Socio-Political Dimensions of the Speaker's Cognition in Political Discourse

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Abstract

The aim of the present paper is demonstrating how factive presupposition and epistemic modality uncover the social and political dimensions of the speaker’s cognition in political discourse. Van Dijk’s discourse-cognition-society triangle has been selected to analyze Hillary Clinton's political remarks on the Tunisian Revolution. First, based on the discursive analysis, the research findings reveal that factive presupposition and epistemic modality are frequently used and almost evenly distributed in the selected corpus. Second, the analysis of political cognition shows that the speaker’s personal and social values and attitudes are demystified via cognitive frames and mental models relating to democracy and human rights. Third, studying social cognition in the corpus demonstrates that H. Clinton’s personal values and attitudes are selections of the socially shared ideologies and opinions in her epistemic community. It also shows that she perceives the world in terms of ideological poles. The present research analyzes the socio-political dimensions of politicians' cognition via factive presupposition and epistemic modality from a socio-cognitive perspective.

Keywords: factivity, modality, political discourse, social cognition, political cognition, polarization.

1. Introduction

The present research is conducted within a combined framework, incorporating presupposition theory, epistemic modality and CDA. More specifically, van Dijk's (1995) socio-cognitive approach will be implemented to study presupposition and modality from cognitive and social perspectives. This seems to be an inviting area of analysis because these linguistic features help to unveil the knowledge background of the speaker in political discourse. The first part of the present paper examines factive presupposition triggers. The second part sheds light on epistemic modality and how it embeds the attitude of the discourse emitter. More concern is about demystifying the link between factive presupposition and epistemic modality and how they reveal the speaker's social and political cognition. The third part focuses on political discourse and, more importantly, on the sociopolitical dimensions of discourse. The present paper attempts to answer the following research questions:

a- How are the lexical features that trigger factive presupposition and epistemic modality distributed in Hillary Clinton’s political discourse?

b- What is the link between factive presupposition and epistemic modality?

c- How do these linguistic features in discourse unveil H. Clinton’s social and political cognition?

2. Literature review

2.1 Factive presupposition triggers

Epistemological presupposition may express both beliefs and knowledge. Epistemological presuppositions are defined as “deep, and often unstated, beliefs that form the foundation of a particular system of knowledge” (Dilts, 1998, para. 7). Epistemological presuppositions are also presented as fundamental assumptions upon which other ideas are built and proven. They are “the primary ideas and assumptions from which everything else in the field is derived” (Dilts, 1998, para. 18). In other words, they are the basic beliefs upon which other concepts are based. Factivity and presupposition are related concepts. The lexical features that trigger factive presupposition are mainly factive verbs and factive unphrases. Factive verbs are divided into epistemic and non-epistemic verbs. First, epistemic facts are described. The mental state of the agent, like in “John knows/doesn’t know that Baird invented television” (Iwanov, 2014, p. 1), where it is supposed that Baird invented television.
Second, emotive factives describe the emotional state of affairs, or the feeling of a heagent, like "Martha's regrets/doesn't regret etdrinkingJohn's homebrew"(Iwanov, 2014, p.2), where it is presupposed that Martha drank John's homebrew. Factive verbs trigger epistemological presuppositions. Factive verbs are verbs of knowledge, 'know', 'besorrythat', 'beproudthat', 'beindifferentthat', 'beawarethat', etc. (Iwanov, 2014, p. 1-2). These verbs seem to evoke the speaker's back ground knowledge since they trigger factive presuppositions, hence factual information. Since information is factual, the speaker seems to show strong commitment to the truth values of her propositions. Distinction, however, has to be made between 'know' and 'believe'. The use of 'I believethat' reveals the speaker's uncertainty about, hence anti-epistemic modality is only triggered by nouns or noun phrases, NPs (Iwa no v, 2014). Presenting personal beliefs as factual information is stronger when not subject to topicalization. Epistemic certainty of propositions are utilized by the speaker (Schmid, 2001). Such nouns are 'fact', 'reality', 'truth' and 'certainty' which are used as markers of strong epistemic claims (Schmid, 2001, p. 1544). By using nouns or 'that-clauses', the speaker may sell their own view and personal opinions as objective truths and irrefutable facts. Speakers, insuch constructions, give the impression that their views are disguised as truth statements and shared knowledge by all discourse participants (Schmid, 2001).

2.2 Epistemic Modality

Epistemic modality is an indicator of the source of information. Epistemic modals are interpreted by analysts on the ground of "a body of information or evidence, which is frequently referred to as the so-called 'what is known'" (Song, 2009, p. 1). Epistemic modality expressions highlight the necessity/possibility of a proposition, or a possible state of some evidence or knowledge (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007). However, epistemic modality does not affect the truth conditionality of an utterance (Papafragou, 2006, p. 1688). Epistemic modality is only a comment on the proposition expressed in an utterance. Its "thespeaker's assessment of probability and predictability" (Halliday, 1970, p. 349). If something external to the content and apart of the speaker's＝sattitude towards is responsible for the uncertainty of an utterance (Halliday, 1970). It also signals the presupposition's status interms of the speaker's commitment (Palmer, 1986). Such an attitude towards the truth conditionality of the proposition depends on evidentiality. As the aim of the present research is studying the speaker's cognition, focus will be on epistemic modal adverbs, epistemic modal adjectives and mental state predicates.

