

The Role of External Actors in Peace-Building and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Nizigiyimana Désiré Louis

Ph.D. Fellow

Political Theory and Political Science
LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome.
Viale Romania 32, 00197 Roma
Italy

Abstract

External actors play various roles in the process of democratization in many African countries. In this paper, I evaluate and discuss various contributions that external actors made in promoting peace-building and democratization processes in three countries, namely, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). I take peace-building and democratization as a unitary model of democratic anchoring in the three countries and examine the conditions and mechanisms for promoting peace and democratization in post-conflict societies. I then argue that the model of democratization which starts with peace-building involves many parameters which contribute to conditions of success, and that this model of democratization remains an area which is largely open to further scholarly exploration.

Keywords: peace-building, democratization, external actors, anchoring democracy.¹

African countries are following different paths in their democratization processes. For some African countries, democratization has been preceded or is pursued after a series of internal conflicts. By comparing democratization trajectories of different African countries, one realizes that a number of African countries have followed a pattern of democratization which starts with peace-building. Under this pattern of democratization, the peace-building process lays down the political foundations for democracy. Nevertheless, in the process of peace-building and democratization in Africa, external actors play an important contributive role and use different mechanisms or strategies to promote democracy. Those mechanisms are, for instance, diplomatic pressure, imposition, threat of sanctions and aid conditionality. This paper makes a comparative analysis of the contribution of external actors in peace-building and democratization in three African countries, namely, Rwanda, Burundi and The Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC hereafter) and evaluates the patterns external contributions followed and their impact on the political processes towards democratization. The analysis and discussion of the paper will focus on the contributions of the following organizations and countries in the peace-building and democratization processes in the three countries: United Nations (UN), donor countries (in the EU) and former colonizing country (Belgium), regional organization (African Union: AU), and some African countries (Tanzania and South Africa).

External actors use various strategies to promote peace and democracy in Africa. Some among the common mechanisms external actors use to promote peace-building and democratization in Africa include diplomatic pressure, imposition, threat of sanctions and aid conditionality. These mechanisms are particularly in practice for countries in which democratization processes take place after a period of internal instability. Under the conditions of internal instability, peace-building becomes the priority as a process of laying down the political foundations for democracy. In other words, in the case of internal instability, we have a process of peace-building which sets the ground for democratic change. One may then wonder why in many African countries (at least in the three cases under study in this paper), there is no peaceful transition to democracy?

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One approach to responding to this question is by looking at the nature of socio-political crises that undermine internal peace and democracy in many African countries. A good number of African countries have many internal issues which make those countries prone to internal instability.

Scholarly research points to some issues such as tribalism as the key challenge facing many African countries². Tribalism here connotes the fragmentation of the society into various ethnic or tribal groups which have been transformed into politicized and antagonistic cleavages. In many cases the outcome of this socio-political challenge of tribalism is the polarization of the political sphere and the proliferation of different forms of tribal based sub-nationalism which lead to ethnic voting during elections, exacerbation of social and political tensions, and sometimes confrontation³. Nevertheless, while the presence of many tribal and ethnic groups in society does not constitute in itself a challenge to democracy, peaceful cohabitation is not always granted when in a given political society cleavages are antagonistically politicized⁴. The politicization of cleavages in some countries such as Burundi and Rwanda has produced a polarization of the internal political sphere into dominant ethnic groups and has largely contributed to creating a climate of ethnic tensions which led to atrocities and even to genocide⁵. Under this background history, it is possible to partly grasp how tribalism undermines democracy and internal stability of some African countries, and how this phenomenon is the major undermining factor for peaceful transitions to democracy in a number of African countries.

