ramos and Musumeci (2005) have demonstrated that the combination of age, colour and area of residence made young black men who live in favelas or other deprived areas frequent victims of bad treatment from police officers. It feeds among youngsters feelings of fear and rancour towards the police. Due to prejudice and the social representation, police officers often capture youngsters randomly. They threaten and intimidate youngsters by arresting them or leaving them in “enemy territory”. It is also quite common for youngsters to be killed by police officers as an evident process of social cleansing. As police officers have institutional power, it is easy for them to blame youngsters for something. Even when youngsters are arrested with a reason, including some criminal activity, it is quite common for police officers try to negotiate bribes as part of corruptive practices. The following extract of an interview with a youngster illustrates this dramatic situation:

Do you know someone who has been caught by the police and then, killed?

Yes, I do. It was four years ago, in 2004. They caught W. He didn’t work for the drug traffickers, but the police officers thought he was a criminal. They thought he was the manager of local drug dealing. They put him inside a police car and started to go around the favela with him. They asked for bribes to rescue him but the local criminals refused, because they said W wasn’t one of them. But the police officers didn’t believe them. So they sold W to a rival gang.

12 The Police of Rio de Janeiro state alone was responsible for a total of 3,078 deaths between 2002 and 2004. In comparative way, in the same period in whole United States, the police was responsible for 363 deaths (Ramos & Lengrubler, 2004). The deaths caused by the police are classified as ‘resistance reports’ (“Auto de Resistencia” in Portuguese), which means that the deaths were result of self-protection reactions against a concrete threat to life of the police officers. However, there is strong evidence that those deaths were intentional. A study carried out by Cano (1997) has revealed that most of the cadavers had shots in the back or in the head.
Sometime after the rival gang returned W’s body completely chopped and they left it in the boundary between their territory and ours. W’s family was desperate as well as the neighbours. W didn’t have any involvement with drug trafficking or any other criminal activity. There was a big revolt here. It is very sad. Isn’t it? The family did not look for the police officers involved. The Police are powerful…(Felipe, 21 years old, Favela da Maré, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2008)13

This extract shows that the authority and abuse of power reflects the social representation of youngsters living in favelas. They are converted into an ‘it’, deprived of humanity, reinforcing the category of ‘dangerous’, ‘enemy’, ‘suspects’, transforming the extermination into a psychologically possible duty, as suggested by Galtung.14

Thus, institutional violence is strongly connected with socio-symbolic violence. This form of violence involves the consequences of the stigmatization in the social life, in social policy and in self-esteem. Symbolic violence is strongly connected with cultural values as well as the place of poverty, race and crime in the social imagination. This involves a strong relationship between the social representation of stigmatized groups and the treatment they receive from society and the government. Therefore symbolic violence is a form of cultural violence, which means aspects of culture and symbolic sphere that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence (Galtung, 1990).

**Reflecting on the Socio-Symbolical Marginalization of Favelas and Youngsters**

Socio-symbolical marginalization sustains strategies of socio-spatial control and enclosure. They limit the exercise of citizenship and autonomy, keeping people in an environment of socio-cultural inferiority and socio-political restriction. Social representations of stigmatized groups influence public policies as well as social programmes, obstructing people from breaking down some socio-symbolic barriers that constrain their lives in the city. Some preliminary questions arise from the ideas developed in this paper as a critique to the way some policies and interventions addressing youngsters involved in criminal activities are conceived. This is of course a generic discussion, much of which is based in the case of Rio de Janeiro city. However, it highlights some elements for a wider debate beyond the case of Rio.

The hegemonic concept of violence prevention is based on stigmatization and criminalization of unwelcome groups. This means, in other words, that some groups are naturally identified with criminal and anti-social behaviour as part of their life experience and as result of their social interactions. Such a view restricts violence prevention programmes to specific targeted groups, while the problem of violence involves much wider problems that sit beyond geographical and socio-cultural boundaries. It is the case of a systematic process socio-symbolic denigration, homogenisation, labelling and targeting of undesirable groups.

Public perceptions of violence are based on ideological values, and sustained by social fear, self-protection and punitive basis alongside social indifference and avoidance. This means that prejudice and stigma remain as strong elements of the social representation of violence and offenders. In this case, the construction of favelas’ social representation as well as the production of “drug trafficker” images are part of a selective process that leads to the demonization and criminalization of the poor.

Punishment and charitableness may have the same ideological foundations. So it is necessary to distinguish the foundations of their approach. They may be based on the idea that people are not able to have free judgment or autonomy in their decisions. It gives rise to control and manipulation. A good illustration of this comes from the apppellative image of poverty and misery which have been used for several charities as part of their fundraising activities. The so-called “porn poverty”15 uses the image of charitableness as a strategy but at the same time they contribute symbolically to perpetuating a social representation that has dangerous consequences.

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13 Felipe is a nickname. This extract is part of several interviews carried out over 2008 as part of my PhD thesis (Fernandes, 2009)

14 This could be exemplified with a famous quotation of a member of the parliament, MrSivuca, who used to say publically that “a good bandit is a dead bandit”. Unfortunately this idea is widely accepted by significant numbers of people in Brazil. For them the idea of Human Rights means benefits for criminals who should suffer as much as possible as part of their punishment. John Galtung (1990).

