Military in-and-out of Politics: A Theoretical Approach to Military Disengagement

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Abstract
Military disengagement from politics is not a dichotomous case because of the unclear boundaries between military and civilian rule in politics. Therefore, there is a spectrum of military withdrawal from politics. The different types of military regimes that the military creates once in power create, with regard to the terms of the level and range of intervention, its consequences on economic and social development, and the role of the military in national defense, makes it even more complicated. The decision of the military to withdraw from politics is not as simple a process as it is expected because of the interactions of many variables involved in the process which create different paradigms that the military regime may follow to give up power or share it with civilians. This is clear in the Arab world with its unique political development which makes it a case study of military intervention in politics.

Keywords: Democratic transition, military withdrawal from politics, coups, re-intervention, Arab World

1. Introduction:
With the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the world moved toward more democratic states, and the question of the role of the military in politics started to disappear from the scholarly agenda. This was in sharp contrast to the significant interest about the same question in the 1950s and 1960s during the epic of military coups in the Third World. With the unexpected changes in the Arab world in particular, and the developing world in general, the role of the military in politics needs to be readdressed and analyzed in light of new circumstances. This requires rediscovery of the process of analysis, refinement of old paradigms, and development of new methods to understand the issues. The most important aspect is to develop a generalization model to explain and predict the patterns of military involvement in politics in the developing world and not stop at case studies, as important as they are, to advance our knowledge.

The generalization of the military’s political behavior must be studied with caution. Samuel Huntington’s argument that increased professionalization of military leaders lead to their disengagement from politics is problematic when applied to the Third World. The criteria of professionalism used by Huntington do not necessarily lead to more politically conservative armies (Huntington: 233-237). Huntington views the professional military as a body with customs and norms of its own, and writes that a healthy society must preserve the autonomy of the military while simultaneously integrating it into an important decision-making role. In The Soldier and the State this thesis is stated at the outset: Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security. They increase their likelihood of reaching right answers to the operating issues of military policy. Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks (Huntington: 1957, 2).

In this paper, we will look at the trends of military disengagement from politics in the Third World in general and the Arab world in particular. The paper is arranged as follows. In the second section we look at the general theoretical explanations of military withdrawal from government roles. The third section examines reasons for military withdrawal from politics. In section four we review different paradigms that military regimes might take when they decide to withdraw from politics. Section five looks at the case of re-intervention in politics by the military. Section six is a brief assessment of the military role in the Arab world with specific attention given to Egypt, followed by our conclusion.
2. **Theoretical Classifications:**

One of the main problems that the study of military disengagement from politics faces is the unclear boundaries between military and civilian rule in politics. It is not a dichotomous issue of an exclusive nature. Therefore, it is not clear what is meant by military withdrawal from politics, since the armed forces will always be associated with politics because of its role in national defense (Messas: 1992, 243-244).

There is a spectrum of cases of military involvement in politics between the two extreme points of complete military and complete civilian control of power, described as “military participation is politics” (Welch 1987:13). A movement along that spectrum indicates the level of withdrawal from politics.

This withdrawal is viewed by scholars in a consistent way. For Finer, it is the situation where the military bows to the supremacy of civilian authority (Finer 1962:28). That means the military recognizes both in principle and in practice, that the nation’s policies are the responsibility of civilian leadership. In the same direction, Welch defines military withdrawal as when the military acts within well-defined and accepted channels where the ultimate power is in the hands of the government. In the bureaucratic process, it provides its professional service and accepts the policies of the government that direct the military duties and actions (Welch 1987:13).

Another difficulty deals with the different types of military regimes that the military creates once in power. Finer (1974) used two criteria to classify military regimes: how much the military controls major policies of the state and how often they do. Based on his criteria, he identifies five different military regimes ranging from direct to indirect intervention in societal affairs (Finer 1974:5-6). This classification allows the study of military withdrawal from politics from different perspectives. These include, but are not limited to, the style of withdrawal, the length of withdrawal, and the possibility to re-intervention (Maniruzzaman: 21-26). Types of withdrawals include scheduled and planned withdrawal, abrupt withdrawal, withdrawal through social revolution, withdrawal through mass uprising, and withdrawal forced by foreign intervention. The length of withdrawal can be linked to the possibility of the return of the military to either the barracks or the “presidential palace” (22).

