

Civil Military Relations during Pakistan People's Party 4th Regime from 2008 to 2013

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Abstract

Civil – Military relations have been a combination of mistrust and suspicions prevailing on both sides, since the early days of Pakistan. Despite of having different constitutional experiences and several political developments, the trust and predictability could not be evolved in both actors, in the same political system. Visible and invisible intervention of military in Pakistani politics has remained. An impending political development played the critical role in bringing the Army in Pakistani polity. The focal point of this study is that civil military relations in Pakistan remained circumstances / incident based. This phenomenon prevailed with its full vigour during the 4th tenure of Pakistan People's Party from 2008 to 2013. This study paper has focused on the civil military relations with respect to role of various institutions in the politics of Pakistan especially of the military.

Keywords: Military, Bureaucracy, Administration, Political Leadership, Pakistani Political System, Military Intervention

Introduction

People in a democratic society largely rely on political institutions. Since political government is responsible and answerable to public; that is why responsibility and authority lies with these institutions, whereas military regime occupies the power as no legitimate authority. Hence both civil and military spheres have always inherited tension in their relationship. These domains compete for power and control over each other especially in the absence of mature democratic institutions. In civil-military relations the dominant theme is to ensure civil control, or more appropriately “political control” of the military. When civilian political government fails to handle the civil-military relations adequately, opposition parties take advantage of the situation. In this process they do not support the military but wants to ditch the government due to political rivalry. The objective remains to build pressure on government, whereas this indirectly accord favour to military.

In both developed and developing countries, military is contemplated one of the most potent institutions, with regards to its domestic polity especially in order to define, formulate and execute external or domestic security policies. However, in developing countries role of military is more complicated, inescapable, dispensed and therefore problematic as compared to other institutions of the state, and has more influence on formulation of security policy as well as domestic politics. Civil-military relations in Pakistan are always tense and unpredictable. They highly depend upon issues and circumstances as well as political and military elite's perception. Although military has a say in the polity of Pakistan, it must submit to the democratic political authority¹ Civil-military relations form an important element of national security policy. During peace time, they enhance the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the outcome. The principle of civilian control is central to the concept of civil – military relations. Traditional approaches emphasize the formal, legalistic aspects in which the military play a subordinate role in national security planning. However, traditional boundaries between civil and military have become blurred and there is a growing acceptance of the military's participation in the formulation of national security policy².

¹Sardar, S. 2012 p. 447

²Rizvi, H.A. 2014

This study paper has assumed that civil-military relations in Pakistan remained circumstances/ incident based during the democratic government of PPP from 2008 – 2013. It is also assumed that an imbalance was created between civilian and military institutions due to thinking and mind set of few military and civilian elites.

2.1 Theoretical Perspectives

The occurrence of military interventions in the political life of nations has been more pronounced since the termination of World War II. The post-war era ended the conventional role of the military as an expansion tool of state's territory and therefore, its employment as an internal power was significantly increased. Within this confine, military was increasingly seen as an important institution with politically overlapping dispensations, later in some regions finding space to wield the state power. This development however did not emerge in a vacuum but was spawned owing to complex domestic power dynamics and external environment surrounding a country. The latter was more a function of threat to national security than any other reason³. Civil-military relations can be explained as a relation between civil societies and the military establishment or organizations enacted to secure it. More precisely, it may be explained as the relationship between the civil and military domination of a society. In a political system and in society military is recognized as a distinct entity at large. A state's nature / design of civil-military relations can be revealed the way military administer its relations with its political elites across the political and social areas of activity⁴. Therefore, both civil and military spheres have always inherited tension in their relationship. These domains compete for power and control over each other especially in the absence of mature democratic institutions. In civil-military relations the dominant theme is to ensure civil control, or more appropriately "political control" of the military. Three names dominate the field of Civil Military Relations that is Samuel P Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel Finer. Albeit these three political philosophers were pertinent to conduct critic on various aspects of each other theories, however they generally agreed on the point that if the military was professional and believed in the principle of civil supremacy; then the stable and democratic civil-military relations were more likely. While Samuel Huntington in his classical book, *The Soldier and the State*, confided on professionalism as the best approach/ technique of achieving civilian supremacy through "objective civilian control"⁵. Whereas Samuel Finer cautioned in his book, *The Man on Horseback*, that professionalism "may lead the military to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power"⁶.