The three countries under analysis in this paper, namely, Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, did not have peaceful transitions towards democracy. In Burundi, the ethnic tensions which expressed themselves violently from 1993 to 2005 have been interpreted in scholarly research as “a long-term ethnic conflict between the historically disadvantaged majority Hutu and the politically, economically and militarily dominant minority Tutsi, with the small number of Twa completely marginalized”⁶. In other words, the post-colonial politics in Burundi has been largely based on ethnic exclusion. Any attempt of rise of Hutu majority to claim a share in the political organization of the country was violently repressed. This amounted to the massive killings of 1965, 1972 and 1988, which claimed more than 300,000 lives⁷. As a result of heavy pressure of international donor countries and internal pressure from some Hutu intellectuals, who jointly wrote a petition in reaction to the massacres and social injustices perpetrated by the state, Burundi opened the way to a multiparty system. Following a referendum in March 1992, a new constitution based on principles of democracy was adopted and multi-party politics was introduced. The first democratic elections were held in June 1993. The Hutu dominant party FRODEBU (Front for la Defense de la Democracy) won the elections with a sound majority and Ndadaye Melchior became the first Hutu President. Three months later, after a failed coup, President Ndadaye and many among his political collaborators were assassinated and the country entered a period of civil war.

After some failed agreements for an inclusive government (Convention du government)⁸ which aimed to ensure ethnic representation in governmental institutions and diplomatic missions, some Hutus parties formed armed wings, which resorted to force to seek political change.

²² See E.K. Francis. “The Ethnic Factor in Nation-Building”, *Social forces*, vol. 46 no.3 (Mars 1968) pp. 338-346. Or, Gabrielle Lynch . “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya”. In *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol 33, Issue 107, 2006

³ This issue of tribalism according to some viewers has been exaggerated through the processes of state building in Africa which took a quasi-artificial process and also the influence of past event such as colonization which strategically attributed some socio-economic advantages to some groups of people. See, A. J. Christopher. “Divide and Rule” *Journal of African studies*, September, 1988. Vol. 20. No.3. pp. 233-240.

⁴ Some historians put the blame on colonialism for having exacerbated antagonism between ethnic or tribal groups by attributing some socio-economic or political advantages to some groups while at the same time undermining opportunities for others. This was carried out via the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ which was applied in some colonies. For more information, see A. J. Christopher. “Divide and Rule” *Journal of African studies*, September, 1988. Vol. 20. No.3. P233-240.

⁵ Peter Uvin. “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence”. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 31. No 3. (April. 1999). pp. 253-271.

⁶ See Devos Curtis. “The International peace building Paradox: Power-sharing and Post-conflict Governance in Burundi”. *African Affairs*. 112/446, December 2012. p.79.

⁷ States supported massacres which took place in Burundi 1972 are usually described as a ‘genocide’. See <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/The-Burundi-Killings-of-1972Lemarchand.pdf>

⁸ Ibid. p. 81.

Following the escalation of instability in the region which followed the start of the war in Burundi in 1993, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the War in the DRC (Zaire at that time) in 1996, the international community observed an increasing need for stabilizing the region to stop atrocities. From 1995, external actors, particularly the UN and AU, increased pressure on parties in conflict in Burundi to start peace talks. As a consequence, Burundi peace negotiations started in 1998 in Arusha (Tanzania) between elite representatives of both Hutus and Tutsis (*via* Political parties) under the mediation of Julius Nyerere, and later with Nelson Mandala. A peace agreement based on power-sharing arrangements in line with Arendt Lijphart formula was signed on 28 August 2000.

This agreement led to a full cease fire by the main combatant group (CNDD-FDD: Conseil pour la Defense de la Democracy –Front pour la Defence de la democracy) three years later. In March 2005, a new constitution, which is based on Arusha power-sharing arrangements, was adopted after a referendum. A series of elections were successfully held and political institutions based on concessional democracy were established⁹. In the peace process and promotion of democracy in Burundi, external actors played a major role. The efforts of the United Nations to stabilize Burundi were visible from the very beginning of the crisis in 1993. Soon after the failed coup in 1993, which triggered the civil war in Burundi, the United Nations opened a small political office (UNOB: the United Nations Office in Burundi) where the UN put a special representative of the Secretary-General. The role of the UN special representative in Burundi was to try to restore security and to stabilize the country via preventive diplomacy¹⁰. The special representative of the UN tried to promote a power-sharing agreement between Burundian ethnic factions, which initially failed because the crisis in the region was exacerbated by the genocide in Rwanda that took place one year after the beginning of the war in Burundi. The UN and donor countries, however, continued to put pressure on the parties in conflict in Burundi. The outcome of UN pressure on both Burundi and regional allies of the parties in conflict was the start of a peace process which constituted the starting point for a power-sharing agreement and the cease fire. Extensive regional diplomatic involvement played a crucial role in peace building and the promotion of democracy in Burundi. The African Union (AU), (which was still called OAU: Organization of African Unity), helped in assigning mediators in the peace negotiations, first the Tanzanian Julius Nyerere, and later Nelson Mandala. The AU also contributed by organizing military peace keeping missions in Burundi when the peace deal was achieved. In 1995, the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire (now DRC) created the Regional peace initiative on Burundi, in which regional leaders would discuss the crisis and assist Burundians to find the means for peace and stability¹¹. This organization contributed a lot by extending its pressure not only on the parties in conflict in Burundi, but it also helped stabilize the region by putting pressure on countries that were taking sides in the conflict in Burundi.