2.2.1 Modal Adverbs

Modal adverbs are basically neutral, but in certain contexts, they may imply subjective or non-subjective evaluations (Nyuts, 2001). Jackendoff (1972) states (as cited in Drubig, 2001, p. 9) that modal adverbs are evidential modality adverbs, such as 'probably', 'supposedly', 'evidentially', 'obviously', 'cannotoccur in negationscope. This can be illustrated in the following example, cited in Drubig (2001, p. 9):

(a) John probably never ran so fast.
(b) * Never did John probably run so fast.

Other modal adverbs, like 'necessarily', occur in the negation scope, but lack epistemic interpretations. Epistemic adverbsof certainty involve 'certainly', which expresses the state of affairs certain (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008). According to Grice (as cited in Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008, p. 1531), the common assumption is that speakers say things they are sure about their truthfulness and for which they have evidence. In short, epistemic modal adverbs can be subjective, objective, or neutral depending on the evidence and context.

2.2.2 Modal Adjectives

Modal adjectives can also steersubjective, objective or neutral readings. Subjectivity is "systematically involved in adjectival expressions of epistemic modality" (Nyuts, 2001, p. 389). Adjectival constructions can express, depending on the form of the construction, both objective and subjective meanings (Nyuts, 2001). For instance, when a speaker uses the standard form 'itisprobablethat', 'sheexpressesonon-subjectivity via the impersonal subject it' and the copula 'be', which asserts the modality expressed (Perkins, 1983, p. 67). Like epistemic modal adverbs, epistemic modal adjectives can reveal the subjective, objective or neutrality of the speaker.

2.2.3 Mental State Predicates
Mentalstatepredicatesaresystematicallysubjective.Consequently,suchpredicates“typicallyandpredominantlyoccurin
textsinwhichthespeakervoicepersonalinopinions” (Nuyts,2001,p.390).Mental state verbs occur in contexts
thatinvolveantagonismbetweentheviewsof
thespeakersandhearers.Sincetheyareinherentlysubjective,mentalstatepredicatessmay
beusedtohighlightthespeakers.Inshort,mentalstateverbsareonlysubjective.Subjectivity leads to questioning
therealityofinformationandthinkingabouttheattitudeofthespeaker.Thissalsoraisesthequestion:does
howepistememicmodalityunveiltwofacesthespeaker’ssocialandpoliticalcognitioninpoliticaldiscourse?

2.3Politicaldiscourse

Politicaldiscourseissimplythediscourseofpoliticansandaformofinstitutionaldiscourse(vanDijk,2002a).Itmustbedeliveredbythespeakerswhensheplaystheroleofapoliticainaninstitutionalsetting.Anotherwords,discourseispoliticallwhentheperformspoliticalactivityinacontextlikeelectoralcampaigns,parliamentarydebates,legislati
on,governing,decisionmakingetc.Itispoliticalbecausethefunctioninthecontextofpoliticallprocess(vanDijk,1997b,2002)
.Add
to
that,
discourseisunderstoodbypoliticalactors.Politicaldiscourseisinfluencedbyideologiesviageneralsocialattitudes,morepersonalmentalmodelsofconcreteeventsandcontextmodelsofthecommunicativesituation(van
tawardourself,beacusetheycarrythepowerthatreflectstheinterestofthosewhospeak”(para.4).Theexistenceofpeopleinpo
eriestakenastruetrueandevident,whereasthewordsofthosewhoarenopowermayberejectedandconsideredasinapp
priatenandirrelevant.Dominantdiscourseinterpretsituation,problesmsandeventsinfavoroftheelite’sinterest.Thediscourse
togethermarginalizedgroupsis,however,consideredasathreattotheideologicalinterestsandpropagandaeffortsoftheelite.
Politicaldiscourseisinfluencedbyideologiesviagnosticpowerandinfluencesforeignpolicy.First,politicalcognitionand
politicaldiscourseareaproductofcomplexinter-litieinfluences,ortherelediscourse
es,suchas,thoseofthemassmedia,ministries
,statesagencies,scholarsandotherspecialists(vanDijk,1997a).Inthiscontext,thegoaldopoliticaldiscourseisvolvoleclarify
theunderstandingofissuesbycitizens,helpcitizenstoreachajudgmentabouthowtosolvethem,boostingcitizen
’s’contributioninpoliticallifeandinthenewgenerationstobeactiveinpolitics(Johnson&Johnson,2000,p.291).Second,politicaldiscourseconstitutesaforeignpolicyframework.Itisonepossiblesourceofforeignpolicy(Lars
en,1997).Infact,approachestodoctrineareveryimportantlytransmitintopoliticalprocesses.Suchinternationalimpulsesareinternallytranslatedand
routedextandtalk(Larsen,1997).