Samuel P Huntington's Institutional Theory

Huntington after analysing the military value system suggested two broad models for supremacy of "civilian control" over the military, subjective and objective civilian control⁷. Accordingly, in subjective civilian control, one organization in civil society is able to maximize its power over all other civil institutions. This is achieved by simple and direct enhancement of civilian power vis-à-vis the military. This increase of civilian control can be attained through state institutions, social classes or constitutional avenues. Nevertheless, as Huntington argued, with the increase of military professionalism, this particular form of civilian control has become obsolete. Whereas, in objective civilian control, military professionalism is of the utmost importance. By maximizing the professionalism of the military, the civil society makes them a tool of the state. Huntington argued that by "making the military professional the state makes them politically sterile and neutral"⁸.

Morris Janowitz's Convergence Theory

Morris Janowitz in his book *The Professional Soldier* concurred with Huntington to the extent that separate worlds of military and civilian exist, but disagreed from him concerning the ideal solution for averting threat to liberal democracy⁹. In his opinion military is basically conservative and would oppose change and do not comply immediately as accepted by the open and unstructured civilian society. Resultantly, the military would benefit against outside intervention as per the arguments proffered by Huntington. Therefore Janowitz professed the theory of convergence, contending that the military, in spite of being slow to the change, was changing without any external pressure.

³Clausewitz, 1989 p. 87

⁴Bartholomees, 2008, p. 3

⁵Huntington, 1957, p. 84

⁶Finer, 2004, pp. 25-27

⁷Huntington, 1957, p. 86

⁸Ibid.

⁹Janowitz, 1968, p. 347

This theory proposed civilianization of the military or a militarization of society. Nevertheless, Janowitz insisted that despite of all this, the military would hold on to some important differences from the civilian so as it is identified as military in nature¹⁰. Theory proposed by Janowitz is a theory that inspired active interaction between civil society and the military so as to encourage more sense of public participation. According to him, Pakistan is amongst those states that pursue this trend. Accordingly, Pakistan's position fluctuates between a civil-military alliance and a military oligarchy.

2.1 Rebecca L Schiff's Concordance Theory

Rebecca L Schiff professed a new theory of Concordance as an alternate that the civil and military domains must importantly be detached, physically as well as ideologically¹¹. This theory stresses upon the requirement to evolve a cooperation strategy between military, government, and civil society in order to attain peace and stability. The most important questions in Civil-Military Relations (CMR) theory is to ascertain in which environments the military interfere in the internal politics of the country. Most political philosophers concur with the Huntington's theory of objective civilian control of the military that advocates on the segregation of civil and military institutions.

Historical Perspective

Sixty six years political history of Pakistan has witnessed political instability and military rule. Although Pakistan came into being through a political and democratic process, however, it inherited political culture of dominant state institutions and subservient political institutions thus its system boundaries were established before its own birth. Resultantly, the state institutions both civil and military bureaucracies, have strengthened their roots creating acute imbalance in the power structure. The strong influence of the military on the political processes can be traced back into the history, where soon after independence; Pakistan experienced its first Martial Law in 1958 and second and the third within the time period of next twenty years. Fourth intervention came in 1999. Whenever the military decided to displace civilian governments in history (1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999) it faced no resistance at the popular level, rather it was generally welcomed by the masses¹².

