Hegelian Analytic Philosophy According to P. Redding
Agemir Bavaresco, Andrew Cooper

Abstract
The classic analytic tradition has often made the error of associating idealism with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Yet in terms of the German Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he described himself as an “immaterialist”. According to Paul Redding, this error made by the classic analytic tradition warrants a reconsideration of the German Idealismus. The aim of this paper is to argue that, through reference to the work of Paul Redding, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents Idealismus as that which reconciles objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. Hegel’sPhenomenology develops this idea in the elaboration of a remarkably novel theory of consciousness. For Hegel, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are a dialectical movement between consciousness and the object, or immediacy and mediacy. The whole movement of consciousness manifests the logic of contradiction working at the back of phenomenological experience that Hegel outlines in the Science of Logic, a logic that involves the thinker becoming consciously aware of her own thought processes. Yet Hegel’s Logic is different from the common meaning of ‘logic’. His Logic is not a formal approach to valid inference but captures the method and the moments and movement of logic. For Hegel, the great problem of classical logic is the immobility of the categories. This paper proposes thatHegel’s ‘holism’entails the description wherein Logic, Nature, and Spirit are articulated as a whole in dialectical movement.

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