PoliticalDiscourseAnalysis(PCA)discaliticalapproachtopoliticaldiscourse(vanDijk,1997b).Criticalpoliticaldiscourse
analysisspaceguidesothereproductionofpoliticalpowerandpowerabuseviapoliticaldiscourse.Thisalsoinvolvesd
owingwiththedifferentformsofcounter-
poweroroppositionagainstdiscursiveenhancement(Fairclough,1995).Locke(2004)states,inthisthesis,that
criticalresearchers“tendtoalignthemselfswithaparticularagendaadthiscommittetoachallengingthetherelativepowerbas
esofcompetingdiscourses”(p.37).Assuch,antagonismbetweendifferentdiscourses
is
centralsincestrugglesoccurbetween
discourses,thereforediscursiveantagonism'
(Larsen,1997,p.20).Doingpoliticaldiscourseanalysisisdifferentfromdoingpoliticalanalysis(vanDijk,
1997,p.37).Theroleofpoliticaldiscourseanalysisis“torelatethefinelinguisticbehaviourtotowhatweunderstandby
‘politics’or‘politicalbehavior”(Chilton&Schäffner,1997,p.211).

2.4Sociopoliticaldimensionsofpoliticaldiscourse

Thestudyofpoliticalcognitionshedslightonhowrepresentationsaresharedbypoliticalactors.Inaddition
toaspectsofpoliticalinformationprocessing.Moreover,“it‘essentiallydealswiththeacquisition,usesandstructures
mentalrepresentationsaboutpoliticallsituationsevents,actorsandgroups”(vanDijk,2002b,p.206).Themaintopicsof
suchpoliticalrepresentationarehowpoliticalbeliefsareorganized,howpoliticalcandidatesareperceivedandhowpoliticaljudgmentsanddecisionsaremade.Italsoinvolvesdissociation,publicopinionetc. Itcovers
othtopicsrelatedtomemoryrepresentationsandthementalprocessesinvolvedinpoliticalcomprehensionandinteraction(vanDijk,2002b,2014).

Political cognition has social facets or dimensions. Social memory consists of representations about knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, values and norms. Some of such representations are schematically organized in the social mind. They represent political knowledge as mostly group knowledge and are considered by opposing groups as mere political opinion. Unlike personal knowledge, which is stored in episodic memory, socially or culturally shared knowledge, however, has to be general and abstract (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 220). Hence, socio-political knowledge resides in the social memory of the human mind.

To comprehend political discourse, one has to unveil the underlying political cognition of participants in a political interaction. Both personal and socially shared beliefs may be organized in different “schematic formats, clustered and assigned to theoretical place in the overall architecture of the social mind” (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 224). Models for the mental background of all social interactions, more specifically discourse production and understanding (van Dijk, 2002b, 2014). This will be elaborated further while conducting the present research.

3. Research methodology

The corpus of the present study is a collection of Hillary Clinton's political remarks that focus on the Tunisian Revolution. The time span is from January 2011 to January 2013. The selected corpus consists of 27 press statements, interviews and remarks. Given their complexity and length, “AntConc” software has been used to analyze Clinton's discourse.

The social and political cognition of the speaker are to be analyzed within a combined framework. First, the classification of presupposition triggers is based on the works of Karttunen (1973), Levinson (1983), Yule (1996) and van Dijk (2003). The collected data involves factive presupposition triggers, namely factive verbs, emotive verbs, and factive noun phrases. Second, studying epistemic modality, mainly mental state verbs, epistemic adjectives and epistemic adverbs, is based on the works of Karttunen (1972), Kratzer (1981; 1991), Lyons (1977), Palmer (1986), Perkins (1983) and Song (1999).

The framework of analysis is van Dijk’s “socio-cognitive triangular approach to CDA. Table 1 illustrates the three analytical levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Ideologies and Discourse: Level of Analysis, adapted from van Dijk (1995, p. 20)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Social Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Group relations, e.g., discrimination, racism, sexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Cognitive Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Social Cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Sociocultural values, e.g., intelligence, honesty, solidarity, equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ System of attitudes, e.g., about affirmative action, multiculturalism…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Personal Cognition: General (context free)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Personal values: personal selections from social values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Personal attitudes: system of personal opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Lexical features: factive presupposition and epistemic modals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three stages of analysis of van Dijk’s (1995) approach will be implemented on Hillary Clinton’s political discourse regarding Tunisia’s democratic transition. First, the discourse analysis focuses on factive presupposition and epistemic modality. Second, the cognitive analysis studies Clinton’s personal and social cognition, mainly personal and social values and attitudes regarding democracy and human rights in Tunisia. Third, the social analysis tackles only group relations based on the values, attitudes, ideologies and agendas of the speaker.