Civil – Military Relations under PPP Various Regimes

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977)

Although Pakistan had experienced civilian leadership before 1971, Bhutto's government was the first period of civilian supremacy rule¹³ following the country's first military coup in 1958. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to enhance the civilian control of military¹⁴. He started setting up Para military and intelligence organizations for monitoring his rivals, military officers and even his own party leaders. Federal Security Force (FSF) was created in order to minimize the dependence on military as well as curtail military's coercive power. Since he enjoyed the popular support of masses in the initial stages of his government, therefore he was temporarily successful in asserting the civilian supremacy which was also well received by the army officers¹⁵. The classical example of civil supremacy and its assertion was the removal of the then Army (General Gul Hasan Khan) and Air Force (Air Martial Rahim Khan) chiefs in March 1972 on a plea that they tried to interfere in the proceedings of Hamoodur Rahman Commission Inquiry¹⁶. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced major changes in the administrative set up of armed forces high command¹⁷. Designation of the head of all three services chiefs was changed from C-in C to Chief of Army/ Navy/ Air Force Staff and were placed under command Joint Chief of Staff Committee and President of Pakistan as Commander in Chief. Tenure of respective Chiefs was also reduced from four years to two years. And High Treason' clause under Article 6 was incorporated in 1973 constitution¹⁸ with regard to violation of constitutions, primarily aimed at discouraging the military interventions. Civilian supremacy of Bhutto's assertion did not prove durable. With the passage of time Bhutto regime became intolerable, violent and more repressive.

¹⁰Janowitz, 1977, p. 81

¹¹(Schiff, 2009, pp. 7-24

¹²Rizvi H. A. 2003, p. 8

¹³Shafqat, 1997, p. 168

¹⁴Rizvi H.A. 2013, p. 213

¹⁵Cohen, 1984, p. 73

¹⁶Shafqat, 1997, p. 168

¹⁷Rizvi H.A. 2013, pp. 213-214

¹⁸See Constitution of Pakistan 1973

To analyse the civil military relations during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it can be ascertained that Bhutto tried to control the military through following four measures:-

1. Imposing constitutional constraints on the public role of the military.
2. Manipulation of geo-political factor
3. Instituting changes in the command structure of the Army.
4. Creation of Para military force FSF in order to reduce the dependency on military.

First Tenure of Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990)

An environment of mutual distrust existed¹⁹ between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and military top brass when PPP appeared as majority party in the general elections of 1988. Hence, the foremost task of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister was to begin a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with army. Additionally, situation also demanded a change in attitude in military elites by accepting her as Prime Minister. Therefore, both parties approached the relationship with caution²⁰. Relationship between military and Benazir government started on a positive note. In this regard, she made three major compromises to show flexibility and pragmatism²¹, agreed to let General Mirza Aslam Baig continue as Chief of Army Staff, accepted and retained General (Retired) Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan as Foreign Minister who was elected senator on IJI ticket and also agreed to remain nominal head of the Defence Committee and not to interfere in army matters including budget and Afghan policy. Benazir Bhutto also did not change the NWFP (Now KPK) Governor a retired brigadier who was ANP nominee²². However, due to confrontational approach, on 6 August 1990 President of Pakistan removed Benazir from power. There were **four major specific issues**²³ in which Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto annoyed military and the gulf between civil leadership and military top brass widened.

In February 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto constituted a committee to evaluate the role of intelligence agencies in a democratic system. Basing on the recommendations, she elected to control the functioning of ISI as she wanted to bring the ISI under effective civilian control and replaced the sitting ISI chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul against the advice of the Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg and appointed Shams ur Rehman Kallu a retired Lieutenant General as ISI Chief. Military complied with the orders; however they considered it as interference in the professional matters. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto government ran into another conflict not only with military but with the President (Supreme Commander of Armed Forces) as well on a constitutional matter. Appointment of CJCSC was in question as Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sarohi was to retire after completion of his three year tenure. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was of the view that Article 243 (c) of the constitution amended in 1985 gave him the right to appoint three service chiefs and CJCSC. Whereas Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto maintained her authority by referring to the executive order 70's passed by the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