The role of Tanzania and South Africa was crucial in peace building and the promotion of democracy in Burundi. Tanzania was not only the first country to offer a facilitator for the Burundi peace process, but it was the hosting country for the peace negotiations that aimed to achieve an ethnically based power-sharing agreement to set the foundations for democracy in Burundi. South Africa was also a key contributor to the peace process and the restoration of democracy in Burundi. According to Devos Curtis, “South Africa’s influence in particular was felt not only through its role as intermediary, facilitator, and guarantor for the Burundian peace process, but it also brought the implicit and explicit promotion of ideas about appropriate constitutional structures”¹². A close analysis of the contributions of external actors in the peace-building and the promotion of democracy in Burundi reveals three dominant strategies. Diplomatic pressure and threats of sanctions were two dominant strategies which helped to push the parties in conflict to engage in the peace process. Diplomatic pressure was exercised particularly by donor countries such as Belgium, the United States, African countries like Tanzania and South Africa, and the African Union. The UN office in Burundi, which later extended into a full UN peace keeping mission, helped to keep a close eye on how the situation evolved in the country and provided an appropriate platform for decision making that promoted peace and democracy in Burundi.

⁹ For more information on the elections in Burundi in 2005, see Filip Reyntjens, Briefing: Burundi: a peaceful transition after a decade of civil war? *African Affairs*, 105, (2011), pp. 315-15.

¹⁰ Ahmdou Ould-Abdallah, *Burundi on the Brink 1993-1995. A UN Special Envoy reflects on preventive diplomacy* (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2000).

¹¹ Devos Curtis. “The International peace building Paradox: Power-sharing and Post-conflict Governance in Burundi”. *African Affairs*, 83.

¹² *Ibid.* 84.

Another strategy that external actors used to promote peace and democracy in Burundi is conditionality for accessing financial aid. Burundi is one of the African countries that receive a large portion of its national budget from external aid. This channel has been largely used by donor countries to boost the commitment of the Burundian leadership to the peace process and to promote democratic values such as fair elections and the protection of human rights. In other words, the achievement of peace, stability and democracy in Burundi has been a long process in which different external actors played a large contributive role.

The strategies of diplomatic pressure, threats of sanctions and conditionality on financial aid were the key approaches used to achieve peace and a stable concessional democracy in the country. Rwanda is another case in which peace-building preceded the democratic process. Similarly to Burundi, Rwanda has known a long history of internal ethnic tensions. Burundi and Rwanda are usually interpreted as two false twins due to the similarities in their socio-political profiles, the ethnic composition of their populations, and their colonial history. After the social revolution of 1959, which led to the overthrow of king Kigeri in 1962, a portion of the Rwandese population (Tutsis) were exiled to neighboring countries, fleeing a series of violence which followed the independence in 1961. In 1990, they formed a rebel group which launched several attacks in Rwanda and threatened to overthrow the Hutu led government of Kigali by force. Following international pressure, the government of Kigali started peace negotiations in Arrusha (Tanzania) in 1992 in order to put an end to the conflict and form an inclusive government in which all ethnic factions are represented. After the power-sharing deal was signed in Arrusha between the representatives of the Hutu government of Kigali and Tutsi elites, President Havyarimana was assassinated on his way back to Kigali, sparking a mass of atrocities and genocide. There are explanations on the failure of the Arrusha peace deal between the parties in the Rwandan conflict. According to Rene Lemarchand, the peace deal signed by the government of Kigali and representatives of RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) was achieved under considerable international pressure. The parties involved had no willingness to build peace. Lemarchand argues that the lack of commitment to peace by the different factions is proven by the fact that all the parties in the conflict continued to arm them during the peace negotiation process and to strengthen their positions on the battle field¹³. The case of Rwanda is an example of how unlimited external pressure can miss its objective of promoting peace and democracy whenever this mechanism is not supported by a genuine commitment to peace by the parties in the conflict.