4. Results

As stated in the previous section, the findings have to be analyzed and interpreted on the basis of three levels of analysis, mainly discourse, cognition, and society.
4.1 Discursive analysis
At this level, the corpus of the present study has been processed both manually, and computationally via "AntConc" concordance program. The following frequency lists have been obtained:

Table 2
Frequency Distribution of Factive Presupposition Triggers and Epistemic Modals in the Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factive lexical triggers (94 items)</th>
<th>Epistemic modality (104 items)</th>
<th>Total N of Lexical Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factive verbs (80 items)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Emotive verbs (5 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beware (2)</td>
<td>Beproud (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beforeced (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forget (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know (51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realize (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remember (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remind (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factive Noun Phrases (9 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nodoubt (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modal adverbs (18 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainly (10), clearly (3), obviously (4), probably (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modal adjectives (24 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain (1), clear (7), confident (4), obvious (2), sure (2), true (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modal adverbs (18 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After examining Table 2, which illustrates the lexical features to be analyzed in the corpus, one can note the important use of factive presupposition in Clinton’s political discourse, with a total number of 94 lexical items. Factive predicates come first (80 occurrences), followed by factive noun phrases (9 uses) and emotive verbs (5 uses). The most frequently used item in the category of factive predicates is the verb ‘know’ (51 occurrences), followed by the verb ‘recognize’ (15 items).

One can also highlight the important use of epistemic modals (104 occurrences), mainly mental state verbs (62 occurrences), modal adjectives (24 items) and modal adverbs (18 uses). In the mental state verb category, the verb ‘think’ is the most dominant mental state predicate (51 items). The second most frequently used verb is ‘understand’ (9 occurrences). In the modal adjective category, one can notice the dominance of the adjectives ‘true’ (8 features) and ‘clear’ (7 occurrences). In the epistemic modal adverb category, one can highlight the important use of the adverb ‘certainly’ (10). As such, factive predicates (80) and mental state verbs (62) are the most dominant lexical categories in the selected political discourse.

4.2 Cognitive analysis:
4.2.1 Personal cognition
This stage of van Dijk’s approach (1995) examines mental models, mainly the speaker’s personal values and attitudes. Clinton’s mental representations are analyzed via factive presupposition and epistemic modality in the corpus. More emphasis is allocated to her views and perceptions of democracy and human rights. More specifically, the focus is on Clinton’s positive or negative attitude towards entities, events and issues discussed in her remarks. Figure 1 illustrates the frequency of occurrence of words relating to human rights, such as freedom, dignity, equality, solidarity, etc.
Figure 1. Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Human Rights' Rhetoric in the Corpus

Figure 1 shows how the rhetoric related to human rights is distributed in the corpus. First, one cannotethedominant use of the noun phrase "right" (153 items), in its singular and plural forms. Such dominance conveys the speaker's main concern, which is promoting human rights in a new democracy, like Tunisia.

Second, one notices the frequent use of the singular noun "woman", along with its plural form "women" (82 items). This reflects Clinton's focus on feminist issues, particularly in newly-democratized Arab countries, because women are deprived of their basic rights in some regions.

Third, the singular noun "freedom" and its plural form "freedoms" are frequently used in the corpus (63 items) to stress the importance of freedom as a basic human right. Based on Clinton's values, humans should not be jailed for expressing their opinions, adopting a different faith, or protesting in public. For democratic transitions to be successful, Clinton emphasizes the importance of providing more freedom for youths, women, and every citizen.

Apart from values, one has to shed light on the main findings relating to Clinton's attitudes in the corpus. Adopting positive or negative attitudes depends on the issues discussed in discourse. First, Clinton has a clear positive attitude towards human rights, democratic transitions, and religious freedom. Second, she expresses a negative attitude towards dictatorship, intolerance, fanaticism, and corruption. She is in favor of guaranteeing the rights of women in the Arab world, and more specifically in Tunisia.

She also supports women and minorities' rights. In this regard, she highlights the significance of leadership roles played by women and young people to determine the future of the country. According to Clinton, the rights to decent life, a good job, and physical sanctity are necessary for building a sustainable democracy (See Appendix A).

However, Clinton shows a negative attitude towards human rights' violations, like torture, oppression, lack of freedom, intolerance, and discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, or ideology. She expresses her bias against oppressors and dictators, like Arab leaders in the Middle East and Ben Ali in Tunisia. Clinton denounces corruption and corrupt political systems. She is also critical about offensive remarks onlinethat nurture hatred and religious intolerance. Similarly, she shows a negative attitude towards religious fanaticism and extremism. In sum, by promoting human rights and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, Clinton fights against abuses of universal values and oppressive political systems.

The analysis of personal cognition in Clinton's political remarks on democracy and human rights in Tunisia in post-Ben Ali period has demonstrated that Clinton's personal values and attitudes are selections of the socially shared mental representations of her epistemic community, mainly the USA, and democratic communities in general. To have a clearer idea about Hillary Clinton's social as well as political cognition, one has to examine the socio-cultural values, systems of attitudes, ideologies and socio-cultural knowledge in her political discourse.

4.2.2 Social cognition
Social cognition is a system of socially shared representations or SRs, which may be conceptualized as networks, organized in hierarchical structures in terms of node-categories. For example, social representations about groups may feature nodes like cultural characteristics, socio-political goals, appearance, origin, religion, political orientation, etc. These categories determine the propositional contents of SRs, which encode shared knowledge as well as evaluative information, like opinions and attitudes towards other people, groups, or communities.