However in view of the eighth amendment, President had the powers and the Prime Minister had to retreat from her position. Nevertheless, her assertion caused annoyance in presidency and military establishment. In May 1990, Sindh government launched a police operation in an old settlement of Hyderabad city known as Pucca Qila with the clearance from federal government. The residents of this area were predominantly from Mohajir community. Sindh government perspective was that the community was involved in terrorist activities against Sindhis whereas Mohajirs claimed that police on the behest of provincial government had terrorized the children and women of their community. Whatever was the case, fighting killed dozens of innocent people in Hyderabad and its reaction took lives of hundreds in Karachi. It clearly showed the lack of communication between police and military especially when the magnitude of the operation was beyond police capacity and strength. In June 1990, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto tried to influence the functioning of Army Selection Board as previously his father tried to do in 70's. She wanted to get the term of Corps Commander Lahore Lieutenant General Alam Jan Mehsud extended to which Army Selection Board did not agree and named Lieutenant General Ashraf Janjua to the post. This compelled the military hierarchy to deduce that Benazir Bhutto was not upholding her commitment not to interfere in professional matters of Army.

¹⁹Nawaz, 2008, p. 416

²⁰Shafqat, 1997, p. 228

²¹Rizvi, H. A. 2003, p. 205

²²Ibid, p. 206

²³Shafqat, 1997, pp. 228-230

Second Tenure of Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996)

During her second tenure, Benazir refrained from interfering in internal affairs of the Army and paid respect to the military autonomy thus the troika functioned smoothly. Some of the main features of civil military relations are as following:- Selection and appointment of services chiefs was done without causing much of problem. Moreover, retirement of Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee General Shamim Ahmed was managed smoothly as compared to the Admiral Sarohi issue. General Jehangir Karamat the senior most of Lieutenant Generals was made Chief of Army Staff after General Abdul Waheed Kakar first time in the history of Pakistan Army. This appointment was hailed by all political leaders as well as opinion builders in the country. In November 1994, when army decided to end security operation in Sindh, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto agreed despite the provincial government demand. In return military supported the civil government in Sindh to organise their Para military forces; therefore rangers emerged as an effective force in Sindh in general and in Karachi particularly²⁴. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto government dealt the foreign policy issues of military interest particularly Afghanistan issue with adequate mannerism²⁵. However, economic mismanagement, complaints of corruption in the higher cadres of government, misuse of state resources, deteriorated law and order situation in the country and confrontation with superior judiciary impaired her rule. Due to bad economic and security conditions in the country, President Farooq Laghri became displeased²⁶. Appointments of judges with political affiliations also antagonized the superior judiciary. Chief of the Army Staff, General Jehangir Keramat intervention to defuse the collision between Prime Minister and President went in vain and the latter removed her from the power²⁷.

Causes of Erosion of Civil Supremacy in Pakistan

Since the political structure in Pakistan had not flourished in ideal manners therefore some of the causes of erosion of civil supremacy in Pakistan are may be attributed to:-

1. Dearth of visionary political leadership, resulting into weak governments, political instability and poor governance.
2. Inability of successive governments to curb lawlessness, discontentment and disharmony in the society and pursuit of divisive policies resulting into alienation of masses threatening national cohesion and integration.
3. Generally undemocratic attitude of the politicians whether in or out of the government and trying to involve the military into politics.
4. Sombre exhibition of the politically elected governments in the financial and other fields, involvement in corruption and favouritism.
5. Absence of efficient and competent political institutions proficient of arbitrating the political crises.
6. Extensive involvement of Army in routine political affairs of the government thereby impairing public confidence in government's dexterity.

Reasons of Civil – Military Gap. It's a general belief that there is a gulf between the army and civil society of Pakistan. Some diversity in social approach clearly exists, representing a 'values gap'. The main reasons of this gulf are:-

1. Mutual distrust and misunderstanding is reflected in functional gap between military and society.
2. Politicians consider and resent the military's expression of views over the internal, foreign and security policy issues as transgression of its mandate.
3. Generally people reckon the military in high esteem. Public perception of military sometimes is effected by their occasional inappropriate conduct. Bureaucracy blooms on the discouraging plight of civil – military relations and is astute at widening this gap.
4. In shaping the civil – military relations, Media plays a significant role keeping its own interests. The trend to act in hurry in order to make exciting headlines and 'breaking news' creates serious misconceptions in civil – military relationship.
5. Pakistan armed forces are considered centre of gravity to national cohesion and unity. Internal dissident groups and foreign adversaries play significant role in eroding these civil – military relations.