In addition, disagreement about the efficiency and depth of military intervention in economic and social affairs is still ongoing among scholars, particularly the efficiency of military in economic development and whether it has a positive, negative, or neutral effect (Deger: 1986, 1-36). These issues play a major role in determining the degree of persistence of military regimes in social affairs (Sundhaussen: 543).

The study of military withdrawal from politics remains a very fertile field for scholarly research. The level and range of intervention, its consequences on economic and social development, and the role of the military in national defense are a few reasons that make the field so important to study (Maniruzzaman: 17-18). Other aspects that make the study of military withdrawal from politics as crucial and pivotal to understanding political development include:

- The factors that lead to military withdrawal from politics are rarely studied. Researchers pay more attention to factors of military intervention and their policies while in power than factors determining their withdrawal (18).
- The persistence of military regimes in politics made some scholars believe it is premature to study them in comparative aspects (Sundhaussen: 543).
- The lack of generalized and comprehensive studies about the field beyond case studies. There is no book written about the subject except for Manuriruzzam’s work, which was written about 25 years ago. Before that, there were studies that focused mainly on geographic regions in the analysis.
- The change of the number of military regimes around the world especially in the Third World goes in cycles through time. From the end of WWII through the 1950s and 1960s, the number of military takeovers in the world was on the rise, but started fading out in the late 1970s and 1980s. These waves of military intervention and withdrawal from politics are accompanied by similar waves of academic publications about the issue.
- With the collapse of the dictatorships in many Arab countries, the need for analysis of the military role in politics is as important as ever.

For the reasons set out above, the need to dust off the old theories is more important than ever. Review of old theories may explain the new waves of military disengagement from politics. If they do not, then the need to start new paradigms incorporating prior theories and the developments of new ones is crucial to understanding this issue (Welch 1992: 323).
3. Why Military Withdraw from Politics?

The main theoretical argument to explain the phenomena is the organizational characteristics of military and the environmental aspects around them. These factors are called the endogenous and exogenous variables of the military action toward engagement in politics. In the next few sections we will shed lights on these factors.

The endogenous variables or the organizational structure of the military as factors that cause the military to withdraw from politics consist of few variables itself. The first is the level of professionalism of the armed forces. Professionalism, according to Huntington, is defined in terms of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. He considers that the military profession stays the same over time and it is not affected by the transformation of society. Based on this view, he sees that a professional army concentrates on increasing its fighting capabilities to perform its main duty of defending the state. The military, “stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state” (Huntington 1957: 84).

In other words, the more professional the military, the more they accept civilian control. The opposite view (Janowitz 1960) argues that professionalism instills the ability and willingness to intervene in politics to protect its interests, institutional structure, and standards. This means that military professionalism encourages the military to stay in power once it intervenes. Janowitz sees military professionalization as a dynamic process where its professional characteristic changes over time with social changes.

Another view is advanced by Alfred Stepan, who argues that the new professionalism of the military, which focuses on national security and national development, encourages a broader political role of the military than the old professionalism, which focuses on external defense (Stepan 1988:5-8).

Based on the findings of these approaches, the argument that the military withdraw from politics due to professionalism is still contentious. The lack of clarity is partly related to the focus of this literature, where more attention has been given to the expansion of the military’s role in coups and social affairs than to the reduction of such roles (Welch 1992:326).

The presence of a charismatic military leader is considered to affect the decision to withdraw from politics. As Welch (1976) argues, leadership is a very important factor in determining the achievement and maintenance of civilian control of the military (Welch 1976: 313-315). In this view, the withdrawal is caused by the efforts of the charismatic leader or leaders who want to change the role of the military from intervention to participation. They accomplish this goal by instituting the spirit of enhancing the civil institutions within the military, which will increase the community feelings in society.

Huntington (1956) sees the role played by Ayub Khan in Pakistan, Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, and Chung Hee Pak in Korea, among others as an example. According to Welch (1974), a charismatic leader can achieve his goal of changing the role of the military in politics only when he considers the socioeconomic variables, the different views of military factions, and the changing environment of civil-military coalition (Welch 1974: 219-220). The problem here is the lack of the definition of a “charismatic leader” and if it necessary for such a leader to come from the military institution. Some scholars argue that the military does not want to see any officer with strong political and leadership skills who may attract popular support among its ranks (Linz 1975: 240-242). This factor needs more systematic approach in analysis, rather looking at specific cases.