### 4.2.2.1 Socio-cultural values and system of attitudes

The SRs, related to social and cultural values and attitudes, are social because they are acquired, changed, and utilized in social situations. They are shared cognitions between all most of the members of a group. They are abstractions of personal experiences and opinions of social actors. Such personal cognitive representations undergo a process of adaptation, abstraction, or generalization to become reproducible.

For example, mental models are the basis of SRs and general knowledge. At this level, mental models are situat ed in episodic memory, socially shared, and cognitively represented personal experiences and interpretations involving personal knowledge and opinions. When mental models are situated in episodic memory, socially shared SRs are located in social memory. Mental models play the role of interface between the personal and individual uses of SRs in social perception and interaction, and the generalized SRs shared by a group, community, or society.

### 4.2.2.2 Ideologies and socio-cultural knowledge

At this level, the focus is on the social and ideological representations, embedded in Clinton’s discourse. Mental models are the cognitive representations of personal experiences and interpretations involving personal knowledge and opinions. When mental models are situated in episodic memory, socially shared SRs are located in social memory. Mental models play the role of interface between the personal and individual uses of SRs in social perception and interaction, and the generalized SRs shared by a group, community, or society. Similarly, mental models are the basis of SRs and general knowledge.

In the corpus of the current study, one cannot that Clinton’s beliefs reflect the socially shared opinions of her epistemic community. For instance, Clinton’s feminist ideology about women’s equality with men emanates from the socially shared ideological beliefs of her society, or at least the feminist groups in the USA and elsewhere, like in

After examining the corpus of the present research, it is found that Clinton’s personal values are selected to socially shared values and principles, like in " [...] while remembering that human rights are at the center of some of the most significant challenges to global security and interdependence and the outcome of national interests (Dec. 6, 12) App. B, p. 38). In fact, Clinton calls for universal human rights values, which are acquired, saved, and retrieved to be reproduced in discourse. Political and humanitarian values, like democratic principles and human rights, are shared, cognitive representations that made discourse meaningful and facilitate its interpretation and understanding, like in "But, the same time, one must never forget universal values are vital to how we are and what we hope to see our world become. And they are American values and Irish values: I would argue they are everyone’s values (Dec. 6, 12) App. B, p. 38). Clinton’s cognitive interface embeds social, cultural, political, and religious values of a community or group.

Regarding attitudes, Clinton reflects the attitudes of her American society, in general, and her government, in particular. Since he is the US Secretary of State, she also expresses the attitude of groups, like humanists and feminists. Sometimes, she defends the rights of disadvantaged and unprivileged people, including religious minorities, LGBT communities, and women, like in "I can certainly promise you, it will continue to be mine. I will continue advocating for civil society, working to make democracy, pushing for Internet freedom, standing with religious minorities, women, LGBT communities, people with disabilities (Dec. 6, 12) App. B, p. 43). However, Clinton, sometimes, stresses that she defends the opinion of personal and hence expresses her personal convictions, not those of the belief for her epistemic community’s siews, like in "I personally h onored that if someone everywhere were treated as equal, then human rights and dignity, we would see economic and political progress come to place that are now at the forefront of the global community (Dec. 6, 12) App. B, p. 42). In short, the micro-level of Clinton’s values and attitudes reflects the macro-level of socially and culturally shared values and attitudes.
"AndcertainlyinTunisia,theyaresayingalltherightthings.Theyaresayingthattheywillprotectwomen' rsights,that—
youngtotheUnitedStates,youseemosqueseverywhere,youseeMuslimAmericanseverywhere.That' sthetfact( Feb.25.1.12\textsuperscript{App.B,p.25}).Second,sheshowsknowledgeaboutdemocraciesthinksthatpeople'svalues,attitudes,ideologies havevestoredpersonalbeliefsandattitudesaboutdemocracyintheofficialdiscourseinthemomentofsignif icanttransitioninTunisiaandthroughthisperiodandbeyondimportanthattheTunisia nGovernmentrespectsrighspeopletopeacefullyassembleandexpresstheirviews(Jan.14.11\textsuperscript{App.B,p.1}).Third,Clintonalso promoteshumanrights,whichshethinksareuniversalvaluesthatshouldbeacceptedforeveryindividualinthe\textsuperscript{world}.Suchkindofknow ledgeisinternationalandmaybebasedonscientifically approvedfacts,specializedknowledgeandevidence.

In short, onecandeducethatgroupbeliefsaffectandshapesherealbeliefs.In other words,socialcognitioninfluencessocialcognition.Subsequently,Clinton’ spersonalvalues, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge are different types of social representations.After dealing with the discursiveanandcognitiveanalysesofClinton’ spoliticalremarkabouttheTunisianrevolution, onecantacklethe\textsuperscript{final}stageofvanDijk’ s\textsuperscript{(1995)}triangularapproach, mainly the social component.