After the genocide of 1994, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) won the civil war and took over the leadership of the country, electing Paul Kagame as the president of Rwanda. During the post genocide period, Rwanda has nearly returned to a single party system characterized by the monopoly of political power by the RPF. The RPF as the ruling party has strengthened its influence in the country by suppressing opposition parties. The promotion of democracy by external actors in post-genocide Rwanda has largely focused on two main mechanisms, namely, diplomatic pressure and aid conditionality. Diplomatic pressure by the United States and some EU countries have been used to persuade the government of RPF to stop suppressing the opposition and open up a political space for free and fair electoral competition. Since the end of the war in 1994, electoral authoritarianism has prevailed in Rwanda and is maintained as a way of helping the RPF to remain in power. Given the ethnic antagonism which has characterized the history of Rwanda and the unbalanced proportions of the ethnic composition of the Rwandan population, there is a permanent threat of ethnic voting. This would lead to the RPF loosing elections opening up the threat of the Hutu return to power. Electoral authoritarianism is therefore a mechanism that the incumbent government of Rwanda uses to safeguard its political power.

The second mechanism used by external actors to promote democracy in Rwanda is aid conditionality. Donor countries have tried to push the government of Rwanda not only to stop supporting armed groups which destabilize eastern DRC, but also to promote democracy internally. Rwanda relies on external aid for a large portion of its annual budget. Countries like the United States, United Kingdom and some EU countries are the main donors for Rwanda. Aid provided to the country is accompanied with some recommendations for democratic change, but the rate of change in democratic anchoring has been very slow. In the past few years opposition has been largely suppressed and many leading advocates have been exiled or put in prison.

¹³ Rene Lemarchand. 'Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo'. *African affairs*, 106/422. Pp. 5-6.

An overall interpretation would lead one to conclude that Rwanda is currently on a stable electoral authoritarian regime; and despite external efforts to promote democracy in the country via different mechanisms, the democratization process has been slow and subject to internal problems linked with the past ethnic antagonism and atrocities in the country. The Republic Democratic of Congo (DRC) is a complex case of political instability; and the efforts of external actors to promote peace and democracy have produced limited results.

An overview of the historical background of the conflict in the DRC reveals that the conflict in Congo is complex and has involved a plurality of interest groups and actors. The war in the DRC is usually divided into three parts¹⁴. The first Congo War began in November 1996 and ended with the collapse of Mubutu Sese Seko's dictatorial regime in May 1997. In that war, a coalition of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola fought against DRC forces. The three countries accused DRC of providing a safe refuge to different rebel groups, which were destabilizing peace in each of the three counties. After the first Congo War, Laurent Kabira became the president of the DRC. Shortly after Kabira's coming to power, he fell out of alliance with Uganda and Rwanda. The end of the alliance sparked the second Congo war which started in August 1998. The second Congo War opposed an alliance made of the DRC, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Mai-Mai who fought against Uganda, Rwanda, and the Movement for the liberation of the Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD).

The second Congo War was ended with a series of peace agreements: the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999); the Sun City Agreement (April 2002); the Pretoria Agreement (July 2002); and the Luanda Agreement (September 2002). All these agreements contributed to the Inclusive Peace Agreement in December 2002, which finally put an end to the war¹⁵. But it is important to note that these different peace agreements did not put a full end to violence in the DRC partly because parties involved in the conflict were forced to sign the peace deals (by international actors, particularly the UN security council and the African Union) as an effort to stabilize the country. Such an approach, however, did not necessarily consider interests of parties involved in the conflict or solve the problems at the roots of the conflict. Consequently, even though the general agreement that ended the Second Congo War helped to establish a Unified Transitional Government and the integration of different rebel groups into national security forces, it did not prevent the continuation of violence in the eastern part of the DRC¹⁶. The lack of security in eastern Congo was the justifying reason for the breakup of the main rebel group from the national security forces to form a new fighting group: March 23 (M23). According to UN reports, it was supported by the incumbent government of Rwanda¹⁷. The group was fully defeated in December 2013 with the coalition forces of the UN mission in Congo and the DRC.

