International Journal of Humanities and Social Science

ISSN 2220-8488 (Print), 2221-0989 (Online) 10.30845/ijhss

Efficiency and Effectiveness in Public Sector Auditing: An Evaluation of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Performance in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2012
Mr. Tawanda Zinyama

The study examines the Government Auditing in Zimbabwe in particular the performance of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The study argues that the legislative framework has a bearing on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s performance. Within this context, the study sought to achieve the following objectives: firstly, critical analysis of the relevant legislative framework and its bearing on the auditing of government accounts and secondly, identification and analysis of the causes and effects of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The study revealed that the legislative framework has numerous loopholes. The Constitution of Zimbabwe; and the Public Finance Management Act Chapter 22:19 and Audit Office Act Chapter 22:18 that repealed the Audit and Exchequer Act Chapter 22:18 do not give the CAG’s Office any sanction powers to compel Ministers, departments and other public agencies to observe and comply with the Treasury instructions. The following factors influence the independence of the CAG in Zimbabwe: appointment procedures, removal procedures, nature of tenure, financial autonomy and the ability to employ staff. In addition, the study notes that the current state of audits and reports is unsatisfactory. The CAG’s Office could not produce annual reports for tabling during the period 2000 and 2007. The study revealed the following challenges being encountered by the CAG’s office: gaps in the enabling legal instruments, unattractive remuneration, lack of sanction powers and budgetary constraints. The study’s recommendations include changes in the appointment procedures of the CAG, amendment of the enabling legislation, improvement of the staffing and remuneration system which would enforce independence of the CAG.

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