²⁴Ibid, p. 241

²⁵Haqqani, 2005, p. 242

²⁶Amin, 1994, p. 144

²⁷Haqqani, 2005, p. 241

Challenges and Prospects during PPP 4th Regime (2008 – 2013)

Memo Gate Scandal²⁸

The relationship between Pakistan and United States was at the lowest ebb of all time before the 2 May 2011 incident of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. After the United States SEAL operation in Abbottabad the commission constituted to investigate revealed that the President Asif Zardari was in picture about the American plan to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. This incident brought both political government and armed forces officials at daggers drawn. In this regard a high level meeting between President, Prime Minister and the COAS was held to deliberate the issue in detail. The memorandum was ostensibly written within the couple of days of the said meeting. The memo gate scandal referred in Pakistan is about an alleged letter written to the US high command by Pakistan political government in the aftermath of Abbottabad incident. Through this memo political government of Pakistan presented their distress and sought help against the likely military takeover. In return, favourable concessions were offered to the US officials more than what they already had including grant of access to nuclear assets of Pakistan and allowing US military to conduct strikes inside Pakistan and so on. The memorandum was drafted by Mr Hussain Haqqani Ambassador of Pakistan in America with the approval of President Asif Zardari and was delivered to Admiral Michael Mullen through James L Jones, US National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama by a Pakistani businessman Ijaz Mansoor based at America. Memo Gate scandal was one of the toughest challenge confronted by the Government of Pakistan. The memo gate scandal exposed the fragile relation between Pakistan and United States government. The Opposition filed a petition in Supreme Court to constitute a Judicial Committee to investigate the issue of Memo Gate. COAS and ISI Chief testified the memo by giving statements and submitting through Defence Secretary Lieutenant General retired Naeem Khalid Lodhi without the consent of the Prime Minister. Resultantly Defence Secretary was removed from his post due to violation of rules and regulations²⁹.

The trust deficit between the government and army developed when the ‘memo gate’ was critically highlighted by the opposition leaders. Pakistani ambassador, Husain Haqani, was considered behind this memo which was delivered to Admiral Mike Mullen by an American Pakistani businessman, MansoorEjaz. Four parties which include the architectures of the memo gate, the federal government, COAS and the director General of ISI were asked by the Supreme Court to explain their position on this issue. Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani criticized the army stance in the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Prime Minister Gilani’s statement infuriated the military high command who issued a stem press release that” there can be no allegation more serious than what the honourable prime minister has levelled. This had very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country”³⁰. Since 2008, this was the first reflection to political change in Pakistan. Military’s displeasure over prime minister’s statement forced the prime minister to take back his statement which he gave in an interview to international media. Gilani’s refusal was direct confrontation with the military institution and he paid the price for his wrong words and action. In the meantime the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued a contempt of court notice to the Prime Minister Gialni. The entire nation was surprised when the elected prime minister backtracked and said, “Army’s filling in the supreme court about memo gate was not wrong”. Once again the upper hand of Pakistani Army prevailed on Pakistani politics. In fact, prime minister had lost his credibility and trusts in the country and when he was convicted by the Court he did not accept the Court’s verdict and legitimized his office through the Speaker of National Assembly. Pakistani people were not happy with Gilani and his Cabinet because his government had failed to deliver in four and half years. People felt a sigh of relief, even people from his own constituency were happy over his removal.

Kerry Lugar Bill

Kerry Lugar bill also known as Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009 was jointly prepared and presented by two US Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar. United States Senate and House of Representatives passed the bill on 24 September and 1 October 2009 respectively. US President approved the bill and signed it on 5 October 2009. According to the contents of the bill, US would provide non-military aid of \$1.5 Billion annually for five years.