The awareness of their own interests is another endogenous factor in determining the military decision toward withdrawal from politics. The belief is that withdrawal will serve the military corporate interest by preventing a further decline in their image and to correct the problems associated with intervention in politics such as cohesiveness, hierarchical structure, and reputation. The military tries to extract assurance from the civilian government that their interest and the leadership’s fate must be protected. The civilian government can last in power only if they guarantee protecting the military’s interest and pardon its leadership from legal prosecution (Messas: 1992, 247). In this regard, some scholars argue that the military as an institution can lobby better for their interest if they are not running the government themselves. This can be seen in the decision of allocating resources for the military (Stepan 1988: 70-74).

The decision whether the military withdraws from politics or not is used to classify the types of military regimes as an indigenous factor in the process of withdrawal. The distinction between the military regime as an “arbitrator” or “ruler” is the explicit manifestation of that (Perlmutter 1977: 104-110).
The arbitrator military regime interferes when it feels the need to remove obstacles facing the functions of the civilian government and withdraws from politics after it accomplishes this limited goal. This is short intervention and the “return to the barracks” happens in an open manner without suppressing the officers who oppose intervention. This type of regime believes in the ability of the civilian government to run the state’s affairs and the limitations of its own abilities to do so (Maniruzzaman: 61-62).

The ruler type of military regime incorporates the concept of new professionalism. This concept includes the political and economic roles of the soldiers as well as their security roles and what makes the military an agent of social and political change. This large mission of the military makes it fit to intervene to rule and not to withdraw. They only withdraw because of exhaustion and erosion of will when they realize that it is much harder to establish and run an efficient government than what they anticipated (80-81).

The last factor in the organizational characteristic of the military in determining withdrawal is the level of homogeneity and cohesiveness among different military factions and officers. A homogenous military due to common language, ethnicity, and religion is likely to strengthen the connection between the military and the state. This makes it easier for the military to subordinate to civilian control. The opposite, such as different factions with low bonds in the military, creates different loyalties that reduce the ties between the military and the state and makes organizational effectiveness hard to keep; therefore, it will be hard for civilian authority to control the military (Messas: 1992, 248).

The environmental characteristics, or exogenous variables, of the withdrawal point to the hypothesis that the withdrawal is a result of factors outside the military itself. In that regard, we can look at some specific factors. Military intervention or withdrawal from politics does not happen in a vacuum. This means there are always political forces working in the society, as coups d’états happen when the civilian regime cannot stop social upheaval and the military intervenes because it believes it has a national internal security duty (Welch 1992: 330). Also, when civilian groups organize themselves and agitate strikes, riots, and demonstrations to show their opposition to the military regime, they may make it very costly for the military to stay in power and force it to return to the barracks. Many cases speak to this, especially in southern and Mediterranean Europe (Danopoulos 1984 and 1991). The important question is whether these social movements are causes, consequences, or simply correlated with the military withdrawal from power. This question is not answered fully in the literature (Welch 1992: 330).

When a military regime takes some unsuccessful policy measures, especially foreign policy, that prove to have harmful consequences for the country and its international relations, the military may decide to leave politics and allow for civilian government to replace it. Scholars point to the cases of Pakistan in early 1970, Greece in 1974, and Argentina in 1982 as examples of this type of withdrawal (Danopoulos: 1988).

One of the crucial policies that capture attention is the economic policies of military regimes. When the population is unsatisfied and unhappy with the state of the economy, they will try to find ways to force the military out of politics. As many studies found, there is a link between economic conditions and military withdrawal in different regions of the world, but they did not reach a generalized result (Welch 1992: 330). Even studies that associate military regimes with economic growth did not find strong support for the military as the cause of development (Mckinaly and Coham: 1976, 308-310).

The regional environment toward democratization and withdrawal of the military from politics in a country is influenced by such dynamics. As a classic example, this indirect impact can be seen in Latin America during the 1980s (Cavarozz: 1992). Expanding this environment to an international stage by looking at the global waves of democratization is another exogenous factor in the withdrawal decision. An example can be seen when totalitarian regimes, especially Communist governments, fell at the end of the Cold War, and made the existence of military regimes whose goal was to fight Communism unnecessary. Another dimension is the politics of international actors, such as the European Union and the United States, concerning human rights and supporting the spread of democracy, which may have been instrumental in ending military regimes in different regions in the world (Huntington 1992).