Peace-building and the promotion of democracy in the DRC have been significantly supported by external actors in different ways, but peace and democracy in DRC continues to be elusive. For instance, the UN has deployed the most expensive peacekeeping mission to the DRC and its mandate has been revised over years to increase the capacity to successfully restore peace and stability in the country. The DRC crisis, however, has revealed itself to be complicated for some reasons. Firstly, the DRC crisis is not simply an internal crisis, but it is a multilevel crisis with the involvement of both internal and external groups, which are interested in the variety of mineral resources found in different parts of the country. Secondly, the DRC is a huge country (a quarter of the United States). Due to the lack of infrastructures, the government is not able to control its territory and some communities become totally isolated and vulnerable to militias and rebel groups taking over the areas¹⁸. Despite these mentioned challenges, the UN and AU have continuously played an important role in peace-building and the promotion of democracy in the DRC. Beside the UN peace mission in the country, different parallel mechanisms have been used to stabilize the country and promote democracy.

¹⁴ Stearns, J.K. *Dancing the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the great war of Africa*. New York: Public affairs, 2011. P. 27.

¹⁵ John Ahere. 'The peace process in the DRC: A transformation of quagmire'. *Policy & Practice brief*. Issue 020, December 2012.

¹⁶ The eastern part of DRC has known a proliferation of rebel groups partly because these groups can easily finance their activities by exploiting mineral resources which are massively available in this part of Congo.

¹⁷ <http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00040390:72d344b708c2f7053f2273e2a5a8ff79.pdf>

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¹⁸ Autessere, Severine. D.R. Congo: Explaining Peace Building Failures, 2003-2006. *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 34. No 113. P. 427.

During the first, second and third Congo Wars, the UN Security Council continuously put pressure on parties in the conflict to negotiate and to put an end to the violence. As an outcome of the UN and AU efforts, different peace agreements were reached, and a number of rebel groups were integrated into the national security forces. UN pressure was particularly useful in forcing countries involved in the conflict to withdraw their troops and to refrain from any action which would contribute to the escalation of war. The mechanisms of diplomatic pressure and the threat of sanctions were particularly used to stop the intervention of Rwanda in Eastern DRC and to stop supporting rebel groups fighting in this part of Congo.

In addition, towards the end of 2013, the United States and United Kingdom threatened to suspend their development aid to Rwanda in an effort to pressure the country to stop its destabilizing involvement in Eastern Congo. External efforts to promote peace and democracy in the DRC have largely relied on stabilizing the country, rather than promoting democratic change. Efforts of external actors have largely focused on putting pressure on parties to negotiate and build an inclusive representative body in the government by giving political positions to leaders of different internal armed groups. Nevertheless, concessional democracy has proven to be inefficient in the country owing to its huge size, governmental inadequacies and other complexities associated with the nature of conflict at stake, particularly, the challenge to satisfy all interested parties. In other words, the transition to democracy has become a chimera in the DRC and the persistence of violence has sensibly undermined any effort of external actors to successfully promote peace and democracy in the country. The United Nations peace mission in the DRC has throughout time changed and extended its role in order to meet the security concerns of the country and the region. The UN mission in the DRC has been transformed in order to allow UN security forces to protect the civilian population. The case of the DRC proves that the promotion of democracy is quasi impossible in the context of internal insecurity, and that peace and stability are the key conditions for the promotion of democracy. While the country has benefited from the active support of external actors to promote peace and democracy, the democratization process has been slow and continuously undermined by the lack of security and basic infrastructures. Due to the lack of infrastructures (such as roads and other means of communication), remote regions in the DRC are cut off from the central power of Kinshasa (the capital city) allowing armed groups to take over regions and finance themselves from illegal mining.