²⁸Complete text of the memorandum is available at <http://www.insightpakistan.com/1/memo-transcript-memogate-haqqani/>

²⁹Lodhi, N.K. 2014

³⁰insightpakistan. (2011, December). Retrieved March 18, 2014, from www.insightpakistan.com: <http://www.insightpakistan.com/1/memo-transcript-memogate-haqqani/>

The amount provided to be used for the construction of schools, hospitals and roads. However, the bill laid down certain conditions / clauses to be met by the government of Pakistan such as:-

1. Deny all sorts of support to terrorists, extremists and dismantle their hide outs / bases.
2. Civil political government to exercise assertive control over Pakistan Army.
3. Assistance provided not to be diverted towards Pakistan's nuclear arsenal programme.

Political elite from opposition and civil society in general criticized the provisions of the bill and labelled it to undermining the sovereignty of Pakistan. National Assembly of Pakistan hotly debated the bill. Opposition leader vigorously condemned the bill whereas Information Minister defended the provisions of the bill. Contents of the bill were also deliberated during the Corps Commander's conference at GHQ. The forum rejected the bill by expressing serious concerns through a thoughtfully drafted press release that it would impinge upon the national security. In 2009 America passed Kerry-Lugar bill and offered economic assistance with harsh conditions and the main objective of these conditions was to diminish the military's influence. The Pakistani media criticized Kerry-Lugar bill and American Policies toward Pakistan, and finally the government refused to accept conditional aid. Kerry Lugar bill became controversial because of the insensitive language used in drafting the text. The clauses included in the bill reflected the work of Indian Embassy and lobbyists working for the Indian interest against Pakistan in Washington DC. For instance, names of Lashkar-i- Taiba and Jaish-i- Muhammad were specified in the bill in relation to terrorism and militancy. What would be the interest of John Kerry and Richard Lugar to have information about these organisations and location of their headquarters? Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani manipulated in such a way to use the parliament and the government for opposition of bill while staying in the background.

2 May 2011 Abbottabad Incident

On 2 May 2011, American SEALs conducted an operation unilaterally inside Pakistan territory in order to target and kill Osama bin Laden. Reportedly, he was hiding in Abbottabad a city in the Province of Khyber Pakhtun Khwa, Pakistan. The US SEALs raided the Osama bin Laden residential compound, killed him in an encounter, gathered important evidences, handcuffed rest of his family members and left with dead body of Osama bin Laden. They came in so deep undetected, undertook the operation and went back undetected. Only loss they suffered was a helicopter crash due to its tail hitting the boundary wall because of some technical failure. They raided the compound on the information provided by a medical doctor named Shakeel Afridi who had the access to the house. This was a total intelligence, Air Defence and Air Force alert failure. Armed forces of Pakistan admitted their failure by informing the National Assembly that they could not match the superior military and stealth technology held by the US Forces. Moreover, undetected helicopter intrusions while flying along the nap of the earth were possible and most of the modern armies of the world can undertake such operations undetected. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani constituted the commission to investigate the matter. The commission was headed by Justice Javed Iqbal and its members were a retired police officer, an army general and a diplomat. The commission testified more than 200 witnesses including the family members of Osama bin Laden, ISI Chief, ministers in the government and officials of military, bureaucracy and intelligence organisations.

Commission established it as a collective failure the state organs including armed forces and intelligence agencies due to their ineptness at all levels. Commission established that Osama bin Laden reached Pakistan in 2002 and stayed more than nine years at various locations in the country including South Waziristan and Swat. After the arrest of Khalid Shiekh Muhammad in 2003 from Rawalpindi Osama bin Laden moved to Abbottabad along with his family members. After 2005 the intelligence agencies of Pakistan did not actively pursue the capture of Osama bin Laden. The commission also did not deny the involvement of some of the individuals from Pakistani intelligence set ups in view of his lengthy stay and change of various locations for residence. This could have possible direct or indirect assistance from intelligence organisations at some level³¹. The American raid to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 brought more closely the both military and government. In fact, government of Pakistan protected the army's interest. The SEAL's action in fact increased the people's resentment toward the army. NATO's attack on Pakistani security check post on 26 November 2011 brought the government and army further on the same page. American airbase was closed on Pakistan's soil. NATO's supply and American's trainers' termination significantly had shown the trust between the army and the government.