Another way international actors can pressure military regimes to withdraw from politics is through the cut or reduction, or the threat of such action, of financial, military, and economic support. This factor shows the importance of material incentives as a means of encouraging military withdrawal from politics (Sundhaussen 1984: 545-552).
When the moral and material pressures by international actors do not achieve the goal of convincing military regimes to end their political rule, then international actors might apply direct military force. Many examples of such acts include the removal of the military regime in the Dominican Republic by the U.S. and Bokassa by France, among other examples. The most recent well-known example is the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime by the U.S. in 2003.

4. Options of the Military Regime Toward Withdrawal from Politics:

The dynamics of the military regime’s decision to enter politics is based on the characteristics of its involvement, either directly or indirectly. When a military decides to intervene in politics it has two options: either to keep power or return it to civilians. However, such options have implications for the political participations of social forces. This creates four paradigms military leaders may follow:

4.1 Return and restrict: The return and restrict option is when the military regime decides to return the country to civilian rule and run elections, but limits participation for certain political movements and excludes other. An example here is what the military in Argentina did in 1955 after overthrowing Peron and banning the Peronist movements and also the Ghanaian military in banning the Nkrumah organization.

4.2 Return and expand: This option is when the military returns power to civilian rule and cooperates with and welcomes back “old” banned traditional political movements. An example is the Venezuelan military in 1958 after overthrowing the Jimenez regime and permitting the freedom to work for the former Democratic Action Party. Similar is the case in Colombia in the same year after the fall of the Rojas regime.

4.3 Retain and restrict: This option is when the military keeps the role and limits political participation by other political movements. This is what the Brazilian military did in 1964 and the Greek military in 1972.

4.4 Retain and expand: The retain and expand option is an old game where the military expands the political participation to give the military a wider power base outside its immediate social and political base. In this, the military will encourage new political forces to participate to balance the old political movements. This was done by the Peron regime in Argentina and in Peru during the Arbenz regime. Both regimes tried to mobilize the peasants behind them to balance the old political forces (Finer 1974: 13-14).

The choice of what option to follow is not simple, and military leaders are not totally free in their choice. In this direction, some scholars try to expand Finer’s postulate that military intervention depends on “disposition” and “opportunity” to explain the decision to withdraw from politics. Therefore, the choice among the above options depends on disposition, which are the endogenous factors, and the opportunity, which are the exogenous factors. Simply, the analytical model used to study the military withdrawal from politics is based on the reasons and the preconditions of withdrawals (Sundhaussen: 547).

5. Re-Intervention:

The re-intervention decision by the military refers to the reversal of the policy of the civilianizing that may happen in the framework of the three options of withdrawal: retain and expand, return and restrict, and return and expand. The military-civilian coalitions under the retain and expand option may be liquidated by the military, as happened in Egypt in December 1952, or by a coup by military factions not directly involved in the government, as occurred by toppling Peron in 1955.

Under the return and restrict option, the military may easily be tempted to use its reserve power and overthrow the civilian government. This can be seen in what happened in Argentina in 1962 after the Peronists won about 35% of the votes in general elections, but the military President refused to accept the results. Similarly, in Turkey in 1971 when the new “named”, old Democratic Party pursued the execution of Menderes, who the military saw as a threat. Under the option of return and expand, the military may re-intervene, as what happened in Ghana in 1972 and 1981, Chile in 1973, and Pakistan in 1977 (Finer 1962: 171).

Re-intervention does not happen simply because the military has a second thought about its power in politics or some factions or military leaders do not agree on the degree and time of civilianization. In this, we mean that the military does not easily forget that is not well suited to govern and its humiliation by bringing civilians in the government to govern. The intervention may occur because the same problems that existed before the coup the first time did not disappear with the civilians being in charge or they may have even become worse. In other words, the disposition of the military to intervene returned and the opportunity has clearly increased.
However, to blame the civilian government’s ill performance for military intervention is not totally correct. It is not easy for the military to recognize the difficulty in problem-solving. They expect that civilianizing the government will create efficient administrative structure to achieve national goals. When these expectations fail, the military may decide to topple the civilian government and takeover.