15 A provocative article on “porn poverty” can be found at [http://aidthoughts.org/?p=69](http://aidthoughts.org/?p=69)
**Final Words: The Symbolical Battle**

The symbolic denigration as suggested by Wacquant (2008a, 2010) is reproduced in the hegemonic social representation of *favelas* and in the creation of evidence that justifies the inferiority and the necessity of control of *favela* dwellers and, in particular, its suspect youngsters. This symbolical power system also produces a self-image based on self-prejudice and self-stigmatization, and, as a consequence, the breakdown of community ties and the traditional forms of social regulation, leading to an increase in violence as a response to social tension. The naturalization of violence as a process incorporated into everyday life experience in *favelas* may be understood as part of the production of an ontological safety, when the incorporation of stigma works as a protective barrier on the production of resiliencies (Silva and Leite, 2007). The lack of power and the absence of justice have led to the creation of a system of values based on conformity as a way to alleviate the effects of oppression (Goffman, 1988). In fact, the incorporation and reproduction of low self-esteem are the most evident expressions of the demonization and symbolic denigration in *favelas*. In this aspect, youth peer violence reflects a process of self-destruction that is ignored but wished by the most conservative groups in the society. This process not only corrodes the community life and hope further, but also reinforces hegemonic social representations on the evil of *favelas*.

The depreciation of culture and aesthetical values is part of a symbolical battle in which dominant classes impose a wide range of forms of social control and spatial enclosure, with the necessary justification and ratification of the socio-political and symbolical place of inferiority and invisibility of the *favelados*. Their cultural practices and values are not considered “culture”, but a sort of rudimentary and tasteless habits, as part of a “foklorization” of their culture. Their aesthetic is depreciated as part of a cultural imposition and cultural homogenization. In essence, there is no respect to the difference, but a strategy of cultural imposition. It produces self-prejudice as part of a strategy of socio-cultural squaring and naturalization of socio-cultural inferiority. These aspects demonstrate that there is a clear symbolical battle in the city. Such a battle has been lost by *favelas* over the time, and has acquired new and more complex shapes with the neoliberal restructuring operating in Rio.

I could not finish this work without reflecting on the possibilities for a positive future. In this case, although a concrete more positive future depends on structural changes in society, there are some small changes in course that reflect resistance and, in certain aspects, adaptation to survival.

The symbolical battle has already started, and there are several examples of it. Cultural movements, new leaderships and the growing number of university students from *favelas* reveal that an emergent movement is getting form. *Favelas*’ dwellers are finding their own ways to express their ideas and dialogue with other groups in the city. They are also creating synergies with agents from different fields to support their local initiatives. There is a critical mass being formed inside *favelas*, with a clear understanding that they need to produce and disseminate their own narratives and world views to confront the hegemonic stereotyping social representations produced by external agents that are clearly enemies in this battle.

In this context, the creation of alternatives for urban marginalization must incorporate the production and dissemination of marginalized people’s narratives and social representation. A first step is to create the socio-political conditions that enhance their capacities to sustain their own symbolic system, empowering them to spread and share their values and vision of world in the production of what I have been calling urban self-esteem (Fernandes, s/d).

*Urban self-esteem* regards the creation of conditions for the socio-political and symbolical emergence of marginalized and stigmatized groups in the city. This process involves in the first instance, the unconditional acknowledgement of the dwellers of the *favelas* as citizens with equal rights in the city and, in addition, the recognition of *favelas* as constituent parts of the city. In this case, it is necessary to recognize the dual and contradictory place of *favelas* in the formation of the cultural and social environment of the urban life. The recognition of *favelas* as a component of the city’s history would reposition *favelas* in the socio-political and symbolical scene, bringing new possibilities to reflect on the model of urban development in Rio. Several strategies must be adopted in this direction – from the participation of the dwellers of *favelas* on the design, implementation and evaluation of public policy, to the change of attitude from professionals and institutions working with them.

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16 I owe this neologism to my colleague Marcus Faustini who is an engaged and critical cultural activist in Rio.
It would involve, for instance, a more critical understanding of professionals’ engagement within marginalized groups, and the valorization of a ‘critical pedagogy’ (Giroux, 2011) in the professional formation. But the big challenge behind (and beyond) all of this, is to reinvent the public sphere in order to rescue and recreate the essence of urban life that is the city as the place of difference, divergence and product of collective agency performed by its citizens – all of them.

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In my view it is clear that some relevant changes should start at universities. Universities are key institutions in the formation of professionals and relevant participants in the production of knowledge, and, by extension, for public opinion as well as policy impact. The incorporation of a critical pedagogy into universities’ agendas should be taken seriously, in particular in times of great marketization of education and lack of engagement between universities and marginalized groups. In this aspect, the ‘university extension’ model adopted by Brazilian universities offers an interesting framework in which students and researchers exchange experiences and learn from communities at same time they have the opportunity to question the social representations behind professional values and attitudes.


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