4.3Socialanalysis: Group relations

At the social level, focushastobeonthe\textsuperscript{communitiesandgroups}mentionedinClinton’ sdiscourseandthe grouprepresentationssharedbytheremembers.In otherwords,groupshosesocio- culturalvalues,attitudes,ideologiesdeterminetheircollectiveidentitieshavetobe\textsuperscript{studied}.Aferexam iningthecorpus,onecannot\textsuperscript{recognizemembersof}\textsuperscript{OUT-GROUP}structure.First,Clinton’ smental representationsdeterminewhobelongstothe\textsuperscript{IN-} GROUP,whatdegreeofinvolvementisconsideredandhowmuchinformationisgivenabout\textsuperscript{IN-GROUP} socialactors.Consequently,Clintonunderstandstheworldinterms\textsuperscript{of}categories\textsuperscript{ordering,}classifying\textsuperscript{andorganizing socialactors}discourse.Clinton\textsuperscript{mentally}transformspeopleandthe-world\textsuperscript{intersocialcategories}.

Second, \textsuperscript{OUT-GROUP} socialactorsareinterpreted,shaped\textsuperscript{and}organizedbyClintonwhounderstands\textsuperscript{theothers}andevaluates\textsuperscript{them}termsof theirperspective.Outsiders,accordingtoClinton,standfarawayfrom'OUR' standards because they are differentfrom'\textsuperscript{US}'.'THEY' referstoextremists,oppressors,dictators\textsuperscript{and}humanrights\textsuperscript{violators}.Differences\textsuperscript{negativelyleveledby}Clinton,whoopstosa'WE- THEY'dichotomymathedesthe\textsuperscript{world}intotwopoles.Clinstonstores\textsuperscript{mentalmodels,}involvingbeliefs,attitudes\textsuperscript{and knowledge}about'\textsuperscript{OTHERS}' values,customs,habits,religiousbeliefs\textsuperscript{and}culturalfeatures\textsuperscript{toorganize themin terms of}categories\textsuperscript{ormentalframes}.Groupinterestasswell\textsuperscript{as}everydayinter\textsuperscript{intragroup}interactions,perceptions\textsuperscript{and}normalshapes\textsuperscript{socialrepresentations}about\textsuperscript{IN-GROUPs} and\textsuperscript{OUT-GROUPs}. Ideologiesplayasignificantrole\textsuperscript{incategorizing}people\textsuperscript{intogroups}based\textsuperscript{on}their ideologicalbackgrounds.In\textsuperscript{the}corpus,Clintoncategorizes \textsuperscript{the world as}democratic\textsuperscript{countries,}non- democratic\textsuperscript{countries}and\textsuperscript{countrytransitions}.These\textsuperscript{groups}aredepictedascooperating\textsuperscript{and}conflicting\textsuperscript{dependingo
nthegroupideologies,goalsandinterests. The first ideological groupsis Clinton’s democratic community, which defend democracy and cooperates with countries in transitions, like Tunisia. Clinton’s group, however, shows negative attitudes towards extremists and governments that work hard to impede the democratization process. Clinton’s idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) reflect a triangular map, which consists of ‘democrats’, ‘our allies’ and ‘ourenemies’. Relations between democrats and ‘our allies’ are based on positive representations, like friendship, solidarity, cooperation, collaboration and humanitarian aid. However, relations between democrats and ‘ourenemies’ are based on negative images schemas, such as extremism, enmity, threat, hijackers of democracy, and dictator etc.

The discursive strategies of polarization, in the corpus, are based on a semantic macrostructure, local meanings, and lexicon. The semantic macrostructures are based on two strategies. The first strategy is POSITIVE SELF-PRESENTATION, like in “we’ve been on the side of freedom, we’ve been on the side of human rights” (Feb. 25.12 Ap. B, p. 23). What is foregrounded is Clinton’s enumeration of American principles, like freedom and human rights. As such, Clinton gives a very positive account of the American historical record. The second strategy is NEGATIVE OTHER-PRESENTATION, like in “Now personally, I think that you will face extremists who are trying to really change the Tunisian culture” (Feb. 25.12 Ap. B, p. 23). Clinton depicts a negative image about extremists and shows a hostile attitude towards them. This image can also be portrayed by emphasizing or rejecting negative topoi about ‘US’, like in “There are comments made that certainly don’t reflect the United States, don’t reflect our foreign policy” (Feb. 25.12 Ap. B, p. 23). In this example, Clinton rejects any doubts about US intolerance with Islam and Muslims in America.

As for local meaning strategies, one can notice Clinton’s focus on and explicitness about ‘OUR GOOD ACTIONS’ as opposed to ‘THEIR BAD ACTIONS’. One cannot notice a prevalence of positive lexicon collocated with ‘WE’, like in “But the United States stands very clearly on the side of peaceful protest, nonviolent resolution, political reform” (Mar. 16’.11 Ap. B, p. 5). Indeed, Clinton selects positive words to present the USA, such as adjectives ‘peaceful’ and ‘nonviolent’ and noun phrases ‘resolution’ and ‘reform’. Moreover, Clinton selects negative words for ‘THEM’, like in “It’s very true that many governments attempt to squeeze civil society into this... punishing people, harassing them, beating them, imprisoning them for what they are” (Dec. 6.12 Ap. B, p. 41). In fact, Clinton uses words that imply negative connotations, such as the verb ‘squeeze’ and the gerund ‘punishing’, ‘harassing’, ‘beating’ and ‘imprisoning’. This builds a very negative images schemas about non-democratic governments.