In some cases, the military has intervened in politics multiple times, as it regularly did in Syria in the 1950s and 1960s and in Ghana in the 1970s and 1980s. First, the military continues intervening whenever it is not satisfied with the civilian rule and keeps the return and expand option in hand. Society is unable to develop civilian elites that can solve the crisis its political culture faces, which creates a vicious cycle of fast-changing ruling regimes. Second, the military may try to reform the system so there is no need for another intervention. Turkey had this experience in the 1980s and 1990s in creating a new political order that did not allow the return of old civilian politicians, which the military saw as the reason for failure of the policies to put Turkey on the right path. This approach did work very well in Argentina since the socioeconomic policies implemented by the Peronistas governments could not be totally removed by military decrees.

Military leadership may come to the conclusion that the unrestricted return to a civilian rule without the right conditions is undesirable and will damage the prestige and self-esteem of the military. Also, the military may believe that the different degrees of the return and restrict option may lead to more intervention and instead decide to retain power.

Under the retain and expand option when the military builds coalitions with some civilian group, if the civilianization conditions are still strong and the reasons to withdraw are favorable, then power will be transferred gradually to the civilian side. If these conditions become weak, the military will dominate the political system until the preconditions for withdrawal become available (Sundhaussen: 547-558).

6. The Military in-and-out of Politics in the Arab World: Brief Assessment:

The first analysis of military rule in Middle Eastern politics was the work of Khadduri (1953). He argues that the social and political movement after WWI sped the process of Westernization in the Middle East beyond the ability of the people to adapt to the new concepts. There was no agreement on fundamentals. This brought the nations to require strong regimes that did not tolerate anarchy in the system. To protect such regimes, there was a need for a strong coercive apparatus, the military.

Historically, there was a close association between the rulers and the military in the region. As the main power in the system, the military was able to depose one ruler after another at their pleasure, which led to the interconnected relationship between the army and the rulers. This significant feature of Arab societies made modern historical events in the region not surprising. Well-disciplined, organized national armies were built along European lines. When countries gained sovereignty, more attention was given to the military to act as guardian of the new independent state.

Army officers were drawn from the middle class in general, and they often played an active role in national decisions. Even though the army was under the influence of political groups, army officers had their own political ideas. When army officers felt that the government was not performing as it should, the officers reacted by overthrowing the politicians and punishing them for their mistakes. The army followed this path in Lebanon for a short period, and more extensively in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. In Jordan, the military was under the rigid influence of the British command, and therefore they did not move. Specifically, younger army officers were on the move rather than the older ones. The motive for them to engage actively in politics was their belief in the need for social revolution, which was not possible under the existing regimes and the democratic process (Khadduri: 511-520).

In the modern history of the Arab World, the military relationship with society went through three stages. First, the formation stage under the colonial powers, which continued in one way or another even after independence, the effects of which are still seen today. Second, the development and growth stage, in which the military played major roles in the national development and in social and economic programs (Alkhurri 1990:13-15). The third stage is disengagement from the direct role of government affairs, where it reduced its intervention in the economic and social spheres of the government (Cooper: 203-204). These stages are not static, but their elements interact and connect, which makes the timeframe for each one not as clear from the others.
The formation stage was the stage of building and developing of armies under European colonization. This stage is marked with the inclusion of minorities to build the armies and the use of the armies as a coercive apparatus to maintain the security of the system (Alkhouri: 24). The colonial powers believed that minorities would better serve their interests rather than the majority who refused their presence (Janowitz: 1964: 52). Based on that policy, the military became more interactive with society compared to the Ottoman’s rule. This connection made the military take on the characteristic of a professional organization, an ideal system for development. These two characteristics are still the image of the military today (Alkhouri: 24-25).

The creation of new states and the new structure of the army were based on the middle class, who made the decision to join the army as a way to upgrade their social status from all strata and ethnic groups. During the colonial period, the top military leadership came from the autocracy class that was connected with the particular system (Torrey 1963:54). This made the military unable to reach to all sectors of the society. After achieving independence, the policy of recruiting, especially for officers, changed during the stage of development and growth. The sons of government employees and farmers who finished high school were able to join military academies. However, the domination of the minorities was not totally changed (Berri 1970: 29-33).