In other words, the DRC is a complicated case where peace-building and democratization are interdependent, and the lack of internal security undermines successful transition to democracy. Efforts of international actors have largely focused on promoting peace and stability as a priority for the democratization process. While the mechanisms of imposition, diplomatic pressure and aid conditionality are used to promote democracy in the country, the democratic process has been overwhelmed by security concerns in different regions of the country. Democracy is only kept on a minimalist level expressed through elections which in some regions are disrupted due to the lack of security and basic infrastructure. Having explored the different roles that external actors played in peace-building and the democratization process in each of the three countries, we may now make a comparative analysis of the three countries and evaluate the conditions for anchoring democracy in post-conflict societies. A comparative evaluation of the democratization process and strategies that were predominant in promoting peace and democracy in the three countries reveals some important observations for the democratization process in post-conflict societies. First, the link between peace-building and democratization is evident in the three cases. For instance, an appropriate peace settlement is a precondition for the possible success in the pursuit of democratization process. Peaceful resettlement of the conflict allows the establishment of a platform for appropriate representation of different factions which were involved in the conflict. Burundi is an example where successful peace settlement allowed the pursuit of democratization by entering into the transitional period with successful adjustments of local constitution to accommodate democratic changes.

On the contrary, unsuccessful peace settlement, or the winner-takes-all approach, undermines the processes of democratic change. When one group in the conflict manages to use force and win the war, it becomes unlikely to secure appropriate representation of all political factions in post conflict political institutions. The case of Rwanda exemplifies this argument. Consequently, in a post conflict society, successful transition towards democracy largely depends on how the conflict has been settled to allow appropriate representation of all parties involved and to establish a minimalist account of democracy. The-winner-takes-all approach leads either to electoral authoritarianism or to dictatorship. Hence, an appropriate peace settlement is a priority for the promotion of democracy in societies under socio-political conflicts. A close analysis of the three cases above suggests some normative guides to the promotion of peace and democracy in post-conflict societies.

For instance, the political strategy that external actors use to promote peace and democracy must take into account the local socio-political context and the complexities it involves. The mechanism of imposition or diplomatic pressure seems to be unsuccessful unless these are oriented to target the key player(s). The peace-building and democratization process in the DRC has been slow due to internal and external challenges that are beyond the control of local government. While diplomatic pressure or imposition can target different local political actors, it is rather difficult to use similar mechanisms to push different armed groups that destabilize a country. The strategies of imposition and diplomatic pressure seem to succeed only when there is a central government that fully controls the country.

Whenever the problem of instability is due to causes which are totally beyond institutional control, imposition or pressure is not an effective mechanism for peace-building and the promotion of democracy. In other words, the success in promoting peace and democracy in a country does not only need an appropriate mechanism, but success also largely depends on how the mechanism fits into the context of its application and targets relevant players. Burundi and Rwanda are usually interpreted as two false twins in consideration of their internal socio-ethnic composition and the nature of their internal political problems¹⁹. Burundi and Rwanda have both known a long history of ethnic antagonism between Hutus and Tutsis. Both countries have comparable proportions of the population between ethnic groups (80% to 84% Hutus, 10% to 14% Tutsis, and less than 1% Twa)²⁰. Due to historical ethnic polarization, ethnic voting is one of the key challenges to democracy in both countries. While concessional democracy in Burundi managed to draw an appropriate solution to this problem by assuring quotas for an appropriate representation of ethnic groups, Rwanda did not follow the path of concessional democracy. The only mechanism for the minority to maintain political power is by resorting to anti-democratic means, particularly, electoral authoritarianism. Therefore, it can be argued that ethnic antagonism in both Rwanda and Burundi has antidemocratic consequences²¹.