The third group includes countries in transitions, in this case, Tunisia a s a model. The discursive strategies are used to positively present countries in transitions. In the whole corpus, Clinton opts for different persuasive strategies to convince audiences about the benefits of democratic changes. Apart from the positive representation of Tunisia’s revolution and its democraticization process, Clinton mitigates its drawbacks, like in “We are very aware of the challenges that come with the kind of transitions. You cannot create jobs or economic opportunities overnight” (Feb. 28’.11 Ap. B, p. 2). Clinton’s emphasis on friendship and cooperation between the US and Tunisia to promote democratic transitions in the region. At the socio-cognitive level, Tunisians are prototypically framed as struggling youths protesting for human rights and democracy. One can infer from the following example: “Let us be sure that we support these new democracies” (July.1.11 Ap. B, p. 16). Figure 2 illustrates the relations between social groups in Clinton’s discourse:
Figure 2. Rightness-WrongnessProximity-Remoteness Scale

Inspired by Chilton’s (2004) scale, figure 2 demonstrates that ‘WE’ and friends, allies and countries in democratic transitions, or ‘INSIDERS’, are collocated with positive words, like ‘right’ and ‘good’. However, ‘THEY’, referring to anti-democratic countries or ‘OUTSIDERS’, are depicted negatively by allocating pejorative words, like ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’. Likewise, ‘WE’ or the SELF is located in the CENTRE of the image schema. ‘THEY’ or our friends are NEAR, whereas ‘THEY’ or our enemies are marginalized in the PERIPHERY. Hence, RIGHTNESS and PROXIMITY are the characteristics of groups like ‘us’, while WRONGNESS and REMOTENESS are the aspects of groups that are different from ‘us’.

5. Discussion

To start with, one can note that ‘think’ is a predicate that performs a mental act. It endorses a judgment, an evaluation, an opinion. Such a judgment reveals the perspective or point of view of the speaker. It is the mirror that reflects the speaker’s perception of the real as well as fictitious worlds. It shows how the discourse emitter understands and interprets events and entities around her. ‘Think’ foregrounds information and explicitly reveals the propositional content of the utterance. ‘Think’ expresses the attitude of the speaker clearly, leaving no doubt on the part of the hearer. Its direct and subjective way to convey personal as well as group thoughts and opinions about particular issues. Its signal is great deal of speaker involvement. Such strong personal involvement unveils the speaker’s perception of events, entities and issues and her mental or epistemic state. In sum, the predicate ‘think’ reveals the speaker’s personal thoughts and her own views, hence her personal values and attitudes.

Since ‘know’ is a primary verb that expresses the speaker’s knowledge, it is used to claim the objectivity and reliability of information. It is also a factive verb that takes a complement clause. The truth conditionality of the proposition is presupposed by the addresser. Indeed, what is presupposed is presented as taken for granted. The proposition is introduced as previous knowledge that is personal or shared by an epistemic community. Such past knowledge seems to be unchallengeable and irrefutable by discourse participants since it is not the speaker’s personal point of view or her biased attitude towards events. The use of the factive predicate ‘know’ means that the proposition is based on evidence, or given by a reliable source. Assuch, knowledge is not a matter of doubt or controversy because it is shared and accepted by all group members.

‘Know’ is a typical factive verb that triggers factive presupposition, while ‘think’ is a typical verb that encodes epistemic modality. Presupposition is always restricted to non-asserted true propositions, while epistemic modality asserts the propositional content of utterances. In whole, the features that embed presupposed, factual information are 94 items, compared to 104 features that describe the epistemic commitment of the speaker to the truth of such information. Whether they encode facts or opinions, both factive

Onehastodemystify thelinkbetweenepistemicmodalityandpresupposition. One can highlight thatwhenthespeakerusesmentalstate verb, shehas evidence that leads sherto expresspessimicinvolvementinthe truthof the proposition. Forinstance, in “Butthethinkofhowmanypeopleneedthishelprightnow” (6.12-12\pB,p.41), Clintonuseseither imperatives or performative recipients to perform mental acts. Asking recipients to think about people who need help presupposes an evident value ofThus, activepresuppositions are based onepistemic evidence. Thesame can be noted about the epistemic modal adversive in the following example: “But theUnitedStatesstandsveryclearlyonthesideofpeacefulprotest, nonviolentresolution, politicalreform” (16’3.11\ApB,p.5). Themodaladverb ‘clearly’ rejectsthe doubt that the proposition can be false. Hence, pigvena presupposedknowledge. Clinton presupposes because she has evidence of it. An otherexample of presuppositions, triggered by epistemic modality, isthe following: “But thepeoplewho are e ected havetoalso respecttheirpeople. And that is true whetheritis a Christianparty, a Hinduparty, or a Muslimparty” (25.2.12\ApB,p.22). Theepistemic adjective ‘true’ evaluates the truth value of the proposition. Clinton relies on her previous, personal knowledge to introduce pasactive, presupposed knowledge. In short, epistemic modal function as active presupposition triggers.