After independence, the military had three characteristics: professionalism, an ideal for development and growth, and an image of the state to reach different sectors of society. During that period, many Arab countries were engaged in wars inside and outside their borders that enhanced the importance of the military. Some scholars assume that the military intervention in politics is because of the roles it played in such wars (Alkhuiri: 27-28). However, the actual drive for intervention was the strong attention and support paid to the military by the state and public compared to all other institutions. As an example, the military was receiving more than 50% of the budget in most Arab states. The military became the first institution to use “modern technology” in its operations, even though it was imported. This induced the public to view the military as the technological institute of society (Vatikiotis: 87). The military became the example of development because of the benefits it provided to its members, such as work compensation, health insurance, retirement, and promotion. It became an example of a social-care institution and a “future example” for the public.

As the institution that had the legitimate authority of coercion, the military had the capability of changing and reforming social systems, including the political system, unrivaled by any other institution. But its interaction with other political, social, and economic institutions limits its ability in leading the process of development and progress. The military is part of the social system, and therefore its capability of changing it is related to the circumstances in other institutions in society (Alkhouri: 31).

The third stage is the military’s disengagement from direct rule in politics. After its dominance of the political process during the 1950s and 1960s, the military started limiting its areas of responsibility and became merely a branch of the government and a lobby in competition with other institutions (Welch 1976). This subordination of the military to civilian authority should not be confused with a transition to democracy. The breakdown of authoritarian regimes does not necessarily mean a transition to democracy, because there are instances where the former is not followed by the latter and one coup d’état may only change the ideological orientation of the regime, not end it (Linz: 144). The histories of Iraq, Syria and Egypt speak to this.

Egypt provides a good example of military disengagement from politics. After controlling the government and the political process from 1952 to 1970, the military began to be sidelined by the governments of Presidents Sadat and Mubarak. A combination of social, political, and economic conditions made the military able to take over and monopolize power. The leaders of the military saw themselves as the only cohesive group capable of saving the nation and setting it on the right path (Herb: 269-276). Sadat’s accession to the presidency in 1970 brought a radical change in the structure of the Egyptian regime. Sadat’s lack of charisma as compared to Nasir and his unfriendly relationship with the old guard of Nasir’s regime made him realize that he could not govern until he sidelined his enemies within the military. In May 1971, he purged the top elite of the military leadership and their associates from their positions. Sadat’s new course of leadership put the military and its leadership under the control of the new regime. Sadat’s strategy was to replace the military leadership with apolitical Generals, which made the Egyptian military totally subordinated to the civilianized leadership. It also resulted in a more professional military dedicated to external defense.
After Sadat’s death, President Mubarak’s focus was on institutional stability of the regime. The achievement of such stability was made possible by increasing the professionalism of the military and using it for the state control of power. The military started having more social and economic functions in society (Gotowicki: 1-7). At the same time, President Mubarak restricted the influence of the officer corps from political decisions. The Egyptian military seems to have accepted its declining role in the political process (8-9). This can be seen by the declining direct role of the military, and officer corps in particular, in the Egyptian cabinet and the military presence that remained in the cabinet was rotated (Copper :205-223).

7. Conclusion

The theoretical explanations for the withdrawal of the military from politics are based on the characteristics of the military institution, or the characteristics of the domestic, regional, or international environments. The military organizational characteristics focus on the development within the military institution, such as concern for its interests, while the environmental characteristics examine social, political, and economic factors working outside the military and sometimes outside the state.

The withdrawal of the military from politics is not a simple process by any means; it depends on multiple variables. Therefore, the interactions of these variables create different paradigms that the military regime may follow to give up power or share it with civilians. These paradigms suggest that military regimes are not capable of providing long-term solutions to political processes in the state. The re-intervention of the military in politics makes the withdrawal even more complicated, which makes the assessment of the military role in unstable political systems hard to achieve.

The Arab world provides an excellent case study military intervention in politics. With unique cultural and political development in those countries, the military association with society went through different stages that made the military a unique institution that either preserved or changed the political, economic and social systems. In many Arab countries, military officers still govern, intervene, withdraw, and re-intervene in politics. Clearly, the process of civilianization of military regimes is far from complete. We can conclude that although military regimes were not able to provide the solution in society they hoped to achieve, military regimes have yet to come to an end.

References