³¹Dawn (Islamabad). (2011, October 6). Retrieved March 18, 2014, from [www.Dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com):
<http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/06/commission-interviews-isi-chief-osama-widows.html>

Chinese Government supported and Pakistani stance on this tragic incident stating that the operation should have been a joint venture and no sovereign country allow such operations to be conducted on its soil. Chinese government also emphasized that Washington must understand the challenges being faced by Islamabad and also recognise the sacrifices of Pakistani nation³².

Salala Check Post Incident

Salala is a mountain in the area of Baizai subdivision of Mohmand Agency in tribal area of Pakistan. Pakistan Army in wake of war against terrorism had established two border check posts along Pak-Afghan border to check cross border movements of terrorists. These check posts code name “Boulder” and “Volcano” on either side of the mountain top were approximately one kilometre apart from each other. On 26 November 2011, these two check posts of Pakistan Security Forces were engaged and targeted by United States led NATO forces. Two NATO Apache helicopters, one AC-130 gunship and two F-15E Eagle fighter jets entered into the Pakistani territory along Pak-Afghan border up to 2.5 Kilometres and opened devastating fire on these check posts at 2.00 a.m local time. It resulted in killing of 24 Pakistan military soldiers including two officers Major Mujahid Mirani and Captain Usman Ali and wounding 13 others. Both sides claimed that they were fired upon first. Government of Pakistan on the pressure of public protest reacted boldly and took measures which adversely affected the US exit strategy from Afghanistan. These were:-

1. NATO supply routes provided from Pakistan through Chamman and Torkham border were closed.
2. US forces occupying Shamsi Air Base were asked to vacate it immediately.
3. US Administration to officially apologise about the incident.

International community and organisations especially the Chinese government expressed strong concerns over the attack causing great loss to human life and maintained that sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Pakistan to be respected and honoured. US administration did his best to find alternate route for supply through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, however, apart from being lengthier and less effective, high cost was also affiliated with these routes being lengthier. On the other hand political government and military of Pakistan were on same page to act a sovereign state and force the US and NATO forces to admit their mistake and extend apology with an assurance not to repeat such incidents in future. After a lot of diplomatic efforts on 3 July 2012 US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton officially apologised. In response Pakistan re-opened the supply routes for NATO forces.

Extension in Service of COAS

On 22 July 2010, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani while addressing the nation on national television announced three years extension in the tenure of Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani. The argument offered by the Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani was that Gen Kayani’s leadership was a key to the successful operation conducted by the military against the militants. Three years extension was granted by relaxing the rules of policy on the subject in order to ensure continuity in the war against terrorism. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani made the decision of extension in the service of Army Chief after consultation with the President Asif Zardari. The important point to mention here is that the extension in the service of Army Chief was announced more four months in advance. It meant that the tenure of Army Chief will be completed once the five years term of PPP led government would be completed. The civil government had faced internal and external crisis. Without the military support the government could not curb with terrorism, extremism and radicalization in Pakistan. In July 2010 General Kayani succeeded to get three years extension and directly influenced the government decisions regarding internal and external security. Prime Minister Gilani justified the Army Chief’s extension by explaining that the extension of COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani’s tenure had put all stakeholders in the power game – the president, the prime minister, the chief justice and the military chief – in a secure position till 2013. All four key players of Pakistan’s beleaguered politics are set to complete their terms at different times during the year 2013. This grant of extension was not a new phenomenon as Pakistan has history that Army Chiefs had been granted extension in their service previously as well. General Ayub Khan was given extension twice by the political government, first in January 1955 till January 1959. Again in June 1958, Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon granted two years extension till 1961; however General Ayub himself assumed the power in October 1958.

³²www. Dawn.com: <http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/chinese-support.html>

General Musa Khan who was then appointed as COAS in 1958 was granted full term extension from 1962 onwards. Three other COAS General Yahya Khan, General Zia ul Haq and General Pervaz Musharraf kept on extending their own tenure being themselves in power. However, there were some serious concerns about the extension granted to General Kayani in civil and military circles as mentioned below. This extension in other words mean that after eight years of continuous military rule of General Musharraf, Pakistan would be led (although from the side lines / back stage) by General Kayani for another six years. It subverted the merit and pointed a finger that the world's 6th largest army was unable to field a suitable candidate to take over from the entire General staff.