At this level, one has to emphasize the social and political dimensionsof Clinton’spersonalvalues andattitudes. They are selections or fragments of socio-cultural values and the systemsof attitudes. First, Clinton’s personalvalues through the translation of democratic societies’ values and principles, mainly human rights and democratic values. Second, Clinton’sattitudes mirror the US community’s perception, interpretation and evaluation of events and identities. In sum, personal cognition is influenced by social cognition. At the cognitive level, one can note that mental models and subjective interpretations of social situations. These mental frames are fragments of past experiences and previous knowledge, hence what is already stored in our memories about the real, perceptual world as well as what we internalize from the abstract, conceptual world. There retrieval and activation of such cognitive frames facilitate discourse production and understanding. Decoding these mental representations in discourse uncovers the speaker’s cognitive frames and the kind of mental models she stores via discourse and lexical features.

Clintons’ values and attitudes, manifested in discourse, reflect her ethics, convictions, evaluations and assessmentsof events and people. In the discourse, she unveilsthe speaker’sadoption of humanist values and her involvement in defending the rights of disadvantaged people, more specifically people who seek freedom and freedom of speech and opposition. The attitudes of the speaker have also been examined to reveal her very positive attitudes towards guaranteeing human rights and implementing democratic principles in Tunisia as a non-democratic country. In general, similar positive attitudes have been noticed towards countries in transition that seek democratic change. However, Clinton’s negative attitudes towards dictators, oppressors and the opponents of democracy and human rights is obvious. These values and attitudes mirror Clinton’s perceptual world, how she grasps events and from what perspectives she makes evaluative judgments. After discussing the main results obtained at the discursive and cognitive analytical stages, one has to discuss the main findings obtained at the social level of VanDijk’s (1995) triangular approach. It has been shown how group relations are based on ideological differences. Clinton’s perceptual world is divided into ‘WE’, ‘friends’ or ‘pro-democratic countries’ and ‘THEY’, ‘enemies’ or ‘anti-democratic countries’. Relations between ‘WE’ and ‘pro-democracy’, more specifically relations between the USA and Tunisia, are based on friendship, cooperation, solidarity and collaboration at different levels. However, relations with ‘THEY’ or ‘OTHERS’ are negative and based on hostility since they have different socio-political norms, identities, interests and goals. These relations are also based on enmity, conflict, opposition, belligerence and contrasting agendas.
Polarization occurs when a dichotomy of 'US' vs. 'THEM' portrays adversarial, conflicting or evil ideologies based on the American system of beliefs and values. It has been found out, in this regard, that constructively the world involves a process of ordering the world in terms of four categories, organizing and classifying it and actively bringing it under control in some way. This means that when we encounter the other, we actively assimilate and transform it in terms of our categories of understanding. In the present study, Clinton classifies non-democratic countries and countries in transition according to her perception of the world as well as the US norms and values. We understand and evaluate the other in terms of our standpoint or perspective. As such, in processing any discourse, people position other entities in their world by positioning these entities in relation with themselves.

It can be stated, in this regard, that language users engage in text and talk as members of multiple social categories. They display social identities in discourse. At the micro level, it has been noticed that, at the discourse level, there are conflicts of interests between democrats and non-democrats to promote their agendas and values. Struggle for gender equality and religious freedom has also been observed in Hillary Clinton's political discourse. At the macro level, political institutions attempt to resolve conflicts of interest and work to ensure the power of dominant groups, in this case American democracy promoters. A powerful group may control the action and cognition of other groups by limiting the freedom of other to think and act. In short, modern effective power is mostly cognitive, and it is exerted via discourse.

6. Conclusion

One can recapitulate that attitudes are a mixture of personal opinions, derived from personal experiences or old models, and more general opinions, stored in the socially shared attitudes of some social groups and sub-groups. Although their general knowledge is constant, people construct different models representing different angles and points of view of the same entity. SRs control our construction of models, and thus, influence discourse production and understanding. As such, discourse can be considered as a mirror that reflects the speakers' attitudes. As these attitudes are rearranged around a core or cognitive concept, they are ego-centered because people evaluate entities according to their perspectives and norms.

One can also conclude that at the discourse level, factive presupposition, and epistemic modality uncover the speaker's background knowledge, her perception of Tunisia's revolution and her conception of human rights and democracy. At the cognitive level, the discourse emitter's values, attitudes and mental models reflect the personal, social and political cognition of Hillary Clinton and her epistemic community. At the social level, group relations establish a mental map based on polarization, dividing the world into three spheres, mainly democracies, countries in transition and anti-democracies. As such, CDA, more specifically van Dijk's (1995) discourse-cognition-society triangle, has demystified Clinton's perceptual and conceptual worlds discursively, cognitively and socially.

The major contribution of the current research is that it provides needed evidence on the link between factive presupposition and epistemic modality and the role in building the epistemic world of the speaker. This study sheds more light on the personal, social and political cognition of politicians. This, however, leads to investigating whether factive presupposition and epistemic modality express 'de-facto' factual knowledge, or whether they are used by politicians to just promote or sell ideological assumptions in political discourse?

References

Appendix A

Clinton’s Attitudes towards Human Rights and American Value

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