As Peter Uvin observed, Burundi and Rwanda have a special distorted mirror relationship which is unique in the whole world²². Uvin points out that in both Rwanda and Burundi, what happens in one country has a parallel interpretation in the local socio-political situation of the other country. For instance, undesirable events which happen to one ethnic group in either country are used to confirm the worst possible scenario which would happen in the other country whenever similar conditions are reproduced. To give concrete examples, repetitive repressions of the Tutsi dominated army in Burundi against Hutus in 1965, 1972 and 1988 has been used by the Hutu government in Rwanda to 'justify' the suppression of Tutsis as a way of pre-empting a possible scenario which would imitate the situation in Burundi. Conversely, Tutsi rulers in Burundi have insisted since the revolution in Rwanda in 1959 that if they give the Hutus a chance to have political power, the event would lead to a scenario of minority exclusion similar to the case of Rwanda. In addition, the ethnic voting in Burundi in 1993 that allowed Hutus in Burundi to take over political power has served as an example for the Rwandese government in the post genocide period to maintain electoral authoritarianism as a way of avoiding the Burundian scenario and maintain political power. In other words, Burundi and Rwanda are two complex cases where ethnic antagonism undermines democracy.

In all the three countries, external actors have tried to promote free and fair elections by providing monitoring teams for elections. External efforts have also focused on promoting power-sharing as an approach to peace-building and transition to concessional democracy. Power-sharing arrangements, however, were only successful in Burundi and failed to produce the expected outcome in both Rwanda and the DRC. In Rwanda, power-sharing arrangements collapsed before they could be applied to institutional reforms. In the DRC, power-sharing did not achieve the desired effect and failed to generate peace and stability in the country, mostly due to the country's size and inability to include all interest groups in political institutions.

¹⁹ See Peter Uvin. 'Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence'. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 31. No 3. (April.1999). pp. 253-271.

²⁰ See Peter Uvin Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence'. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 31. No 3. (April.1999). p. 254.

²¹ The problem of ethnic voting in Burundi has been solved by concessional arrangements. The Burundian constitution which is based on the power-sharing arrangements has forbidden political parties which are based on ethnic exclusivity. Ethnic representation must follow pre-determined quotas to ensure political representation of all ethnic groups in Burundi.

²² See Peter Uvin Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence'. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 31. No 3. (April.1999). p. 266.

While external actors used different mechanisms to promote peace and democracy in the three countries, the promotion of democracy largely remained on minimalist level expressed particularly in the promotion of free and fair elections. Particular emphasis has been placed on stabilizing the countries rather than anchoring democracy in the three nations. Nevertheless, without peace, the promotion of democracy becomes impossible. The transition to democracy in post-conflict societies has proven to depend largely on the outcome of the peace-process. An appropriate representation of different factions in the political arena is not only the condition for anchoring democracy, but it is also an important element for durable peace and stability. To conclude, the role of external actors is primordial for peace-building and democratization in Africa. As has been explained, external actors use different mechanisms or strategies to promote peace and democratization.

In the case of the three countries analyzed, the strategies that were used include imposition, diplomatic pressure, threats of sanctions, and conditionality of financial aid. In countries where the democratization process is preceded by socio-political conflict, successful transition to democracy largely depends on how the socio-political conflict is settled. Yet, successful promotion of democracy in fragmented societies seems to require appropriate mechanisms which not only promote peace and stability, but also ensure appropriate representation of different social fragments. Concessional democracy is a relevant approach in this case. While external actors play an important role for the promotion of peace, stability and democracy in different countries, anchoring democracy is a task which is under the responsibility of local political actors.

External contributions to the promotion of democracy can only lead to minimal democratic change. Burundi is one example where external contributions allowed successful achievement of the peace settlement and the transition to democracy. Rwanda and the DRC are other examples which show the complexities associated with the promotion of democracy in the post-conflict context. While peace and stability are preconditions for democracy, democratic change largely depends on how the peace settlement has been achieved. Negotiated peace allows easier transition to democracy (Burundi), while peace won after a war victory of one faction in the conflict can lead to dictatorship or electoral authoritarianism (Rwanda). The transition to democracy can also be challenged when a peace settlement requires dealing with a multiplicity of political players (internal and external) whose interests and influence differ (the DRC). Successful promotion of democracy in post-conflict and fragmented societies depends on multiple elements defined by both internal and external components; Burundi being so far the only case of a fragmented society in Africa which successfully used this model in its transition to democracy. This domain remains an open field for further exploration, particularly on the African continent.

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