This extension was also not fair from the perspective of Army's organisational hierarchy. Although General Kayani did his job quite well but there were other generals some of them best strategists in the world waiting in line for their promotion to command. Furthermore, it would have left a bad taste in so many mouths. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani's statement that the extension was granted to have continuity in the policies of fighting against terrorism had no logic. In this regard it is necessary to mention that General Kayani was not fighting this war against terrorism in isolation. Entire top brass of army was intimately involved in each operation and were also aware of about all national and international developments. New COAS might have had fresh and new ideas to tackle the situation and a more dynamic approach to accomplish the job. The situation in Afghanistan was more hostile than Pakistan, there were no such exemptions and relaxations in policies for the US, NATO and British high ranking military officers performing the duties at Afghanistan. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) both were due to retire within months' time. If COAS was granted extension in his service then why the extension was not granted to CJCSC? However, trust between civil-military institutions was strengthened during these three years as General Kayani made earnest efforts to isolate the army from the politics of Pakistan.

Analytical Review

In order to understand the civil-military relations in Pakistan during the period of PPP 4th regime, the theory of concordance professed by Rebecca L. Schiff is applied. The theory of concordance proposes arbitration, accommodation, and mutual ethics between military, the political elites, and the society. Concordance theory explains the detailed and specific atmospheres describing the military's role in the domain that comprises the government and society. It does not force a precise form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making procedure, but takes place in the framework of active agreement, whether validated through parliament, decree, or constitution. In other words, this theory does not assume that separate civil and military domains are necessary to forestall domestic military intervention. Rather, it can be barred if the military go alongside with the legislators and civil society. When this theory is applied in case of Pakistan, it is observed that many of the major events during the period of 2008 -2013 discussed above replicate the practical manifestation of this theory where military, civil society and parliament were hand in gloves such as closer of NATO supply due to Salala check post incident, Kerry Lugar Bill, Abbottabad incident or grant of extension in the service of army chief. However, praetorianism of Pakistan Army was observed than the professionalism. Memo gate scandal is the case in point where army acted covertly and got rid of Prime Minister Gillani. Hence, it is established civil-military relations in Pakistan keep oscillating from cordial to circumstances / incident based. This research work concludes that in case of Pakistan, separation theory envisages the mechanisms by which a civil government may establish control over its formerly interfering military. Nevertheless, with alterations, concordance theory may provide insights into how that control may be maintained following the transition to durable democracy.

Conclusion

Governance is a delicate balancing deed in Pakistan between the Army chiefs and the civil political governments. It is a power-sharing formula where army has significant impact over Pakistan's nuclear program, foreign, security policy and important internal affairs, and arbitrates confrontations among opposing politicians, political parties or state institutions; if these confrontations are a threat to country's stability and political order. Though the civil government enjoys significant autonomy for political and economic administration and execution of state power, the army has frequently validated that it can and will sway the nature of political change without assuming power. How to survive with such type of "mild" military interference is an impasse for political leaders of states that have observed extended army regimes. A crisis in civil-military relations is obviously certain.

However a visible change was observed in the stated position of army during the period from 2008 to 2013 as compared to the previous precedents. Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani along with Director General ISI was seen giving a detailed briefing to the parliament during a National Assembly session. Details regarding defence budget allocation into various heads are also now more visible to the general populace. Civil-military relations during President Asif Zardari 4th regime of PPP kept oscillating from cordial to tense. Memo gate scandal and Kerry Lugar Bill put the civil political government into tremendous pressure; whereas Abbottabad incident in May 2011 put the Army under severe critic and pressure. However, NATO forces attack on Salala Check Post brought both political government and Army on the same page that resulted in closer of NATO supply route until an official apology was extended by United States and NATO. In a democratically developed society each institution has its role and cannot be seized by other institutions despite it may appear the compulsion of the time. If the intents are unbiased and objective is unblemished, Pakistan's polity will be able to uphold positive civil-military relations; however, process will take its course.

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